VIEW

OF

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

PHILOSOPHY,

COMPLEAT.

In Four LETTERS to a FRIEND.

In which his whole System
Of Infidelity and Naturalism

I S

EXPOSED AND CONFUTED.

With the APOLOGY prefixed.

THE THIRD EDITION.

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PHILOSOPHY

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The Two First Letters:

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tolk to control with the second of the control of OON after the publication of the two first of these Letters I had the honour of an anonymous advertisement, in the warmest terms of friendship lamenting the displeature, which my treatment of Lord Bolingbroke had given to that part of the Public, where the Advertiser had an opportunity of making his observations.

There was in this friendly notice fo many fure marks of the Writer's regard to the Author of the View; fo much good fense, elegance, and weight of Authority in the composition; and the whole fo superior to every thing, but the force of plain and fimple truth, that I had as much pleasure in the honour of the admonition as I had real pain for the occasion.

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He assures me I shall never know from what hand it came: so that when such a Writer will remain unknown, it is foolish as well as indecent to presume to guess.

Yet I am very confident that a Friend so generous could never intend, by keeping himself out of sight, to deprive me of the means of vindicating my conduct to him. I am rather inclined to think, that, he took this method to oblige me to convey my Apology to him, which he had a right to expect, thro' the hands of that Public, which appear to have none: and which yet, I am persuaded, it was his principal concern, I should first satisfy. For I must inform my Reader, that the severe reflexions, I am about to quote, are not his proper sentiments, but the sentiments of those whom he is pleased to honour with the name of the Public.

They are introduced in this manner: I am grieved to the heart to find the reception your two Letters meet with from the World.—I am very fure he is; and so, I think, must every good man be; and more for the sake of that World than for mine. For what must an indifferent person think of a World, by profession, Christian, of so exceeding delicate a feeling as to be less scandalized at three or sour bulky volumes of sed hot Impiety, because they come from a Lord,

LORD, than at the cool contempt of such an infult, in a Defender of the Religion of his Country, because he may be a poor Priest or an ignoble Layman? Will not every impartial man lament with me so abject a state of things, as that must be, where atheistic principles give less offence to our politeness, than ill manners; and where, in good Company you may be better received with the plague-sore upon you, than the itch?

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It vexes me (fays the anonymous writer) to bear so many positively deciding that the Writer must be - by the SCURRILITY and abuse. The term is a little strong. But the best of it is, that it is one of those words the Public think themselves at liberty to apply indifferently, either to scandalous abuse or to honest reproof, just as they happen to be disposed to the Author, or the Subject. The equity of this kind of judgment, for readily passed upon Authors, had been sufficiently apparent in the case of one much more considerable than the Author of the View. The Author of the Divine Legation of Moses composed a book in support of Revelation; and sensible that the novelty of his Argument would give the . alarm, and bring down whole bands of Answerers upon him, he did all he could to invite fair quarter. He publickly engaged that a candid,

and ingenuous Adversary should never repent him of his civility. Answerers, as he foresaw, came down in abundance: but it was not his hap to meet with one who treated him with common good manners. Of about a hundred of thefe writers, One or two, and no more, he thought fit to answer; and, (who can wonder?) without much ceremony. This was in the heat of controversy, when his resentments were fresh; and the injury aggravated by every circumstance of . the lowest malice and most bare faced misreprefentation. Since that time to the present, a course of many years, he has seen these miserable railers, fome with names, and fome without, go on in all the nonfense and billingsgate with which they fet out. Yet tho' he has feen all this, and without any other marks of refentment than a contemptuous filence, he could not escape the character of a scurrilous and abusive Writer. It was in vain to appeal to his provocations then, or to his forbearance ever fince.

But to return to the Author of the View. He was detected, it seems, by his fourrility and abuse. Surely there must be some mistake, and my Lord's own dirt imputed to his Answerer. The Author of the View seems to be in the case of a Sca-

Scavenger, (his enemies, I hope, will take no offence at the comparison) who may not indeed be overclean while at such fort of work; but it would be hard to impute that stink to him, which is not of his making, but of his removing.

The Letters are universally read; and it is almost universally agreed that Lord Bolingbroke de-Served any treatment from You, both as a man per-Sonally ill used by him, and a member of that OR-DER, WHICH HE HAS TREATED IN THE LIKE MANNER: ___In a Law of Vespasian, we read, Non oportere maledici Senatoribus; remaledici, civile fasque eft. And the equity of it feems here to be allowed. But I will claim no benefit from the Authority of Vespasian, nor even from that which I more reverence, my anonymous Friend's. The truth is, that nothing personal ever once entered into my thoughts while I was writing those two Letters. Had that been the case, it would rather have been the fubject of my vanity, than my refentment. For nothing could be more glorious for an obscure writer of these dark and cold days, than to find himself treated in the same manner with the greatest and most famous of the golden Ages of antient and modern Literature.

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But (fays the anonymous letter) it may dishenour a Gentleman and a Clergyman to give him that treatment he deserved, especially after his death. It is falling into the VERY FAULT for justly objected to him : every body would have applauded your selecting those instances of his railing, arrogance, and abuse, had not you followed his example. This Public then takes it for granted, that treating a licentious Writer as HE DESERVES, may disponour a Gentleman and a Clergyman. Here, I think, we should distinguish. When the thing concerns only the civil interests of Particulars, a Gentleman has but little provocation for unufual feverity of language, and less right to personal reflexion, especially on one of superior Quality. But when the highest of our religious interests are attacked, the interests not of this man, nor of that; not of this Community, nor the other; but of our common Nature itfelf; and where the People are appealed to, and invited to be Judges, there, I think, all paultry. distinctions of Title cease, they vanish before so. great an object, and every Gentleman who loves his Religion and his Country should take the quarrel on himself, and repel the insult with all his vigour. there bourflesses and the "When True or Vertes an affront endures,
"Th'affront is mine, my Friend, and should be yours.
Pore.

The manners of a Clergyman, if they are to be distinguished from the manners of a Gentleman, consist in Zeal for God, and Charity towards Man. The occasion will sometimes call out one, sometimes the other: they may be exerted separately, but never at one another's expence; for they are disposed by Nature to be joint promoters of the common good: as in the case before us, I presume to say, a zeal for God is the greatest Charity to Man.

Now when Opinions of that kind, which the View of L. Bolingbroke's Philosophy exposes, proceed to their extreme, not to consute them in terms either of horror or ridicule, for sear of transgressing the civil maxims of politeness, would be like that Preacher, the Poet speaks of, who scrupled to mention Hell before his audience at Court.

If then, amongst the Christian duties, there be a force to be exerted against Deceivers, as well as a patience to be observed in compassion to those who are missed; and that the occasion before us was not a time for vigor-

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ous measures; I desire to know when this time comes?

When men are fincere in their mistakes, after a diligent and candid fearch; when the fubject is of small moment, such as the mode of discipline, the measure of conformity, or a distinction in Metaphysics; the mistaken, and even the perverse should be treated with tenderness. But when the avowed end of a Writer is the destruction of Religion in all its forms; when the means he employs, are every trick of prevarication and ill faith; and every term of scurrility and abuse; when, to use the expression of Cicero, est inter nos non de terminis, sed de tota possessione contentio, Then, a practifed calmness and an affected management look like betraying the Cause we are intrusted to defend; or, what is almost as ill, like defending it in that way only which may turn most to our private advantage: As where, in questions of the greatest moment, we comply with this fashionable indifference; or flatter it into a Virtue; when we should have striven to rekindle the dying sparks of Religion by a vigorous collision with its profefsed Enemies, whose faces (to use the unpolite

language of the Prophet) are barder than a Rock [1].

Men who have had Christianity indeed at heart have never been disposed, in capital cases like the present, to spare or manage the Offend-When the incomparable STILLING-FLEET undertook to expose the enormity of the Court of Rome, in turning the dispensation of the word into a lucrative trade, he profecuted the controverfy with fo much vigour of flyle and fentiment, as to be reviled by those who found themselves affected by it, with the names of Buffoon and Comedian. The Servant of the Lord (said they) must not strive, but be gentle unto all men; in meekness instructing those who oppose themselves. An answer equally apt and satisfactory. Without doubt, offenders would find themselves much at their ease, when fecure from the refentment of the Laws, they, understand they have nothing to fear from the animadversion of the Learned.

But this leads me to another confideration, which may further justify the Author of the View, in the account he has given of this relent-less Enemy of RELIGION and SOCIETY.

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The English Government, secure in the divinity of that Religion which it hath established, and jealous of that Liberty which at fo much expence it hath procured, doth now, with a becoming consciousness of the superiority of Truth and Reason think fit to suffer this, and many other writings, (tho' none fo criminal in the form and manner, to pass thro' the Press, into the hands of the People; writings, in which not only the Institutions of positive and national Worship have been insulted, but even those very GROUNDS OF NATURAL RELIGION, Which hitherto have been esteemed the bond of civil Society, as they inforce obedience on the principle of Conscience. A bond, which no Nation under heaven but our own have ever fuffered to be brought in question : because no Nation. but our own, has a perfect confidence in Truth, or is in perpetual alarm for Liberty. thoughted nothing to that from the

But do flagitious Writers therefore become more privileged or respectable? Or rather, Is there not the greater need that those evils, which the Public cannot redress, should at least be checked and opposed by a private hand? Why do the civil Laws of all other Nations interfere to punish these offenders, but to pre-

vent the mischiefs of their writings? Why are not the fame Laws put in execution here, but from the experience, or, at least, from a forelight, that recourse to them has been, or may prove, injurious to public Liberty & However, the end is confessed to be of the utmost importance, tho' thefe means may be thought incommon What is left then, but to use others of a private nature, where no ill consequences are derived to any but to the Infrument employed in the correction of these evils? Now the mischief done by licentious Writers is from their credit with the People. If their credit be undeserved, the way lies open for the Defender of Religion. to lesien it, either by Ridicule or serious expostulation. The Author of the View preferred the first. He thought it more effectual; for now-adays, Folly discredits more than Impiety: He thought it more generous; for he had no defign. of bringing in the Magistrate to second his arguments. Nor is he one of those impertments. who are for directing Authority, or who think there is any need of fuch as him,

"To virtue's work, to urge the tardy Hall,

"Or good the Prelate flumb'ring in his Stall.

He rather thinks it becomes him to follow their example. The Convocation, in their late address to his Majesty, lament the depra-

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pravity of our times, evidenced beyond all former examples, by the publication of writings which strike at the very vitals of all Religion and shake the foundations of civil Government. Yet they are fo far from throwing the scandal on the State, or calling out upon the civil Magistrate for redrefs, that, as if they even respected the stander of their Enemies, they engage themselves to his Majesty to exert themselves to the utmost, ta maintain the honour of our most holy faith. Let no one therefore take offence, that a private man has adventured to lend his hand to that work which the whole body of the Clergy hath, with fo much glory to themselves, engaged to undertake. migrion. Lac d'urior d'

But his Lordship's death is a further objection to the manner in which his writings are treated.

Cuperem ipse Parens spectator adesset!

Had these Essays been published during his life, and had the Author of the View deferred his remarks upon them, in expectation of this good time, the censure might appear to have its weight. But what shall we say if his Lordship was publicly invited to give his Philosophy to the world, by the promise of a speedy answer?

If a Writer's death may skreen his Works from the treatment they would deserve in his life, he has a very effectual way to secure both his Person and his Principles, from disgrace. Yet, where this is mentioned as an aggravation, it is confessed that in these posthumous Works published by his Lordship's direction, the Author of the View is abused in the groffest manner. Now, what is faid in discredit of a living Writer, and by one of his Lordship's Authority in politics and letters, may prove a real injury: The harm to a dead Writer is but imaginary. This is only faid to shew, that had the Author of the View retaliated, as he never had it in his thoughts, the return had been still short of the provocation.

But He commits the VERY FAULT objected to Lord Bolingbroke—and in selecting the instances of his railing and arrogance he follows his Lord-ship's example. — This would be weighed. Lord Bolingbroke has, in the most contemptuous manner, reviled almost all the Wise and Virtuous of antient and modern times. He has railed at the primitive Saints; the modern Doctors, the whole body of the Christian Clergy; and, in a word, the whole race of Mankind; which, ever since Religion came amongst us, deserves,

deserves, he says, to be considered in no other light than as one great aggregate of Lunatics. He has abused Moses and Paul; he has ridiculed the Son, and blasphemed the FATHER. Here is another Writer, who by his fourrility and abuse is judged no other than-and what has he done? He has fallen into the fame foult, and followed his example. What, Has he likewife railed at all the Good, the Virtuous, and the Pious? Has he likewise had the arrogance to fay, that the World was one great Bedlam? Has he likewise blasphemed his Creator and Redeemer ? Alas! no. Two fuch Writers would be too much for one age! And yet, what less can justify this Public in saying, that the Author of the View has fallen into the fame fault with Lord Bolingbroke, and followed his example? All he has done is occasionally telling the World, That his Lordship, once in his life, was for bringing in Popery and the Pretender; and is now for introducing Naturalism, a more specious form of Atheism: that he is overrun with paffion and prejudice: that heunderstands little or nothing of the subjects he handles, which yet he treats with fovereign contempt: that his learning is superficial, his reasoning sophistical, and his declamation

tion inflated: and that, if ever Religion should happen to regain its hold on the People, his Philosophic works will run the hazard of being applied to the lowest and vilest uses. This is the substance of what he has said. And if this be falling into the same fault, and following his Lordship's example, the Author of the View, for aught I can perceive, must be content to plead guilty.

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But we will suppose, the manner of writing only, as feparated from the fubject, is here to be understood. Is the railing at all Mankind; at all Religion; at God Almighty himself, but of the same species of writing with His, who shall tell the world, that this Railer was once as much an Enemy to the Civil, as now to the Religious Constitution of his Country; that he reasons ill, and that he declaims worse? Did the politeness of a Clergyman or a Gentleman require, under pain of being matched with his Lordship in railing and arrogance, that, after the Author of the View had quoted all his Lordship's horrors in principle and expreffion, he should have added, "This, good " People, is the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which is to be substituted amongst you, in the place of Religion. But take me along with -510 " you:

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" you; Tho' this, indeed, be the bane and co poison of your HOPEs; tho' it reduce Hu-" manity to the most disconsolate and forlors condition, by depriving it of the MORAL " Ruler of the World, and by diffolving all " the ties of Civil Government; Yet, Cou-" rage! The Author was a man of diftinguished « Quality, of uncommon abilities, and of infi-" nite politeness. His great talents for Bufiness " enabled him to fee what was best for Society; his penetration into Philosophic matters, what was best for human Nature; and his profound. " knowledge of Divinity, what was best for "Both. He had governed States; he had in-" ftructed Kings; and this last great Book of Wisdom was the result of all his skill and experience." conditution Confirment

All this indeed I might have said: and, it is probable, a good deal of it I should have said, had the aim of my View been to recommend Myself; and to raise a reputation from the defeat of this mighty Man. Had this, I say, been my aim, the raising the character of an Adversary who was presently to fall by my hand, would hardly have been amongst the last of my Contrivances. But as I had another purpose, the

preventing the mischiefs of his Book, I took the different method of reducing his Authority to its just value; which, by having been over-rated, had prepared the way for the easy reception of his Opinions amongst a corrupt People.

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The Letters, says this Public, (whose sentiments have been, with so much real kindness, conveyed unto me) purport to be a View of Lord Bolingbtoke's Philosophy. They are a view of his life, morals, politics, and conversation. It may be true and just. But that is not the question. Whether be made a good treaty, or wrote the Craftsman, neither concludes for nor against the divinity of the Christian Religion.

I readily confess, that, had Lord Bolingbroke's Morals and Politics nothing to do with his religious Principles, I had acted both an invidious and an idle part to bring in his Treaties and his Crastimen into a View of his Philosophy. But I held all these to be the various parts of the same System, which had contributed in support of one another to produce a Whole.—I can believe he found it for his ease in retirement, to adhere still closer to a set of Principles, which having forwarded his Practice, enabled him to bear the retrospect of it's effects: but I am much mista-

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ken if he did not begin the World with his notions of God and the Soul; hence his rounds of business and amusements.

"Now all for Pleasure; now for Church and State.

The rest sollowed in course. For, as Cicero well observes, Cum enim DECRETUM proditur, Lex veri rectique proditur: quo a vitio et AMI-CITIARUM proditiones, et RERUM PUBLICA-RUM, nasci solent.

But this is not all. I beg leave to fay, there was not only a close connexion between his Principles and his Practice, but that it was necessary to a just defence of Religion against him, to take notice of that connexion.

One of his Lordship's pretended purposes, in his Philosophic Essays, was to detect the abuses brought into the Christian Religion by a CORRUPT CLERGY: My aim in this View was to expose a species of Atheism, inculcated on the ruin of all Religion by an IMPIOUS LAYMAN.

Not that I place my justification on his example; that, indeed, would be confirming the charge I am endeavouring to refute; neither would I in-

I infift upon the right of retaliation; for, tho' that be fomething a better plea, it is the last which a Writer for Truth would willingly have recourse to. I quote his Lordship's method with perfect approbation, as that which right reason preferibes to all who propose the detection of erfor and impolture. His Lordfhip's point, as we faid, was to fliew, that the Clergy had corrupted the purity and simplicity of Religion. It is not my defign to inquire with what ingenuity he has represented the Fact, or how justly he has deduced the Confequences, which he pretends have rifen from it. He has shewn some corruptions; he has imagined more; and dreffed up the rest of his catalogue out of his own invention; all which, he most unreasonably offers as a legitimate prejudice against Religion itself. Well, be it fo, that the Clergy are convicted of abuse and imposture. The question, which every one is ready to ask, who thinks himself concerned to enquire into the truth of the fact, is, cut sono? What END had the Clergy to ferve by these conruptions? His Lordfhip thinks the question reafonable, and is ready to reply. That they had a wicked antichriftian Yoke to impose upon the necks of Mankind: in order to which, they contrived to introduce fuch kind of conventions into Religion

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Religion as best tended to pervert men's understandings, to intimidate their wills, and to impress upon their consciences, an awe and reverence for their spiritual Tyrants. The answer is satisfactory, and shews the use of this method of detecting error. With his rhetorical exaggerations, with the extension of his list of corruptions, with his ridiculous inferences, I have, at present, no concern.

As the Author of the Essays had, what he called, a tyrannical Hierarchy to unmask; so, the Author of the View had, what he called, a declared, an impious, an outrageous Enemy of all Religion to expose. I believe they are both rightly named. Now, as errors to be detected, we must trace them to their source; and as errors influencing practice, we shall find their original to be in VICE.

His Lordship had publickly and openly, in his respectable Character of a Nobleman, a STATESMAN, and a PHILOSOPHER, declared Religion to be all a Cheat, supported only by Knaves and Madmen; which indeed was a large Party, fince, by his own account, it takes in the whole body of Mankind. His Lordship had been held

held up to the People [2] as an ALL ACCOM-PLISHED Perfonage, full and complete in every endowment of civil and moral Wifdom: And the enchanting vehicle in which his triumphant Character was conveyed, had made it received, even against the information of our senses. A PUBLIC thus prejudiced, would, on such a representation of his Lordship's religious principles as his Effays contain, and the View collects together, be ready to ask " could so sublime a Genius be disposed to deprive himself, and us, of all those bleffings which Religion promises, had he not discovered, and been perfectly affured, that the whole was a delufion; and therefore in pity to Mankind, had broke the Charm, which kept them from feeing their present good, in fond expectation of a recompence in the shadowy regions of futurity?" We fay, deprive himfelf, for he feems fufficiently vext, and fenfible of his disappointment, when awaked from the pleasing dream of a life to come. There is no one thought (fays his Lordship) which sooths my mind like this: I encourage my IMAGINATION to pursue it, and am heartily afflicted when ANO-THER FACULTY of the intellect comes boisterously

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^[2] See the fourth Ep. of the Effay on Man, and the great Poet's other Works.

(eff.)

in, and WAKES me from fo pleasing a dream, if it be a dream [3]."--- In this manner I supposed, that they, for whose use the View was intended, were disposed to argue; I mean that part of them who yet retain any concern for another life; and who have not thrown off, together with their Guides, all thoughts of their journey thither. Now, against this dangerous prejudice, the Defender of Religion was to provide. He was first to remove their delution concerning Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophic Character; and to thew, that he had none of those talents of Reasoning, of Learning, or Philosophy which are necessary to qualify a man to decide on so important a Question. But this opposed only one half of their prejudice. They could by no means be brought to think that so good a Man, so benevolent a Citizen, so warm a friend to Mankind, as his Lordship's Effays represent him, could be lightly willing to forego that great bond of Society, that great support of Humanity, RELIGION. Advocate of Religion therefore, unless he would betray his cause, was obliged to shew, that the Social light, in which his Lordship puts himself, and in which he had been placed by his poetical Friend, was a false one; that his moral virtues

[3] slill Letter to Swift in Pope's Works, Vol. ix.

were the counterpart of his religious principles; And public virtue (according to his favourite Cicero) embracing and comprehending all the private [4], it was to the purpose of such a desence, to shew, that his Lordship had been a BAD CITIZEN.

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Now tho' Religion has the strongest allurements for the Good and Virtuous, it abounds with objects of affright and terror to the profligate and abandoned; who, in fuch circumstances, have but this for their relief, Either to part with their Vices, or their Religion. All the world knows his Lordship's choice. He himself tells us, it was made on the conviction of Reason; others think, by the delution of his Passions. The World is to determine; and that they might judge with knowledge of the case, the Author of the View attempted to obviate the latter part of this popular prejudice; which would not fuffer them to conceive any reason short of demonstration, that could induce a man in his fenses to part with the foothing confolation of futurity, as his Lordship so justly calls it.

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^[4] Omnes omnium Charitates PATRIA una complexa eff.

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And now, I suppose, every candid Reader will allow, at least I am sure the candid Writer of the anonymous Letter will allow, that his Lord-ship's Morals and Politics come within the view of his Philosophy; where the question is of the TRUTH OF FALSHOOD of Religion; and of his Lordship's AUTHORITY to decide in it.

To sum up this Argument: His Lordship descents on Ramish superstition; the Author of the View, on his Lordship's Philasophy: Not to shew for what and the one was established, or by what means the other was produced, is relating Facts without their Causes; which the Writer on the use of history justly throws into the class of unprofitable things: and therefore his Lordship, speaking of the corruptions brought by the Clergy, into Religion, accounts for them by a aperit of dominion; and the Author of the View speaking of his Lordship's religious principles, reminds the Reader of his moral profe, and was, besides, notorious to all mankind.

Lord Bolingbroke (says this Public) deserved every thing of you; but who are those friends and admirers of his, whom you represent applauding all he wrote; whom you bring in unnecessarily upYou had better have named them.

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change his mind, and give thole killings to the As unexceptionable perhaps as that liberty might have been thought, I should certainly have ventured on it, had I conceived it possible for the Reader to understand, by such friends and admirers, any of those few illustrious Persons. whom Lord Bolingbroke's politeness, his distance from business, his knowledge of the world, and, above all, his ambition to be admired, occasionally brought into his acquaintance; and who gave dignity and reputation to his retirement. The Chief of these I have the honour to know, and the pleasure of being able to inform those who do not, that they were so far from being in the principles of his Philosophy. that some of them did not so much as know what those Principles were; and those who did, gave him to understand, how much they detested them. Indeed, nothing but this Fact, which I here affert on my own knowledge, can account for the disposition in his Will, concerning his Philosophic papers. And were it only for the fake of this fair occasion, of explaining myself, I could readily excuse all the hard thoughts this Public feems to have entertained of me. As to b 2 the Man

the friends and admirers who applauded all he wrote, I meant those who persuaded him to change his mind, and give those Essays to the Public, which he had over and over declared were only for the inspection of a Few; and which those Few had given him to understand, were fit for no body's inspection at all. Nay he seems willing the World should know to whom it was indebted for this benefit, by his letting those places in his Essays stand, where he declares his own opinion of their unsituals for general communication.

But what grieves and hurts your friends most (says this Public) is still behind. Poor Pope did not deserve to be treated by you with so much cruelty, contempt, and injustice. In a work where Lord Bolingbroke is represented as a Monster, hated both of God and Man, Why is Pope always and unnecessarily brought in, only as his friend and admirer? Why as approving of, and privy to all that was addressed to him? Why should be, who had many great talents, and amiable qualities, be described only by the slighting Epithets of tuneful and poetical. You say, Pope announced the glad tidings of all these things. In what work can be be said to have done it, except in his Essay on Man?

Man? This is throwing a reflexion on the excellent Commentary on that Essay.

The Editor of Pope's Works certainly thought with this generous Animadverter, that the great Poet deferved every thing of his Friends. For he tells us "That to have been one of the greatest Poets in the World was but his fecond praife; that " Pope was in a higher Class. He was one of the noblest works of God: He was an bonest Man. " A man who alone poffeffed more real virtue than, in very corrupt times, needing a Satyrist " like him, will fometimes fall to the share of His filial piety, his difinterested " multitudes. " friendships, his reverence for the constitution of his Country, his love and admiration of " Virtue, and (what was the necessary consequence) his hatred and contempt of Vice, his extensive Charity to the indigent, his warm " benevolence to Mankind, his supreme veneration of the Deity, and above all, his fincere belief of Revelation, (the Editor tells us) " shall, amongst other things, be the subject of the history of his Life. Non (fays he) SHALL " HIS FAULTS BE CONCEALED. It is not for " the interests of his Virtues that they should. "Nor indeed could they be concealed if we b 3 miration

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n ? " were fo minded, for they shine thro' his vir-

" tues; no man being more a dupe to the Specious

" appearance of Virtue in others [5]."

But then, who it was that treated poor Pope with eruelty, contempt, and injustice, Lord Bolingbroke, or the Author of the View, let this Public themselves judge; and, by their freedom from passion and resentment, at a time when a friend would be most hurs, they appear well qualified to judge

impartially.

When, on the publication of the Patriot King, Lord Bolingbroke did indeed use the memory of poor Pope with exceeding contempt, cruelty, and injustice, by representing him, in the Advertisement to the Public, as a busy ignorant interpolator of his works; a mercenary betrayer of his trust; a Miserable, who bartered all the friendship of his Philosopher and Guide, for a little paltry gain. Who was it then that manifested his burt and grief for poor Pope? Was it this Public! Or was it the Author of the Letter to Lord Bolingbroke, on that occasion?

But in what confifts the contempt, cruelty, and injustice of the View? The contempt is in the slighting epithets of tuneful and poetical: the Cruelty in giving instances of Pope's unbounded ad-

[5] See the Editor's Advertisement to his works.

miration

miration of Lord Bolingbroke; and the injustice in saying that he denounced the glad tidings of the first Philosophy, and that he approved and was privy to all that was addressed to him.

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My using the epithets of tuneful and poetical, in speaking of a man who had many superior qualities, was, I humbly conceive, well suited to the occasion. It is where I speak of Pope as an idolatrous admirer of Lord Bolingbroke: and they aptly insinuate what I would have them mean, that, Judgment had there nothing to do; but all was to be placed to the friendly extravagance of a poetical Imagination. Who could fairly gather more from it, than that my intention was to place his Lordship's ingratitude, and Mr. Pope's idolatry side by side, in order to their fetting off one another?

But cruelty is added to contempt, in the instances I give of Pope's unbounded admiration. I am verily persuaded, had Pope lived to see Lord Bolingbroke's returns of friendship, as well in his Lordship's usual conversation, [6] as in the advertisement to the Patriot King, he would have been amongst the first to have laughed at his own delusions, when this treatment of him had

[6] See the conclusion of the fourth Letter. of their

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he would have been ready to laugh with a Friend, who should chuse to turn them into ridicule. For he held this to be amongst the offices of friend-ship, to laugh at your friend's foibles till you brought him to laugh with you;

"Laugh at your Friends; and if your Friends be fore,
"So much the better, you may laugh the more."

as implying, that, while they continued fore, they continued to hand in need of this friendly operation.

My injustice confists in supposing Pope was privy to all that was addressed to him. An injuflice indeed, had I supposed any such thing; I, who with greater certainty than most men, can affirm, that he was privy to nothing of the fecret, but the defign of the Address, and the preliminary Discourses. So little did Pope know of the Principles of the first Philosophy, that when a common Acquaintance, in his last illness, chanced to tell him of a late conversation with Lord Bolingbroke, in which his Lordship took occasion to deny God's moral attributes as they are commonly understood, he was so shocked that he did not rest till he had asked Lord Bo-DECE lingbroke

ngbroke whether his informer was not miftaken? His Lordship affured him, he was; of which, Pope with great fatisfaction informed his. Friend. Under this ignorance of his Lordship's real fentiments it was, that Pope gave easy credit to him, when he vapoured that he would demon-Arate all the common Metaphysics to be wicked and abominable [7]. And this leads me to that part of the charge, where it is faid, I could only mean the Essay on Man, by the glad tidings of the first Philosophy. I meant a very different thing ; and alluded to the following passages in his LFT-TERS. Do not laugh at my Gravity, but permit me to wear the beard of a Philosopher, till I pull it off, and make a jest of it myfelf ... Tis just what my Lord Bolingbroken'is doing with METAPHYT sice. I hope you will live to fee, and flore at the learned figure he will make on the same Shelf with Locke and Malebranche [8] And again, Lord Boling broke is voluminous, but he is voluminous only to destroy volumes. I shall not live, I fear, to see that work printed [9]. Where, by the way, his fancy that this METAPHYSICS was deout have ingeniously telepa

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bongil that he not ein condensed but despried

^[7] Bolingbroke to Swift, Letter xlvili. Vol. ix.

^[8] Letter lxxi. Vol. ix.

figned for the public, shews he knew nothing of the contents. This then was what I meant. The Essay on Man I could not mean. For in the 55th page of the View, I make the fundamental doctrines of that Poem and of his Lordship's Essays to be directly opposite to one another. The one, a real Vindication of Providence against Libertines and Bigots: the other a pretended Vindication of it against an imaginary Confederacy between Divines and Atheists.

Thus I have explained, in the best manner I am able, my reasons for speaking of this great Poet in terms which give offence. But what shall we say, if this air of negligence to his memory was assumed, the better to conceal the Author of an anonymous Epistle? The motive fure was excusable; the the project was without effect: for this Public have positively decided, that the Author must be — by the scurrility and abuse.

But, Had you pursued (say they) the advantage you have ingeniously taken from an expression in one of Pope's Letters, to have shewn that Pope differed from Belingbroke where he was in the wrong; that he not only condemned but despised the sutility of his reasoning against Revelation; that that where he was right Pope improved but never fervilely copied his Ideas, you would have done ho nour to your Friend and Your self: you would have differed the cause of Religion: you would have differed ted Lord Bolingbroke the more by the contrast

Now all this, the Reader will see in the fourth Letter, I had actually done; and (as it was in it's place) fully and largely too. In the mean time, every body might see, it was what I was ready, on a fit occasion, to do, by the passage referred to just above from the second; where Pope is bonoured, and Lord Bolingbroke the more differedited by the contrast.

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But I must not leave this head without taking notice of one expression in the censure. It is said, that the View REPRESENTS L. Bolingbroke as a Monster hated both of God and Man. The expression had been juster, had it been — from the View it may be COLLECTED; because, whatever ideas Men may form of his Lordship from a perusal of the View, they arise from his Lordship's own words, which are faithfully quoted: What the Author of the View adds, is only a little harmless raillery, which can present the Reader with no idea but what (in the opinion b. 6.

of Pope) arises from every fruitless attempt of Impiety.

"Heav'n still with LAUGHTER the vain toil surveys,
"And buries madmen in the heaps they raise.

That the Author of the View affisted in the drefsing up so strange a sight, as a Monster bated both
by God and Man, was very far from his intention. He made a scruple of accompanying his
Lordship's quotations with those reflexions of
serious indignation which such a Scene of horrors naturally suggests, lest he should be thought
to aim at something more than private animadversion. He therefore generously endeavoured
to turn the public attention from the horror, to
the ridicule, of the first Philosophy, and to get
his Lordship well laughed at; as being persuaded, that when the Public is brought to that
temper, its resentment seldom rises to any considerable height.

Men had better speak out, and say, the Author of the View ought to have represented L. Bolingbroke as neither detestable, nor ridiculous. He could have wished, that his sense of honour and duty would have permitted him to have done so. He is neither a Fanatic, nor an Enthusiast,

thusiast, and perhaps still less of a Bigot. Yet there are occasions when the most sober, and candid thinker will confess, that the interests of Particulars should give way to those of the Public. It is true, there are others, when politenels, civil prudence, and the private motives of Friendship, ought to determine a man, who is to live in the world, to comply with the flate and condition of the times; and even to chuse the worse, instead of the better method of doing good. But his misfortune was that this did not appear to him to be one of those occasions, in which, when he had explained the Doctrines and Opinions of an erroneous Writer, he could leave them with this reflexion: " These are the "Writer's notions on the most important points " with regard to human happiness. They are " indeed very fingular and novel. But then " confider; the Writer was a great man, and " high in all the attainments of Wisdom; there-" fore weigh well and reverendly before you " condemn what I have here exposed to your " Judgment."-But had I, with a view to prudence, faid this. Would it have fecured me from OFFENCE, the very thing that PRUDENCE would most avoid? Would it not rather have furnished out another handle, a handle for the making me children. a con-

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a Confederate in his guilt, only a little better disguised? Had this happened, it would not have been the first time I had been so served, when endeavouring to avoid offence.

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And yet there was but one of these three ways; Either to laugh, to declaim, or to say nothing. I chose the first, as what I fancied least obnoxious; in which, however, I was mistaken; and as most likely to do good; in which, I still hope, I was not mistaken.

The only harm L. Bolingbroke, whose reputation of parts and wisdom had been raised so high, can possibly do, is amongst the PEOPLE. His objections against Religion are altogether of the popular kind, as we feel by the effects they have had, when used by their original Authors, long before his Lordship honored them with a place in his Effayr. What then was that Man to aim at, who had made it his bustnefs (indeed without being fet on work) to put a speedy stop to the mischief, and neither to palliate the doctrines, nor to compliment the Author of them, but to give a true and fuecinct representation of his System, in a popular way; to make a right use of that abundance, which the Essays and FRGMENTS afforded, to shew that his Lordship's Principles were as -1100 n foolish foolish as they were wicked; and that the Arruments used in support of them were as weak as they were bold and overbearing; that he was a pretender in matters of Learning and Philoforhy; and knew no more of the genius of the Gospel, than of that supposed corruption of it, which he calls, artificial Theology. This I imagined to be the only way to reach his Lordthip's AUTHORITY, on which all depended :: and then, the very weakest effort of ridicule would be able to do the reft. These were my motives for the method I laid down; and whatever impropriety there may be in divulging them. in a way that tends to defeat their end, it should, I think, be laid to the account of those who make this explanation necessary. Last vd batter

I have been the longer on this matter as it will serve for an answer to what follows.

Lord Bolingbroke (says this Public) is so universally and so justly obnoxious to all sorts and ranks of people, that from regard to bim, no body cares bow he is treated, but he assured your MANNER has destroyed all the merit of the work.

Tho' with regard to the manner I have said enough; yet the candid Reader, I am sure, will allow me to add a word or two Concerning the effect of an unacceptable manner, in a work of public

public fervice. It had, till of late, been always deemed defert to do a general good, the' in a way not perfectly acceptable. But we are now become fo delicate and fastidious, that it is the manner of doing, even in things of highest importance, which carries away all the merit. And yet, this false delicacy on a question of no less moment than Whether we shall have any Religion or none at all, feems as abfurd as it would be in a Great man to take offence at an officious neighbour for faving his falling Palace, by a few homely props near at hand, when he should have confidered of a support more conformable to the general tafte and flyle of Architecture in his Lordship's superb piece; or to find him disconcerted by that charitable hand, which should venture to pull his Grandeur by head and shoulders out of a flaming apartment. 101 sviol liw

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But in these suppositions I grant much more than in reason I ought. I suppose the Public TASTE, which the manner in question has offended, is a reality, sounded in Nature; whereas its the fantastic creature of Fashion, and as shifting and capricious as its Parent. TRUTH, which makes the matter of every honest man's enquiry, is eternal; but the manner suited to the public toste, is nothing else than conformity to our

dices, or dispositions. When the truths or the practices of Religion have got possession of a People, then a warmth for its interests, and an abhorrence of its Enemies, become the public taste; and men expect to find the zeal of an Aposses in every defender of Religion: But when this awful Power has lost its hold, when, at best, it stoats but in the brain, and comes not near the heart, then, if you expect to be read with approbation, you must conform your manner to that polite indifference, and easy unconcern, with which we see every other trial of skill plaid before us.

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But now I am advanced thus far, I will venture a step further. When Insidelity first made its appearance amongst us in set Discourses addressed to the Public, our ecclesiastical Watchmen instantly took the alarm; and communicated it to their Brethren with a warmth and vigour that gave lustre to their high Trust. No Writer escaped unnoticed; no argument remained unanswered; and a searned Critic received public honours, as the deliverer of his Country, in rescuing common sense from the very silliest raphsody [4] that ever disgraced

[4] Discourse of Freetbinking.

human

human Reason. But fince the danger is become imminent, or, to speak more properly, since the mischief so much dreaded has done it's work, and one would naturally expect to see this vigilance increased, and the Body up in arms, we find a perfect peace and tranquillity reign amongst them. Which, were it not attended with equal unconcern, one might mistake for a well grounded confidence in vigorous measures. As if it were our unhappy fate to be still mistaken, as well when we thought the Church in danger, as now when we appear to believe it triumphant!

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Indeed (fays this Public) it, [your manner] bas furnished your enemies with a bandle to do you infinite mischief. Your COLD friends lament and make the worst sort of excuse, by imputing it to a temper contracted from the long habit of drawing blood in controversy; Your WARM friends are out of countenance, and forced to be filent, or turn the discourse.

Would not any one by this, imagine, that the Author of the View, after much pretended opposition to Infidelity, was at last detected of being in confederacy with it, and all along artfully advancing its interests; that the Mask had unwarily

unwarily dropt off, and that he stood confessed, what Lord Bolingbroke has been pleased to call him, an Advocate for civil and ecclesiastical Tyramy. At least, no one would imagine, that this handle afforded to his enemies of doing him mischief, was no other than the treating the Author of the most impious and insulting book that ever affronted public justice, as a bad Reasoner and a worse Philosopher, whose VANITY led him to abuse every Name of Learning, and his FEAR to discredit every Mode of Religion.

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These cold Friends however acted in Character; the great secret of whose address is the well poiloning an Apology, or, as the excellent writer better expresses it, making the very worst excuse they can find. But here, methinks, we want their usual caution, which rarely suffers an ambiguous expression to admit of a favourable meaning: For, the compliment of drawing blood in controversy, the Author of the View may fairly take to himself with great complacency. As his Controversy has always lain in a quarter very remote from political altercation; neither with Ministers nor Factions; and on no less a question than the truth and honour of Religion, against Infidels and Bigots; the drawing blood thews him to have been in earnest. which. mid

which is no vulgar praise. It would be but poor commendation, I ween, of a brave English Veteran, who had feen many a well-fought field for Liberty and his Country, to fay, he never drew blood; tho' fuch a compliment might recommend the humanity of a Champion at Hockley-hole. When the fituation of the times have engaged two learned Men, at the head of opposite factions in a Church, to engage in a party-quarrel, and play a prize of disputation, with the reward placed, and often divided, between them, it is no wonder if there should be much ceremony, and little blood shed. But the Author of the View writes for no Party, nor party-Opinions; he writes for what he thinks the TRUTH; and, in the point in question, for the CLERGY, its Ministers; (they will forgive him this wrong) and as Both of them are yet by good fortune of public authority, he thinks himself at liberty to support them, tho' it be by drawing blood from premeditated impiety, from low envy, or malicious bigotry; which, he apprehends, are not to be fubdued by management or a mock-fight. Yet as much in earnest as he is, he should be ashamed to turn the same arms against simple error; against a naked adversary; or against the man who had thrown away his weapons; or, indeed, against any but him,

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him, who stands up boldly to defy Religion, or, what is almost as bad, to dishonour it, by false and hypocritic zeal for the errors and corruptions which have crept into it. In a word, had I written with any oblique views, and not from a sense of duty, I should have suited the entertalnment to the taste of my Superiors. For a man must be of a strange complexion indeed, who when he has conformed to Religion for his convenience, will yet scruple to go on, and reap the benefit of his compliance, by conforming to the Fashion.

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ut n, So far as to the Author's cold Friends. With respect to his warm ones, They have not plaid their parts so well; they seem to have given up their Cause too soon. They might have said with truth, and a full knowledge of what they said, "That no man was more disposed than the Author of the View, to comply with the temper of the times; and especially with the Inclinations of his Friends; to whose satisfaction he has been ever ready to sacrifice his own inclinations; but, to their services, every thing—except his duty and his honour: Was he capable of doing this he would not deserve a virtuous Friend: That probably, he considered the matter in ques-

tion as one of those excepted cases, where he could hearken to nothing but the dictates of honour, and the duties of his station: That he Taw Religion infulted, a moral Governor defied; Naturalism, a species of Atheism, openly, and with all the arts of fophiftry and declamation, inculcated; and the opposing World insolently branded as a cabal of fools, knaves, and madmen." They might have faid, " That where errors of finall confequence are in question, or even great ones, when delivered with modesty and candour, fuitable measures are to be observed: but that here the impiety and the infult were both in the extreme." To which, in the last place, they might have added most of those other confiderations, which have been urged in the course of this Apology. And had they been fo pleased, the Desence had not only been better made, but with much more dignity and advantage to their Client. and and la roday

However the Author of the View has yet the vanity, amidst all this mortification, to reslect, that there is a very wide difference between difpleasing, and the being disapproved: and that this very Public, who complain by the pen of my anomymous Friend, seel that difference. The decencies of Acquaintance, the impressions

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might make them uneafy to see Lord Bolings Broke exposed to contempt: But their love of the Public, their reverence both for its Civil and Religious interests, will make them see with Pleasure his PRINCIPLES consuted and exposed. When a noble Roman had in public Senate accused one of the greatest Pests of his age and country, he observed that the vigour with which he pursued this Enemy of the Republic, made many worthy men uneasy; but he satisfied himself with this reslexion, tantum ad siduciam vel metum differt, nolint homines facias, an non probent.

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In a word, my duty to God, to my Country, to Mankind at large, had, as I fancied, called upon me to do what I did, and in the manner I have done it. If I have offended any good Man, any Friend to my person, or my Cause, it is a sacrifice to Duty; which yet I must never repent of having made, tho the displeasure of a Friend be the severest trial of it. I know what that man has to expect, both from Insidelity and Bigotry, who engages without reserve in the service of Religion.

" Ah! let not VIRTUE too, commence his Foe!

And and stone statute, How-

However I have long fince taken my party:

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"Omnia praecepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi.

« Nec recufo, fi ita casus attulerit, luere

poenas ob honestimma facta, dum FLA-

"GITIOSISSIMA ULCISCOR."

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LEADING WAR STORY

LETTRE

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DU

Feu Prefident MONTESQUIEU

À

L'AUTEUR

J'AY reçu, Monsieur, avec une reconnois-Jance tres grande, les deux magnisiques ouvrages que vous avés est la bonté de m' envoyer, et la lettre que vous m' aves fait l' bonneur de m'ecrire sur les œuvres posthumes de My Lord Bolingbroke: et comme cette Lettre me paroit être plus à moi que les deux ouvrages qui l'accompagnent, auxquels tous ceux qui ont de la raison ont part, il me semble que cette Lettre m'a fait un plaisir particulier. J'ay lu quelques ouvrages de My Lord Bolingbroke, et s'il m'est * a permis

permis de dire comment j'en ai êté affetté, certainment il a beautoup de thaleur : mais il me semble qu'il l'employe ordinairement contre les choses, et il ne faudroit l'employer qu'à peindre les choses. Or, Monsieur, dans cet ouvrage postbume, dont vous me donnes une idée, il me semble qu'il vous prepare une mattere continuelle de triomphe. Celui qui attaque la Religion revelée n'attaque que la Religion revelée; mais celui qui attaque la Réligion naturelle attaque toutes les Religions du monde. Si l'on enseigne aux bommes qu'ils n'ont pas ce frein ci, ils peuvent penser qu'ils en ont un autre: Mais il est bien plus pernicieux de leur enseigner qu'ils n'en ont pas du tout. Il n'est pas impossible d'attaquer une Religion revelée, parce qu'elle exifte par des faits particuliers, et que les faits, par leur nature, peuvent être une matiere de dispute: mais il n'en est pas de même de la Religion naturelle; elle est tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas disputer, et du sentiment interieur de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas disputer encore. J'ajoute à ceci, Quel peut être le motif d'attaquer la Religion revelée en Angleterre? on l'y a tellement purgé de tout prejugé destructeur qu'elle n'y peut faire de mal, et qu'elle

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qu'elle y peut faire, au contraire, une infinité de biens. Je sais, qu' un bomme en Espagne ou en Portugal que l'on va bruler, ou qui craint d'être brulé, parce qu'il ne croit point de certains articles dependans ou non de la Religion revelée, a une juste sujet de l'attaquer, parce qu'il peut avoir quelque esperance de pourvoir à sa defence naturelle: Mais il n'en est pas de même en Angleterre, où tout bomme qui attaque la Religion revelée l'attaque sans interest, et où cet bomme quand il reussiroit, quand même il auroit raison dans le fond, ne feroit que detruire une infinité de biens pratiques pour etablir une verité purement speculative.

pleased to make me of your books, and for the Letter you do ince the honour to write me and iwarity of his possibility. As that Letter feems to be rather more my own than the two Books which accompany it, every reas wall books which being interested therein as well at 1421 with head of length of what particular delight. I have dipped into length my Lord Believe to say in what manner they affected me, I not own that he writes with a good deal or warmth; but methicks he generally employs

LETTER

FROM THE

Late President Montesquieu

TO THE

AUTHOR.

SIR,

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T Am exceedingly obliged to you for the magnificent Present you have been pleased to make me of your Books, and for the Letter you did me the honour to write me on Lord Bolingbroke's posthumous Works. As that Letter seems to be rather more my own than the two Books which accompany it, every reasonable creature being interested therein as well as myself, I enjoy it with particular delight. I have dipped into some of my Lord Bolingbroke's Discourses; and, if I may be allowed to say in what manner they affected me, I must own that he writes with a good deal of warmth; but methinks he generally employs

ploys it against things, whereas it ought to be employed only in painting them. Now it appears to me that, in the postiumous work of which you have given me an uccount, he liath prepared for you, Sir, contitual matter of triumph. He who attacks Pevened Religion, attacks revealed Religion only; But, he who attacks natural Religion, attacks all the Religions in the World. Though men should be taught to difbelieve the Obligations of revealed Religion, they may fall think themselves bound by some other; but it is most pernicious to andeavour to persuade them that they are bound by none at all. It is not impossible to attack a revealed Religion, seeing it depends on particular facts, and facts are, in their own nature, liable to be controverted : but that is not the case with Natural Religion; for it is drawn from the Nature of man, which cannot be disputed, and from the internal Sentiments of mankind, which are equally indifputable. Besides, what motive can there be for attacking revealed Religion in England? In that country, it is fo purged of all destructive prejudices, that it can do no harm; but, on the contrary,

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trary, is capable of producing numberless good effects. I am fenfible that, in Spain or Portugal, a man who is going to be burnt, or afraid of being burnt, because he does not believe certain articles, whether depending or not depending on revealed Religion, hath very good reason to attack it, because he may thereby hope to provide for his natural defence. But the case is very different in England, where a man that attacks revealed Religion does it without the least personal motive; and where this champion, if he should succeed, nay, should be in the right too, would only deprive his country of numberless real benefits, for the fake of establishing a merely specularive truth. Long affeit relucinen no own nature, liable to be conveyered : but

that is not the cafe with Matural Religion; man to sunt I I was charmed &c. i not

which cronne be disturbed, and from the

Paris, 26th Manistanti la a apanisas? Isanoti

equally indipurable. Beides, wittende-

JU ALUO SATROM In the country, it

is to gurged of all destructive prejudices,

that is can do no barm; but, as the conin the control of the second

to the state of the state state a rece-

pocket was checape to kroperty in your parie: y

s (which, I think, were become as fonous and other-

ORD BOLING BROKE Is PRILID SOFTEY, formuch and so long talked of, is now come, and very fairly, into the hands of the public. For I think it would be injustice to the editor to suppose his Lord-ship did not design us this Lega que. His last Will sufficiently declares his kindness to us. But, you will say, the speaks of his Philosophy as a thing composed only for the solace of a few friends in a corner [1]. What then? might not his Lordship change his mind, and extend his benefits? Hardly, you think, without contradicting his professed principles. So much the better. The publication then will be of a piece with the rest. And never trouble your head with one contradiction, where you may meet with a thousand.

Quid te exempta levat spinis de pluribus una?

languages the the sale and and an arrange have

[1] "Let us feek truth, but feek it quietly as well as freely."
Let us not imagine, like fome who are called Free-there."
IRS, that every man who can think and judge for himself (as he has a right to do) has therefore a right of SPEAKING, any more than of acting, according to the full freedom of his thoughts. The freedom belongs to him as a rational creature.

He lies under the restraint as a member of Secrety.— As we think for ourselves, we may keep our thoughts to earselves or communicate them with a pure reserve and in such manner of only, as it may be done without offending the Large of our Country, and disturbing the public peace. — Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope, Vol. iii, p. 343. Quarto Edition.

Now

Now tho' I know You have as little Curiofity to hear what a Freethinker can object to the FAITH which has got possession of your heart, as what a pickpocket can chicane to the Property in your purse; yet the name of L. BOLINGBROKE'S METAPHYSICS. (which, I think, were become as famous, and hitherto as little understood, as his POLITICS) cannot sure but incline you to fome flight acquaintance at least with this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as he calls it; and which, in the manner of other Conquerors, he erects

on a general defolation.

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The only part of his Lordship's Character, that vet remained equivocal, was his literary. How this will fare by the publication of his Philosophy, I will not pretend to fay; perhaps not altogether so well as his Friends might give him the pleasure to expect. He frequently tells his reader, that the Doctrine of his Essays and FRAGMENTS had been occasionally thrown out amongst them, and made the subject of many free conversations. And while he harangued in that circle, I will suppose he met with the applause he sought after. But had he chose himself to bring them to the bar of the Publick, he might have feen strange revolutions. " Illic, et Judex racet, et " Adversarius obstrepit, et nihil TEMERE DICTUM perit : et, fiquid TIBI IPSE SUMAS, PROBANDUM " eft: et, omifio magna semper flandi tumore, " loquendum est [i]." Indeed his Lordship could hardly expect to escape the severity of this Tribunal but by the superior evidence of his principles: since his meditations on divine matters are fo extensive, that fearce any one, who has written in defence of Virtue, to amery, and a furbing the public todes." - Int

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or Religion, but will find himself either insulted in his person or misrepresented in his opinions; and this, merely for being in the great man's way.

But furely, when a person of his Lorship's polite manners had condescended to enter into learned altercation, the world might expect, at least for the courtly management of Controversy, a most consummate Model, which should either reform, or should for ever discredit, the grosser Polemics of the Schools. So that the' the Divine might expect no great matter from these oracles of reason, yet he should readily accept his amends in the manner of fo elegant a pen-And perhaps You, who have observed their commerce with the world, and their conduct to one another, might be apt to think they would have been no lofers by the bargain. Indeed, Divines have been generally thought wanting in forms; whether their pride prompts them to appeal to the Authority of reason; or their prudence teaches them to submit to the Wisdom of their Betters. And the management of their Controversies in the Schools, and their interests in Courts, have, on different accounts, been equally obnoxious both to the dealers in Truth and Falsehood. I would willingly avoid both their extremes. For I would, if possible, preserve and support that love and reverence to an uleful body, which the noble Writer, relying not on his own politics but on other men's, has in his fourth Effay devoted to Destruction. He, indeed, may call for aid on the Secular arm; he has the old reason for so doing; but I dare say, the Clergy never will. Things are now come to that pals, that the State seems to be in more need of their B 2 Support,

Support, than They, of the State's. For, tho' the cavila of licentious men always end in the Confirmation of Truth and Virtue, yet they generally fet out in loosening the hold, which Religion had got upon the Propuls. And when that is gone, what other Engine the Magistrate will invent, to keep the Multitude in order, They, whose principal concern it is, would do well to consider.

As I faid, then, I had taken it for granted, that our noble Adverfary, for an Adverfary he has condescended to be, would be principally anxious to teach us in his writings, what was his wont in conversation, that studied politeness, which is so well fitted to keep inferiors at a distance: And that, when he had declared mortal war against every thing the world hath hitherto called Religion; and against every Order of Priests, or Ministers, which civil Government has thought proper to establish, for the support of it, we should see his attack carried on by the fairest as well as strongest reafoning, the gentless as well as strongest reafoning, the gentless as well as strongest and the politest as well as keenest raillery.

But how were we disappointed, to find this Confervator of States, this Legislator in Philosophy and Religion, utterly unable to raise his head above the rank contagion of the Schools: to see Polemics go their usual train; and this Sun of our new System, whirled along the turbid vortex of Controversy, like any the most ignoble of the earthly Bodies! But his Poet, or rather his Prophet, (who so magnificently announced to us the glad tidings of all these good things) had prepared us for it. He had contemplated

placed this strange phenomenon: not, indeed, with

To be plain. I met with nothing in these big volumes, but the rankness of South without his force; and the malignity of Marver without his wit. You shall not take it on my word: the evidence lies before us. Give me leave then to present you with a specimen, under his own hand, of his candour, his temper, and infinite politeness. And the one can but ill judge of the harvest by a sample of the field-showers, yet we may form a pretty good guess of the sold-

Nor is this intemperance of language, of which I propose to give you a taste, the mere escape of sancy or humour, which is would be candid to overlook a le is a fort of formula dicendi, without which, all his Lordship's authentic acts of Legislation would be invalid: It is the very Spirit of his new Religion, without which, the whole would be indeed but a dead letter.

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It was with the less reluctance I entered upon this part of my design, that I might have to justify myself to the world for the plainness and freedom with which I may hereafter chance to treat his Lordship's Reasoning; for, as Quintilian well observes, "Prediction has a liquid and o etiam DIGNITATIBUS ut libertatis nostrae ratio reddatur, ne quis nos aut petudantes in lædendis his, aut etiam ambitiosos putet."

Without any further prologue, then, let the Shew begin: Only premising, that as his Lordship had a FIRST PHILOSOPHY to erect, he had an immense

deal of rubbish to remove: The authority of every great Name, and of every sacred Order, standing di-

rectly in his way.

With CUDWORTH he begins: and of CUDWORTH he fays, The heads of many reverend persons have been turned by a preternatural fermentation of the brain, or a philosophical delirium. None hath been more so than this Divine [3]. Again, CUDWORTH [in his INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM] gives you little less than a nonsensical paraphrase of nonsense. It was not his fault. The good man passed his life in the study of an unmeaning jargon; and as he learned, he taught [4].

Totalk, like CUMBERLAND, of promoting the good of the whole System of rational Agents, amongst whom God is included, and of human benevolence towards him, is to talk metaphysical jargon and theological blasphemy [5].

CLARKE triumphs in this foolish and wicked rhodomondate, &c. [6]. — All CLARKE says about the discovery of God swill, is a rhapsody of presumptuous reasoning and of prophane absurdaties [7]. — Audacious and wain Saphist! His terms have a solemn air, that may impose on the unswary, and consirm the habitual prejudices of others; but more absurdity cannot be stuffed into so few swords [8].

of Woll Aston, he lays, But I will detain you no longer about such discourse as quould convince you, if you beard it at Monnoe's, that the Philosopher who held it was a patient of the Doctor's not yet perfectly restored to his sense; [9]. Again, of the same excellent Person, We have here an example of the second sort of Madness men-

[3] Vol. iii. p. 353. of his Works, in Quarto.

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^[4] Vol. iv. p. 92. [5] Vol. v. p. 82.

^[6] Vol. v. p. 252. [7] Vol. v. p. 292. [9] Vol. iii, p. 518.

tioned above. The man who writ all this nonfense was a man of parts. — But when these learned Lunaticks, &c. [10].

and ready to be chained together. Indeed from henceforth they are rarely shewn asunder. We sometimes
find them in the beight of a metaphysical frenzy [11]:
And, by what one can perceive, without much provocation. They had proved the Soul to be a thinking substance distinct from Matter: We may allow
them to be jealous of the glory of this atchievement.
But who contested it with them? No body, that I
know of, before his Lordship. And he very civilly
let them enjoy the honour of it for life.

The President FORBES is really mad; but it is only quoad boc. For observe, he was no Divine by prosession, but something better [12]. Indeed, not much. He was a LAWYER. Of which UNLEARNED Prosession, as he calls it, ninety nine in a bundred of least, (he says) are Petty-foggers, Sharpers, Bratulers, and Cavillers [13].

But, to give the better edge to his well-tempered language, he sometimes dips it in irony: and then it is, The good Earl of Nottingham; and the righteous Bispop Sherlock. They deserved his anger. The First publickly desended, and ably too, that Faith which stands so much in his way: and the Other ventured to oppose that Party, whose patronage he had condescended to assume [14].

[10] Vol. v. p. 374.

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[12] Vol. v. p. 523.

[14] See spa Grafffman

[11] Vol. iii. p. 574.

[13] Vol. ii. p. 353.

He comes next to the whole Bopy of the Chris fian Clergy. And now the first Philosophy begins to work, and the task to grow ferious. The PRIMI-TIVE SAINTS and DOCTORS have the precedence, as is fitting. " The lift of MARTYRS confilled, L. believe of those who suffered for BREAKING THE " PEACE[17]. The PRIMITIVE CLERGY Were, under " pretence of Religion, a very LAWLESS TRIBE [16]." " ALL the Christian FATHERS using a DELIRIOUS. " sty Le, it became that of Christian Theology [17]." "It would fcarce be possible to believe that the " greatest Saints and Doctors of the Church had talked fo much BLASPBEMOUS NONSENSE, and " employed fo much artifice about it, if their writ-"ings were not extant [18]." - " Of all this ab-" furdity, profaneness, and ridicule, they who built up " Christian theology were guilty." - You ask, with furprise and impatience, What this abjurdity was ? He was going to tell you; for he never minces matters. "They ADDED (fays he) the EPISTLES to the "Gospels; the doctrines of Paul to those of " CHRIST; till the APOCALYPSE became a part of " our holy Scriptures [19]." And now, I hope, you are fatisfied. If not, take what follows, "Chrifian Divines and Philosophers have done more to " DEBASE our notions of the fupreme Being, than all the Doctors of Polytheifm [20]."

This was reasonably well, for new-beginners: But nothing like the exploits of MODERN DIVINES.

[15] Vol. iv. p. 434. [17] Vol. iv. p. 612. [19] Vol. iv. p. 371. [16] Id., ib. [18] Vol. iv. p. 303. [20], Vol. iii, p. 541.

" It is MADNESS, or fomething WORSE thus mad-" negs, for Divines to imagine themselves able to comprehend a whole Occonomy of divine Wifdom from Adam down to Christ. And yet this is fo cuftomary, that not only the learned and ingenious, but every dabbler in Theology, who must pass for a fool or a knave whenever he grows extravagant, affects to reason in the same manner [1]22 a 121 "

- "Would Divines infift chiefly on the external proofs of the authenticity of Scripture - they would avoid a great deal of BLASPHEMY [2]."-They are absurd and licentious in urging both the external and internal evidence of Revelation [3]."

- " Our Divines turn themselves to declaim on certain and undoubted marks of divine Authority " of the Scriptures of the Ifraelites --- Let us com-" pare some of these supposed marks with these of " human original, and they will flare us in the face, " and point out plainly the FRAUD and IMPO-"STURE [4].

- " It is common and yet aftonishing to observe, . "with how much folemnity and confidence almost "all those who teach and defend Christianity, pres " fume to AFFIRM ANY THING, the' never fo evi-"dently PALSE [5]."

-" The best, and even such as pass for the fairest " controversial Writers, improve by artifice the na-"tural infirmity of the human mind: ... They do, on " purpose, confound ideas and perplex the fignifica-

[1] Vol. iv. p. 274-

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[3] Vol. iv. p. 293.,

[5] Vol. iv. p. 295.

[2] Vol. iii. p. 272.

[4] Vol. iii. p. 288.

The doctrine of Clarke and other Christian Divines about our obligation to imitate God is PALSE and PROFANE [9]."

"Divines have IMPUDENTEY and WICKEDLY af"fumed, that there is a law of right reason common
"to God and man [10]."

What I have advanced will be treated as an impious paradox by some of the trifling solemn dogmatists in Criticism and Theology, who have advanced to many absurd and impious paradoxes of
their own [11]

We now come to what the noble Author calls the perinium of Metaphysical Theorogy [12].

" The man who walked foberly about in the Bedlam

" of Paris, and believed himself God the Father,

"was mad. Thus the Philosopher, who takes a bold leap from a few clear and distinct ideas to the

" first principles of things, is mad [13]." onsamon

"The reasoners à priori resemble very much one

" fort of MADMEN. Some of these are so VERY " MAD that they lose all use of their season. Others

At again deduce confequences, and argue very justly,

[6] Vol. iii. p. 424--5.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 435.

[10] Vol. v. p. 77.

[12] Vol. iii. p. 356.

[7] Vol. v. p. 6.

[9] Vol. v. p. 65.

[11] Vol. v. p. 190.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 139.

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but are STILL MAD: because they reason from

" principles that have no appearance of reality out " of their own overheated and difordered imagina-

tions. You will find inflances of this kind, with-

" out the trouble of going to Bedlam; but you will

" find them principally in Colleges and Schools [14]."

"They deferve to be treated like patients pro-" per for Dr. Monrot, and to be put under his care.

" Nothing less than Metaphysics could have turned to

" many good heads [15]."

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Well then, Divines are all MAD; and, for fear of mischief, in safe custody. Sometimes, indeed, his Lordship lets them out to cool, and air themselves; nay, he is so good to give them their lucid intervals; but it is only to play the rogue, and to cant in the pulpit; and then, back again to their kennel, to Monroe, and his discipline; or, what is much worse, to his Lordship's; to hear themselves called Foots, Knaves, Cheats, Madmen, Impostors, and Blasphemers. And, for these hasty changes of the Scene, he has contrived a most ingenious expedient. He has divided the Clergy into the two classes of Theologians and Metophylicians: in the first of which, the Knave is predominant; in the fecond, the MADMAN. So that he has of either fort always ready and at hand, just as he wants them. But as Madmen are much eafier dealt with than Knowes, he has prepared one common Beblam for them all. For God forbid (he fays) be should be as uncharitable as Divines, to think they deserved a worse place, as blaspheming in their fenses [16]. Good man! How kind

[14] Vol. v. p. 396. [15] Vol. v. p. 417. [16] Vol. iv. p. 464.

A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

now is all this? How humane! What fhall the Clerry do for him in return? Alast he thinks not of it: his modefly is fill greater than his charity: and he is only anxious not to be mifunderstood. He is even ready to fear that Divines should take his honest freedom in dudgeon; and that it may possibly procure him, in return, some eccleseffical BILLINGSOATE; to be called infidel, deift, and perhaps asheift. My reply (fays he) to SO ANGRY Disputants Should be CALM, AND SUCH AS MIGHT TEACH CHARITY to those who preach it fo much, and pradife it so little [17]. To say the truth, his Lordship feems, like JUSTICE SHALLOW in the Play, to be suspicious of those he had so well entertained. Davy, (fays the Justice, of his Court Guests) be civil to thefe Knawes, for they will BACK-BITE. Not worse than they are BITTEN (replies Davy) for they bave marvelous foul linen. Whether his Lordship found the Priest's Surplice in the like condition, or whether he has left it fo, is not material. No marvel at it's evil plight, when it has been fo long over-run with Vermin; fuch as Toland, Chub, Morgan, and those who have been fince bred out of them.

The BILLINGSGATE, however, if we give but equal credit to what we see of his Lordship, and to what we hear of the Clergy from their Enemies, lies pretty nearly between them. Yet I agree with him it becomes the Ministers of Religions, much less than it does his Lordship. They are Disputants; he is an Orator. Their business is to reason; his is to rail. While each confines himself to his province, all goes well. But should they change weapons; should the Orator attempt to reason, and the Disputant be pro-

[17] Vol. iv. p. 225.

voked

voked to rail every thing would be out of order I venture on the authority of Quintilian, to reckon railing amongst the ARTS of Eloquence, "CONVI-"THIS implere VACUA caufarum," fays this able Rhetor. It is true he holds it to be of the less perfect kind - " eft enim prorfus CANINA ELOQUENTIA" But his Lordship might naturally think, that his Dog-Eloquence, was well enough fitted to their Dog Legic, However, Quintilian would not overload this species of Eloquence, nor would I; the neither of us be. disposed to extol it; he confesses there is yet a ranker kind. "Sed hæc minora funt 1110 virio ANIMI, QUO MALEDICUS & MALEFICO non diffat, " nifi occasione." "In which, fays he, nothing " but opportunity is wanting to make the evil-fpeaker " an evil-doer." But the Minifter of State muft join the Orator before this compound excellence can difplay itself; just as the Diwine and Arbeiff must conspire to make that ARTIFICIAL BLASPHEMY, which gives his Lordship so much concern.

But the mention of this CONSPIRACY reminds me that it is now high time to give you some account

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Hitherto we have only the out-lines, or, at most the general air of this Clerical Portrait; all he could catch at the first sitting. A horrid combination sinishes the Picture: a Confederacy between Drivines and Athersts, to dishonour and decrease the God of the universe. This is the striking feature; and so artificially disposed, that, turn the Portrait which way you will, it has still a platting, which, in his Lordship's justice, is little better than a banging look.

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A Confederacy fo mad, fo monfirous, may perhaps startle you at first. But don't be frightened. Take my word for it, it will come to nothing. It is a Treaty of his own making. And you have heard enough of his talents for Treaty-making, It is true, you fay, he could reconcile the most unnatural alliances to the delicacy of his morals; and the most ridiculous miscarriages to the superiority of his Politics; but a confederacy between Divines and Arbeifts! Was any thing fo odious! What think you, my Friend, of that blind bargain he once drove between certain of King George's Protestant Subjects, and a Popish Pretender? How that came to nothing, he has not thought fit to tell us, in his curious account of that transaction [18]. But, as to this confederacy, I may have an opportunity of shewing you, that, after all his pains to form it, he betrayed and diffolved it, himself. At present, my business is only to shew you what he fays of it.

" After pleading the cause of natural and revealed Religion, I am to plead the cause of God himself,

against Divines and Atheists in confedera-

1 cr [19].

"The conduct of Christian Divines has been fo far from defending the Providence of God, that they

" have joined in the clamour against it. Nothing has

" hindered, even those who pretend to be his Mes-

fengers, his Embassadors, his Plempotentiaries, from

" renouncing their allegiance to him, as they them-

felves have the FRONT To avow, but the thypo-

^[18] See the whole Letter to Sir W. Windham.

"thefis of a future flate. On this hypothesis alone " they infift; and therefore if this will not ferve their " turn, God is disowned by them, as effectually as if " he was fo, in terms [20]." " Divines, if not "Atheifts, yet are ABETTERS of Atheifm [4]

"That there were some men, who knew not God " in all ages may be true : but the fcandalous tafe of "COMBATING HIS EXISTENCE under the male of "Theifm, was referved for Metaphyficians and

"Theologians [2]." We worke of an in var as W

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- " Divines are still more to be blamed. A con-" FEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the pro-" fessors of Theism. No matter. They PERSIST. " and have done their best, in concert with their " allies, to DESTROY the belief of the goodness of " God: - They endeavour to DESTROY that of his " goodness, which is a farther article of their Al-" liance [3]."

" The CONFEDER ACY between Atheifts and Di-"vines appears to have been carried VERY FAR -" Nay the Atheist will appear, to that reason, to " which they both appeal, more consistent in his ab-" furdity than the Divine [4]." " Divines UP-"BRAID God's goodness, and CENSURE his Jus-" tice [5]." - " INJUSTICE is, in this life, ascribed

" to God, by Divines [6]."

The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaston and Clarke, do, in effect RENOUNCE the God " whom you and I adore, as much as the rankest of

[20] Vol. v. p. 487-8. [1] Vol. v.p. 485.

[2] Vol. v. p. 307. [3] Vol. v. p. 393.

[4] Vol. v. p. 348--g. [5] Vol. v. p. 417.

[6] Vol. v. p. 541.

A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

the Atheistical Tribe. Your Priests and our Parfons will exclaim most pathetically, and RAIL OUT-RAGEOUSLY at this affertion. But have a little patience, and I will prove it to their shame to be true [7]."

Give me leave, Sir, for once, to go a little out of my way to vindicate the whole body of Divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary Confederacy. To say the truth, the charge is too ferious to be passed over with the same lightness I am disposed to treat the rest of his Lordship's Extravagances.

Be pleased then to understand, that ATHEISM has ever endeavoured to support it self, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of fense can give it; namely the unequal distribution of

moral good and evil.

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l good and evil.

"Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi

" Adspicerem, Letosque din florere nocentes,

" Vexarique pios -- LABEFACTA CADEBAT. " RELLIGIO," -

was the common language of the impatient fufferen From hence the Atheist inferred, that the Universe was without an intelligent Ruler; and all things driven about by that Fate or Fortune, which first produced them. DIVINES opposed this conclusion: for they did not venture to be fo paradoxical as, with his Lordship, to call in question the premisses, a phenomenon which objected itself to all their Senses. They demonstrated, strictly demonstrated, the Being of a God, and his MORAL attributes: And then shewed, that if the whole of man's existence were

[7] Vol. v. p. 485.

included

meluded in this life, the present distribution of moral good and evil would contradict that Demonstration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole was not meluded in this life; but that man was reserved for an after reckning; in which, an equal distribution of rewards and punishments would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

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But Athrifts were not the only enemies that Divines had to deal with. There was a fet of men, who allowed an intelligent first Cause, endowed with those moral attributes, which Divines had demonstrated : and, on that account, called themselves Daisrs. Yet they agreed for far with Atheilm, as to confine the whole of man's existence to the present life. These, the Divines combated, in their turn; and with the fame arms; but in an inverted order. In disputing with the Atheift, the principle held in common, was the present unequal distribution of Good and Enik So that to cut off their conclusion from it, of no Goo, they demonstrated his Being and Attributes : and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be fet right. With the Deift, the common principle was the Being and Attributes of God, Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a FUTURE STATE, they appealed to the present mequal distribution of good and evil (which there Men, as well as his Londship, were very backward to allow and very industrious not to feel and from that inequality inferred, that there must be

This is a short and true account of their contest with ATHEIST'S and DEISTS. so far as the subject of a future flats came in question: In either controversy; that State is deduced from the moral attributes: only with

A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S 18 with this difference. In the dispute with Atheists, the demonstration of those attributes is made; in the dispace with Deists it is allowed. The final purpose against Atheism is to prove the BENGOAND, ATTRI-BUTES of God; the final purpole against Deism is to prove a FUTURE STATE: For neither natural nor revealed Religion can subfift without believing that God 16. and that he is a REWARDER of them that feek bim [8]. Thus, we see, the question, in either controverly; being different; the premisses, by which each was to be proved must needs be different. The difference is here explained; the premises, in the argument with Atheifts, were the moral attributes; the premisses, in the argument with Deists, the wegual di-Aribution of good and evil in its basistion married and

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What Enemy to Religion now, could ever hope to fee a Calumny either thrive or rife on to unpromising a ground? or flatter himself with the expectation of an advocate bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the Divines was a consequence with ATHEEST S, to decry God's providence; to blot out his attributes of goodness and justice to combat his Government; and to dem his very enifence? The RIOHT HONOURABLE Author does all this: And more; - he expects to be believed. At is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our credulity to far, had he feen his way. clear before him: - His Lordship is always fublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a distance to look into the detail of things, or to enter into their minuteness: (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his Genius.) So that in his general view of Theologic matters, he has jumbled Cale of State [9] St. Paul. thefe

thefe two Controversies into one; and, in the confufron, commodiously slipped in one Fact for another. He, all the way, represents Divines as making a future State THB PROOF of God's moral attributes Whereas, we now fee, on the very face of the controverly, that they make the moral attributes a PROOF of a future State. Let us confider how the dispute flands with Atheifts. These men draw their argument against a God, from the condition of the moral world The Divine answers, by demonstrating God's Being and Attributes; and, on that demonstration, fatisfies the objection. Confider how it stands with the Deift? Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle. And on this ground the Divine stands, to deduce a future flate from the unequal distribution of things. - But this was to support his slander of a Con-TEDERACY There was no room to pretend that God's Being was made precarious, by proving a /uture flate, from his attributes; but could he get it believed, that Divines proved the Attributes from a fature flate, he would eafily find credit with his kind Readers, for the reft.

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Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY comes to this, That Divines and Atheifts hold a principle in cammon; but in common too with all the rest of mankind; namely; that there are irregularities in the distribution of moral good and evil. His Lordship has been angry with all POLITICAL, as well as all RELIGIOUS Parties in their turns. Suppose he had taken it into his head to ornament a CRAPTSMAN with the detection of a political confederacy; between the WHIGGS and JACOBITES, to dethrone KING GEORGE; because both denied that he reigned

reigned jure divino: Mother Ofborne would have fmiled

But whatever his Lordship might think proper to disguise in this reasoning, there is one thing the most careless Reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and solemnity of accusation, you see lurking that poor species of a Bigor's calumny, which, from one principle held in common

with an obnoxious party, charges his Adversary, with all the follies or impleties that have rendered it odious. This miserable artifice of imposture, had now been

ble Lord took it up; and, with true political skill, worked it into a SHAM PLOT; to make RELIGION

distrust it's best Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

TINDAL and COLLINS were manly Adversaries. They knew how to invent, to push, and to pursue an Argument. But what does this noble Writer know — His Followers will tell you. They admire him for his Wit and Eloquence. But They admire, where You and I see nothing but an instance spirit, and an instated style. For (to use the words of a great Master [9] of expression) TRUE ELOQUENCE I find to be none but the serious and hearty love of TRUTH: And that, whose mind soever is fully possessed with a fer-

od ar' ising [9] Milton.

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fro [went defire to know good things, and with the demest CHARLTH to insufe the knowledge of them into others; when such a man would speak, his words, like so many nimble and airy Servitors trip about him at command, and in well-ordered siles; as he would wish, fall aptly into their own places.

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He has not yet done with the CHRISTIAN CLERcy. What remained behind was to collect together, his featured abuse; and to pour it all at once on that venerable Body, with an unfeeling hand, and unrelenting heart.

"Nothing more (fays he) will be wanting to an-

" fome that they who minister in holy things are the

Omrabs, the Vizirs, and the Baffas of This MIGH-

" pret, and execute, or cause to be executed, rather

" than his EMBASSADORS: by affuming which latter

"characters, they feem to lessen, over modestly,

"the dignity of their own order, and to raise that of

"the Laity too high: But I AM ASHAMED TO "HAVE SAID SO MUCH ON THIS SUBJECT [10]."

He may pretend what he pleases. But who ever it was that brought him to shame, it certainly was not the Clergy. They are ready to assure him, in the words of the Poet,

" Let SHAME come when it will, we do not call it."

Besides, after what has passed, I see nothing he has to be assumed of; unless it be for stealing the paultry joke of Embassadors and Plenipotentiaries [11] from Lord Shaftsbury:

[10] Vol. v. p. 540 -- 1. [11] See p. 14. of this Letter.

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and scolded out of his Kingdom."—But when, be[12] Vol. v. p. 446.
[13] Vol. iv. p. 353.

reft, for our MASTER is not a man to be fcratched

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the Carrest into dranken flavors; you must not think he would neglect so good an occasion of exposing them to his north a Spartans. Indeed the Entertainment is at hand: and no cost is spared of lavish expression to set out these dranken revels. "The Choirs of birds (says he) who whistle and sing, or scream at one another, or herds of beasts who bleat and low, or charter and roat, at one another, have just as much meaning and communicate it as well—Such is the common conversation—Such, too, for the most part, are all the public discourses that are held, and the solemn has angues or the Pul-

After so large a gleaning from his Lordship's abundance, you will dispense with me from gathering up his looser slowers of speech; such as, absurday, effronderies knowery, folly, nonfense, delirium, frency, lunacy, downright madness, impiery, prophaneness, blassbemy, and acheism: which like seed pearl, are every where scattered over the embroidery of his eloquence.

The our indignation at this torrent of ribaldry, makes us prompt enough to aft,

Yourpia cerdoni, Voletos Brutumque decebunt?"
yet I am ready, in charity to fuspect, that his Lordhip may be abused. Who knows, but just as his
Lordship gave Bownes, (his friend's dog) the sentiments of his Master [15], so his Lordship's Secretary,

[14] Vol, iii. P. 422-3.

[15] The world (lays his Lordship to Pope) is as well fitted for Bowncz as for you, with respect to physical nature; and with respect to MORAL nature, Bownez has fittle to do beyond heark natured attending

attending to two at once, his Lord and this Lord's PARROT, might unaware put down to the great man, what indeed belonged to the Favorite: who however eloquent be might be, vet, we are told, was no Phimenting at hand: and so cold is fraged of handqold

"The Coxcomb bird, fo talkative and grave,

That from his cage cries cuckold, subore, and knowe,

"Tho' many a paffenger he rightly call, and is

"We hold him No PHILOSOPHER at all."

And I the rather suppose the Secretary to be here in fault, fince his Lordship, in one place, feems to think, that ribaldry and ill language difgrace the animal implume, bipes, the two leg'd, unfeather'd Philasopher. For, speaking of SPINOZA and HOBBES, he says, Let it not be faid, they are men of DEPRAVED UNDER. STANDINGS, AND DEPRAVED MORALS ; THIS IS TO RAIL NOT TO ARGUE. To rail, then, when we should argue is, in his Lordship's opinion, unbecoming a Philosopher: unless you will suppose, that these two Atheists were especially favoured, for not being found in bad company, or taken in the fact, wickedly confeds. RATING with Divines and Metaphyficians 'or "

Seriously, as good men may be fcandalized to find their best and ablest Pastors accused of blasphemy and prophaneness, it will be right to tell the plain truth: which is no more than this, that his Lordhip is apt

ing to the STILL WHISPERS, the SECRET SUGGESTIONS, and the sudden instrument of inflinet. Wol. v. \$5264.1 This, the Reader fees, is intended for a compliment on the following Ranza of his Friend's Universal Prayer.

T

Where I am right, THY GRACE IMPART, and [21]

[&]quot;Still in the right to flay; in the wor of the 23N well

Where I am wrong, O TEACH MY HEART A TOM ON THE

To find that better way,"

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to annex new ideas, to old words; and not very careful to give us notice of his handy-work. So, in the cafe before us, Who would suspect, that teaching a law of right reason, common to God and man; and inforcing man's obligation to imitate God, were BLASPHEMY and PROPHANENESS? Yet such they are; or we must renounce the first Philosophy [16].

So then, as what has hitherto been Piety is become. Blasphemy; we need not wonder that his Lordship turns the garb of old threadbare blasphemy; and gives it the new gloss of piety.

But now comes a scene indeed. The two Reve-LATIONS and their two FOUNDERS are brought upon the stage. And here, his piety pretends so much to the impulse of conscience, that you would suspect he thought himself, like St. PAUL, under the malediction of a woe if he preached not his new Gospel.

Of Moses, he says, "It is impossible to excuse all the puerile, romantic, and absurd circumstances in the author of the Book of Genesis, which nothing could produce but the habit of dealing in trisling traditions, and a most prosound ignorance. It is impossible to read what he has writ on this subject without feeling contempt for him as a philosopher, and horror as a Divine [17]."

"The PENTATEUCH has such evident marks of falsehood, as can be objected to no other writings

[16] DIVINES HAVE IMPUDENTLY AND WICKEDLY ASSUMED THAT THERE IS A LAW OF RIGHT REASON COMMON TO GOD AND MAN. Vol. v. p. 77. — And again, To PREACH UP THE OBLIGATION OF IMITATING GOD IS FALSB AND PROPARE. Vol. v. p. 65.

[17] Vol. iii. p. 233.

" except

We may laugh at Don Quixote, for reading Romances till he believed them to be true histofries, and for quoting Archbishop Turpin with " great folemnity; but when Divines speak of the "PENTATEUCH as of an Authenthic History, and " quote Moles as folemnly as he did Turpin, are they much lefs mad than he was [19]?" Don Quixote is his Lordship's favorite simile; and comes as often over as the As and Lion in Homer. But mocking (as the proverb fays) is catching. Whoever attentively confiders his Lordship's Essays, will, I dare say, be of my mind, That the much reading his master LOCKE, who was deeply engaged with School-divines and Metaphysicians, had the same effect on his Lordship's temper, in an advanced age, and under a bilious habit, that the reading books of Chivalry had on the prudent Gentleman of La Mancha. And, by his own confession, a man's head is soon turned by complex and abstract ideas. From henceforth the enchantments of Schoolmen and the gigantic Forms of Metaphysical Divines got entire possession of his understanding. Confider what you can make of the following remark, without supposing with me, that these fancies had made very deep havoc in his brain. "That "THEOLOGY, fays he, which pretends to deduce " the duties of a man from speculations concerning " the moral attributes of God, is to be reckoned in the " class with NATURAL MAGIC [20]." Now, if you

[18] Vol. iii. p. 271. [20] Vol. iv. p. 621.

[18] Vol. iii. p. 271. [19] Vol. iii. p. 280.

feek, I do not say for the elegance, but for the common propriety of this observation, any where out of his Lordship's hurt and wounded imagination, you will seek for it in vain. Yet, allow him but his Theological Magicians, and you see, their Theology could be nothing else than natural Magic.

So again, — Clarke shall not force me into Atheism; no nor Wollaston neither; What is this, but Don Quixote, up and down? dreadfully afraid that these Necromancers would, at last, force him into their exchanged castle of a future state; for so he calls it in a letter to Lord Bathurst [1], where he threatens to demolish it, as built upon unholy ground, by Divines and Atheists in confederacy.

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No doubt, every Reader must have observed this unaccountable rage and horror whenever a DIVINE comes cross his Lordship's fancy. One would think, they had served him the same trick the Enchanters plaid Don Quixote; that they had run away with his Library, and walled up his Study-door. Most true it is, that not long before this immense Treasure of the sirst Philosophy was given to the world, certain of these wicked Magicians had turned it all into fairie-favours: And the Public, on it's first appearance, found nothing in it better proved than the truth of the old Adage, Pro Thesauro, Carbones. And indeed, if I was not perfectly satisfied that no man in his senses could mistake the value of this new Money, I should make a scruple of laying so much of it before him; espe-

^{[1] &}quot;To discover error in axioms, says he, or in first principles "grounded on facts, is like breaking of a charm. The EN-

[&]quot; CHANTED CASTLE, the fleepy rock, and the burning lake dif-

[&]quot; appear." On retirement and fludy, Vol. II. p. 525.

28 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S cially the following pieces, which have an uncommon glow, as if they came hot from the place where they were minted.

THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MOSES, " like the whole fystem of his conduct, WAS FOUND-" ED ON MURDER [z]."

"The Jews blended together, at once, in the " moral character of God, injustice, cruelty, and

" partiality. - They made him an object of terror

more than of awe and reverence; and their Reli-

e gion was a System of the RANKEST SUPERSTI-" TION [3]."

The Jews with more inconfiftency, and not less or profanation, than the Pagans, dreffed up the one

" fupreme Being in all the rags of humanity; which

" composed a kind of motley Character, such as " foolish Superstition, and mad Enthusiasm alone

" could ascribe to him, and such as no man who be-

" lieves him an all perfect being can hear without

" horror [4]."

"The Jews give fuch notions of the supreme

" Being as no People on earth, but this, would have " ascribed, I do not say to God, but to the worst of

of those monsters, who are suffered or fent by God,

" for a short time, to punish the inquity of men [5]." From Moses and JUDAISM, his Lordship descends to PAUL and CHRISTIANITY. Let us fee whether

he gives Them better quarter. " CHRISTIANITY abrogated the Law, and con-

" firmed the biftory of Moses; from the times, at least,

[2] Vol. v. p. 183. [3] Vol. v. p. 531.

[4] Vol. v. p. 529. [5] Vol. v. p. 515.

" when

" when St. PAUL undertook, like a true cabalistical

" Architect, with the help of type, and figure, to

" raise a new System of religion on the old founda-

"tions [6]." "The Gospel of Christ is one thing; the Gospel of St. PAUL another [7]."

" He preached a Gospel in contradiction to CHRIST's,

" and directly repugnant to it [8]." and directly repugnant to

On this account, I suppose, it was, that he dignifies Paul, with the elegant appellation of the Leather-dressing Pontiff. But the immediate occasion of giving him this new title of honour, was particularly happy. His Lordship was on a favorite topic, he was abusing the first Messengers of the Gospel, for their claim to maintenance. He was conscious, Paul came not within his censure. So that, lest this should give the Apostle too much credit; he informs the reader, in his polite way [9], that he had a trade, and could shift for himself. For it seems, nothing but downright starving will acquit the Apositles of thest and extortion, at his Lordship's Tribunal.

"JESUS (in his opinion) had no intention of freading his Religion further than amongst the Jews; but Paul, bred at the feet of Gamaliel, faw further than that poor ignorant fisherman Peter." — The sense requires you should read, that poor ignorant Carpenter Jesus: and so without doubt his Lordship designed his compliment. Well, but what did Paul see further? It was this, "That the contempt and aversion in which both the nation

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^[6] Vol. iii. p. 288.

^[7] Vol. iv. p. 313.

^[8] Vol. iv. p. 326--7.

^[9] Vol. iv. p. 423.

"rest of mankind, would make it much more easy to convert the Gentiles at once to Christianity.

"than to make them lews first, in order to make

them Christians afterwards [10]." In the Common "

For it feems - "To DISSEMBLE was a funda-

"mental principle of apostolical conduct. PAUL practifed it. We have his own word for this; and

"he boasts of it [11]." His Lordship lets us know, that Paul had assurance enough to do any thing. For speaking of the Apostle's famous argument ad modessiam — Nay, but, O man, who are thou that repliest against God? &c. [12]. He says, "There is some-

"thing fo IMPUDENT, as well as abfurd in this pro-

" ceeding, that, common as it is, one can fee no

"Can be be less than mad, says his Lordship, who boasts a revelation super-added to reason, to supply the defects of it, and who super-adds reason so further so for the same time? This is madness or there is no such thing incident to our nature. And into this kind of madness, St. Paul, prosound in cabalistical learning, hath fallen [14]." And yet, as mad as it is, all Governments have matched it, when they super-added civil Laws, to natural conscience or Religion, to supply the defects of it; and super-added natural conscience or Religion to Civil Laws, to supply the defects of those too, at the same time. But more of this in it's place.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 306. [12] Rom. ix. 20. [14] Vol. iv. p. 172. [11] Vol. iv. p. 306--7-[13] Vol. iii. p. 307.

" St. PAUL carried into the Apostleship a great " deal of that ASSUMING AIR, which is apt to ac-" company much learning, or the opinion of it or a " great profusion of words, and of involved and un-" connected discourse, even on those subjects which " required to be most clearly and distinctly deve-" loped. - He was a hose paraphraser, a Cabalistical " Commentator, as much, at least, as any ancient or "modern Rabbin [15]." "St. PAUL's fystem of " Religion, is an intricate and dark System, with, bere " and there, an intelligible phrase, that casts no light on " therest, but is rather lost in the gloom of the whole [16]." "Having faid fo much of the intelligibility of " Paul's Gospel, TRUTH authorises me to add, that " where it is intelligible, it is often ABSURD, or " PROPHANE, OF TRIFLING [17]." - "PAUL " taught predefination and UNLIMITED PASSIVE OBE-" DIENCE : the one abfurd, the other both abfurd " and IMPIOUS [18]." and IMPIOUS [18]."

Was it allowable to laugh, amidst all these horrors, what mortal could forbear? Unlimited passive obedience, quoth he! The noble Lord had been so long accustomed to the cant of his Faction, which made St. Paul the preacher of I cannot tell what nonsense under that name, that he seems now in good earnest to believe he was so. A just judgment on the Politician; to come at last, to give credit to his own Flams. However, in this instance, at least, one would hope St. Paul might have been spared, if it were only for old-acquaintance-sake; and the hard

[15] Vol. iv. p. 326--7.

[16] Vol. iv. p. 328.

[17] Id. ib.

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[18] Vol. iv. p. 510.

fervice they had put the LEATHER-DRESSING PON-TIFF upon. But it is bad trusting, we see, to the gratitude of Statesmen. Happy for us, PAUL has yet an able Defender; who will never be wanting in what he owes to gratitude and honour. I only take the liberty to drop a hint. It is well known to those who were in the secret of his Lordship's passions and his party, that Clarke and Wollasson sound the worse treatment for being the favorite Philosophers of Q. C. who knows whether St. Paul, fared the better for being patronized by his learned Friend?

"CHRISTIANITY (fays his Lordship) became FA"NATICISM in the FIRST professors of it. Men
"corrupted it by ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY. And
"fome will be apt to think, that the first of these men
"was PAUL — Divines will be FURIOUS to hear
"such language [19]." Alas! No. He guessed
ill of the mood, in which his Works were to find
them. They laugh at his vanity; and pity the fury
that inspired such language. Indeed he gives them
ample exercise for all their pity: for having done
with PAUL, he now directs the poison of his tongue
against Jesus Christ himself.

"The truth is, Christianity preserved, in many respects, a strong tang of the spirit of Judaism. The supreme Being took a milder appearance; his favour was confined no longer to one people. The Messiah came and redeemed fallen Man. Christian Theology discovers in this mysterious proceeding the love of God to
Man; his infinite justice and goodness. But

[19] Vol. v. p. 275.

"REASON will discover the fantastical, confused, and inconsistent notions of Jewish Theology, latent in it; and applied to another system of Religion. This love will appear partiality; this justice will appear injustice; this goodness will appear cruelty. On the whole, the moral character imputed to the supreme Being by Christian Theology differs little from that imputed to him by the Jewish. The difference is rather apparent than real [20]."

The scene of Christianity has been ALWAYS a scene of diffention, of hatred, of persecution, and of BLOOD [1]."

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Speaking of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, he fays, — "Some [of the precepts] are directed to the "Jews only, and some more immediately to the Disciples of Christ. The second fort seem sit enough for a religious Sect; but are by no means practicable in the general Society of Mankind. Considered as general duties they are impracticable, inconsistent with NATURAL INSTINCT, as well as LAW, and "QUITE DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY [2]."

"The CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY has derived from the Jewish, a prophane licence, which makes men blaspheme without knowing they blaspheme, and makes their very devotion impious [3]."

"I would sooner be reputed, nay I would sooner be, a Pagan than a Christian, or an Atheist than a Theist, if to be one or the other it was necessary to believe such ABSURDITIES as these; which,

[20] Vol. v. p. 532. [1] Vol. iv. p. 511. [2] Vol. iv. p. 299, 300. [3] Vol. v. p. 519.

"however disguised and softened by a certain cant of sexpression, are directly PROPHANE; and indirectly,

or by confequence at least, blasphemous [4]."

"ALL THE BEDLAMS OF THE WORLD cannot match the abfurdities that have been propagated

by Christians, whether heretics or orthodox, con-

" cerning the making and governing of the world by the

"ministration of inferior Beings: Beings not eternal,

" but produced in time by emanation, or some other

" inconceivable manner of generation [5]."

We cannot believe the SCRIPTURES to be

" God's word, tho' we know the physical and moral

System are his Work, while we find in them such

" repugnancies to the Nature of an all-perfect Being;
not mysteries, but absurdities; not things incom-

" prehenfible, but things that imply manifeftly con-

tradiction with his Nature [6]."

In a word, he tells us, that "THE RELIGION OF

" NATURE HAS BEEN TURNED ALMOST INTO BLAS-

" PHEMY BY REVELATION [7]." "To believe

" (fays he) that Jesus iwas the Messiah is said by some

[meaning his Master Locke] to be the unum necessa-

" rium of FAITH but TO OBSERVE THE LAW OF

" NATURE IS THE UNUM NECESSARIUM OF DU-

" TY [8]."

But now having exposed Moses, Christ, and Paul; having decried the falshood of the two Revelations, and ridiculed the absurdity of facred Scripture; he shews us, in mere charity, after the example of the wise Alphonsus, how either System

[4] Vol. iv. p. 34.

[6] Vol. iil. p. 306, 7.

[8] Vol. iv. p. 410.

[5] Vol. iv. p. 72.

[7] Vol. iii. p. 498.

might have been mended, had his lordship been confulted; while, like the wise Alphonsus, he believes just as much of God's Word, as the Other did of his Works.

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First, he hints, how the Law might have been better planned. "God purchased the obedience of " the Jewish People by a mercenary bargain. It was " ill kept on their part, And the Law, with all it's " fanctions, was continually violated; fometimes re-" jected; and had, in no degree, a force sufficient to " maintain itself in observation and reverence. Now, " one of the most conceivable perfections of a Law " is, that it be made with such a forefight of all " possible accidents, and with such provisions for the " due execution of it, in all cases, that the Law may " be effectual to govern and direct these accidents, " instead of lying at the mercy of them. - Another " the most conceivable perfection of a Law consists " in the clearness and precision of its terms.-These " will be found, no doubt, and ought to be expected, " when God is the Legislator [9]."

He next shews us, how he could have improved the Gospet, had he been of God's privy-counsel.

the Gosper, had he been of God's privy-counsel. "Had the doctrine of future rewards and punish-

" ments been taught by CHRISTIANITY in terms

"more general and less descriptive; had the punish-"ments been represented, for instance, like the re-

" wards, to be, fimply, fuch as eye never faw, nor ear

" beard, nor the beart of man could conceive, it might

" have been maintained in credit, and had an uni-" verfal and real influence perhaps, to the great ad-

" vantage of religion [10]."

[9] Vol. iii. p. 292,3. [10] Vol. v. p. 542.

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An inattentive reader may be furprized perhaps, at this wantonness of his Lordship's pen, That when he had given it as his fixed decree, that all which the world hath hitherto called Religion, is a public mischief, and a future flate, an absurd fable; he should with great formality deliver in a plan which would have given credit and real efficacy to nonfense But we must consider, He had been and impiety. fo long playing the PHILOSOPHER, that he had reafon to apprehend we might forget the other part of his fublime Character, the LEGISLATOR. He therefore deemed it expedient to give us a flight cast of his office, in rectifying the blunders of Moses and Jusus Complete La market CHRIST.

With regard to Moses and his Law, I have so much to say to his Lordship, that I shall reserve it for an after-reckoning. The other is but a small matter, and may be settled here.

I suspect then, our Legislator, in this remark concerning the manner in which Jesus revealed a future state, did not sufficiently attend either to the nature of the human mind, or to the genius of the Gospel. He would have, we see, the account of future punishments as general, and as little descriptive, as that of future rewards. He seems to think the latter well managed, and with propriety: which yet he measures on the imaginary impropriety of the other: He appears to have no idea of any positive excellency it has in itself. I shall endeavour therefore to explain why this method of representing future rewards was right: By which it will appear, that the other, of representing future punishments, was by no means wrong.

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To grow particular and descriptive, whether of foture rewards, or future punishments, the Speaker must borrow his images from material and corporeal things; because the Hearer has no faculties of sensation proper to comprehend ideas taken from things Spiritual. Now when a follower of Christ is so far advanced as to have his Faith work by hope, his fentiments grow refined, his ideas purify, and he is rifing apace towards that perfection which the Gospel encourages him to aspire after. But while fear of punishment chiefly operates upon him, he is yet in the lowest state of probation; his imagination is gross, and his appetites sensual. Is it not evident, then, that a descriptive Heaven of delights would be ill suited to that purity and elevation of mind, folely fixed by boje, on happiness; and as evident that a general undefined denunciation of Hell would not have force enough to make the necessary impression on a sensual fancy agitated by fear? Let not his Lordship's admirers, therefore, be offended, if we believe that, in this point, the Author of our Salvation went at least one step beyond their Master, in true Politics.

At length, for a concluding stroke, his Lordship comes from vilifying BOTH RELIGIONS, and their FOUNDERS, to rail against the God of both Religions. And with this I shall close the horrid Scene.

" IF WE BELEIVE IN MOSES, AND HIS GOD, WE CANNOT BELIEVE IN THAT GOD WHOM OUR REA-

" son shews us [11].

"Can any man presume to say that the "God of Moses, or the God of Paul, is the

[11] Vol. iii. p. 307.

" TRUE

fight, and cruel; delights in blood, commands af-

" fassinations, massacres, and even exterminations of

people. The God of PAUL elects some of his

"creatures to falvation, and predefinates others to

destruction, even in the womb of their mothers.

And, indeed, if there was not a Being INFINITELY

" MORE PERFECT than thefe, there would be no God at all, nor any true Religion in the world [12]."

Who, that hears this dreadful language, without knowing from what quarter it comes, but will ftrait call to mind the words of the Satyrift?

" Not Danté, dreaming all th' infernal State,

Beheld fuch scenes of envy, fin, and hate.

But when we understand them to be the ejaculations of this Noble Philosopher, the Confessor of Truth, the Advocate of Virtue, and the Restorer of banished Nature; employed, as he himself tells us, or rather fet apart, TO PLEAD THE CAUSE OF GOD HIMSELP AGAINST DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY [13]; when we confider, I fay, all this, What are we to think, but that they are the pious breathings of an over-heated zeal: and the' expressed in no confecrated terms; (indeed fuch as had been much worn in the fervice of the CRAFTSMAN) yet when new-fet in his Lordship's immortal Panoply of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, they may now prove as ufeful, to advance the fear of God, as before, to promote the bonour of the King.

It is in HATE as in Love; hard to diffinguish the divine from the carnal species; or rather to separate

[12] Vol. v. p. 567. [13] Vol. v. p. 305.

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the different ebullitions of what is but one and the fame species. Hence it is, that the melting frains of the Myflie, the Methodift, and the Moravian, fo often smell of the STEWS; and hence, by parity of reason, the thunder of his Lordship's eloquence may naturally re-echo, as it were, from BILLINGSGATE.

But these things make You serious: and You ask, "Who, that hath ever heard Lord Bolingbroke's Story, would have suspected, that his God and his-COUNTRY lay fo near his heart? And yet his Political and Philosophic Writings, fay you, are full of Lamentations; where, like another Jeremy, he bewails the dishonours which wicked PRIESTS, and wicked POLITICIANS, have brought upon the Church and State: Nay, in his extreme fondness for these his favourite Objects, he fuffers himself to be alarmed with something less than panic terrors. He is afraid the Whigs will bring in the Pretender; and apprehends, the English Clergy have made large steps towards Atheifm.

I know what you drive at. You would infinuate, that those who have nothing to fear, and a great deal to hope from Religion, are not wont to give it up fo eafily. For Hore encourages men to fearch into the grounds of what Religion promifes; though FEAR often hinders them from giving proper attention to what it threatens. You are ready to fay to his Lordfhip, w beigner read agen as it great off

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Card. Polig.

Dalacon lenomeni orbito aparatasarate " Si VIRTUTIS eras avidus, RECTIQUE BONIQUE

[&]quot; Tam fitiens, quid RELLIGIO tibi sancta nocebat?

[&]quot; Afpera quippe nimis visa est? Asperrima certe

[&]quot; GAUDENTI VITIES, fed non virtutis amanti.

You are for applying to his right honourable Person, the old trite aphorism, That wicked principles spring out of a wicked life. But what says another noble Peer to this? "Fain would the Bigot, in consequence of his moral maxims, and political establishments, con-

found licentiousness in morals with liberty of thought, and make the libertine, who has the LEAST MASTE.

" RY OF HIMSELF, resemble his direct opposite [14]."

It may be fo, you will fay. But Lord Bolingbroke fure, could never object to the imputation which bad morals cast upon a Teacher of Truth: He, who sees it so clearly, and presses it so charitably, upon the whole body of the Christian Clergy. "How (says his Lord-

" ship) can the CLERGY of your Church, or of ours, pretend that they contribute now, or EVER DID

"CONTRIBUTE, to the reformation of mankind?

"No age can be pointed out, wherein ALL THE vices, that Tully imputes to most of the heathen

"Philosophers, did not prevail AMONGST MOST of

the Christian Divines with great circumstances of

" aggravation. They have not only ALL THE VICES incident to human nature in common with other

"men, but they have had the peculiar Vices of their

"Order. I WILL SAY BOLDLY, they are, in gene-

" ral, much fitter to hinder, by their EXAMPLE, than

" to promote by their DOCTRINE, the Advancement

" of Religion, natural or revealed."

We have, it is true, been favoured with very ample accounts of the immoral conduct both of antient Philosophers and Modern Churchmen; and these, even by some of the more charitable of their own

[14] Charatterifics, Vol. iii. Mife, 5. Chap. 3.

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respective Bodies. FREE-THINKERshave been bashful, and more on the referve: nay they might have been thought Saints, for any thing their modesty would have fuffered, had it not been for the Confessions of one of them, the famous CARDAN; who, like another St. Auflin, feems fworn to leave nothing behind him in the inkhorn. The account he gives of himfelf deferves transcribing .-" In diem viventem, nugacem, religionis contemptorem, illatæ injuriæ memorem, invidum, triftem, infidiatorem, proditorem, fuorum oforem, turpi li-" bidini deditum, folitarium, inamænum, austerum, " obscenum, lascivum, maledicum, varium, anci-" pitem, impurum, calumniatorem [15], &c." This was fair dealing: and he who was fo free with himfelf, might be excused if he spared no body elfe. But men do not use to be wanton on so nice a subject; and Freethinkers have generally more MASTERY OF THEMSELVES, fays the noble Author of the Characteriffics: Whenever therefore we fee it done, we must conclude it to be done for fome good purpose; such as, emulation of the Christian Confessors; who, to display the powers of Grace, did not scruple to tell the world, with great fimplicity, what they were by by Nature: And thus, Cardan to shew us, that the PIRST PHILOSOPHY is as efficacious in all great changes, has fairly told us how well befriended he had been by his Stars. However, let his design, in presenting us with this picture of his amiable turn of mind, be what it would, we are much beholden to him for fetting the Example. Though, like all other good Examples, it may possibly end where it set

[15] De vita fua.

A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

out; and the first Philosophy wait with patience for fome less incommodious way of recommending itself. And indeed, while Infidelity, which is the cure, is unjustly supposed the cause of these Peccadillos, we need not wonder our Philosophers should soon think themfelves at liberty, and be as foon disposed, to turn their view from their own morals to those of the Clergy: and affirm boldly, with his Lordship, that the order in general is much fitter to binder by their EXAMPLE, than to promote by their DOCTRINE, the advancement of Reried out attel the war of house is the critis spectacioil.

What shall we fay then? May it not be better to leave the Examples of both to shift for themselves.; and to consider only their Doctrines? I think it would; and will therefore proceed from his Lordship's TEM-PER, to his PRINCIPLES. But this must be the subject of another Letter. words was as he had a lead

graduated the control of the last should be CALLER A CONTROL CONTROL CALLED A CONTROL OF THE ARREST OF A the state of the s ANTHORNE OF A TOLAND IT HE VALLE OF BOSTO Constant of the many state with the reservoir coch fiche ac energy is an eller an eller and the the has Transmitted and an about the state of the and Beering and the state of the state and the state of the State Company in the working of the state of the state of Burgers & White all in house of which self-dupon to TO THE HEAVIST OF THE STATE OF THE STATE OF Total Balling Comment of the Comment

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And indeed, while Insidelity, which is the care, is unjuilly in poster for earlies. Trades we need not wonder one Philosophers thank them. There are served on the supporter than their

I T has been observed, that uncommon blessings, whether civil or religious, seldom happen till hope grows desperate, and long expectation has wearied out itself in vain. Then it is the criss approaches, the superiour Genius bestirs himself, and the admiring world is taken in by surprise.

Quod optanti Divûm, promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en! attulit ultro.

Never was this observation so well verified: for never was mankind in so deplorable a way as when his Lordship arrived from — what other System is not yet discovered; tho his tuneful Friend was very positive he belonged not to this: Insomuch, that when the last Comet appeared, and came pretty near the Earth, he used to tell his acquaintance, he should not be surprized if in the event it proved, that it was sent only to convey his Lordship home again; just as a Stage-coach stops at your door to take up a Passenger. Be this as it will: Bad indeed was our condition when Lord Bolingbroke arrived, — what shall I say, to be a light to those who sat in darkness? No, this is the work of meaner missionaries; but, to restore manking to their senses.

For his Lordship, in his account of the general Delirium which had seized the Clergy, had given us but a specimen of our condition: the Madness was

UNIVERSAL. Infomuch, that (as he well expresses it ALL THE BEDLAMS OF THE WORLD [1] were not fufficient for these things. And indeed how should they! For, to confess the truth, these visions of what he calls an over-heated imagination, fuch as, belief in the moral Attributes of God, the immortality of the Soul, a particular Providence, and a future flate, had infected all times and places.

ALL EUROPE (fays his Lordship) GREW DELIkrous [2]. Christianity was left to shift for itself in the midft of a FRANTIC WORLD [3]." And again, "OUR WORLD feems to be, in many respects, THE " BEDLAM OF EVERY OTHER SYSTEM OF INTEL-" LIGENT CREATURES: and, with this unlucky cir-" cumftance, that they who are most mad govern, in " things of the greatest moment, them who are least 6 [4]." By what is here dropt in the concluding words you understand, why his Lordship chose to make the Clergy lead up the Brawls in this mad dance; and the Leather-dreffing Postiff himself to prefide as Master of the Revels.

But to find all Mankind mad, is perhaps more than you expected. What then? Is the madness less real for being universal? - I think not: but, furely, more desperate. Tell us, therefore, what strange disaster occasioned this general infanity. Was it some evil disposition of the Stars? - So, indeed, it is reported [5]. The WORLD, it feems, like the men of Abdera [6],

[1] Vol. iv. p. 72. [3] Vol. iv. p. 353.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 377.

[4] Vol. iv. p. 316.

[6] See Lucian de confer. Hift. Dad Confer MULHELIA

^[5] Vid. D. N. J. C. geneseos thema, inter Cardani opera.

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had seen a Tragedy in a very hot day: which left so strong an impression on their sancies, that they all thought themselves concerned in the subject; Some ran about from Country to Country, to tell their story; and the rest have been ever since rehearing and celebrating those affecting Scenes, at home! till LORD BOLING BROKE, like another HIPPOCRATES, came to their relief: and, having first well physicked them of their Faith and their Fancies, brought them to themselves, by applying to their hurt imaginations, the sovereign Restorative of his first Philosophy. Of which, I am now, as I promised, to give you some account.

But to see this extraordinary Man in a just light, it will be proper to shew what Man was before him. A Religious Animal he is allowed to be, on all hands: And, till the coming of this first Philosophy, Religion was understood to rise on that wide basis, on which the fanatical Knave, Paul, had the art to place it; that "He who cometh to God must believe that he is: and that he is a rewarder of them who diligently seek him [7]." For, men who supposed the infinite goodness and justice of God to be as demonstrable as his infinite power and wildom, could not but conclude from his moral attributes, that he rewarded; as well as from his natural attributes, that he created.

On the more complex notion, therefore, of a mo-RAL GOVERNOR, all mankind supposed Religion to arise; while Narunalism, the Ape of Religion, was seen to spring from the simpler notion of a phy-

and set order , see squared settled to be a set a

RELIGION, therefore, stands, and must, I think, for ever stand, on those two immoveable Principles of PRESERVER and REWARDER, in conjunction.

The length or shortness of human existence was not primarily in the idea of Religion, not even in the complete idea of it, as delivered in Sr. Paut's general definition. "The Religionist, says he, must believe that God is, and that he rewards."

But when it came to be seen, that he was not always a Rewarder here, men concluded this life not to be the whole of their existence. And thus a FUTURE STATE was brought into Religion; and from thenceforth became a necessary part of it.

To explain my meaning, if to clear a thing needs further explanation. Gop, under the physical idea of Preferver and Creator appears uniform, regular, and inflant to his Creatures: Under the moral idea of Rewarder and Governor, he feems frequently to be withdrawn from his Servants. For tho, in the moral difpensations of things here, good and evil be often proportioned to defert; yet often, too, they are otherwife adjusted. The Antient Religionist, therefore, confiding in his Demonstration of the moral as well as the natural attributes of the Deity, concluded, That the prefent was not the only flate ordained for man; but that in some other life, these irregularities would be fet right. Hence a FUTURE STATE became in all ages and countries (except one, where the moral administration of providence was different) insepa-12311 rable

mankind. Even the mere Vulgar, who did not reach the force of this Demonstration, yet seeing the marks of moral Government, amidst the frequent interruptions of it, embraced the doctrine of a future State as considertly as the Learned. For plain Nature had instructed them to reason thus, — If all were regular, nothing needed to be set right: and if all were irregular, there was no One to set them right:

Such was the ANTIENT RELIGION OF NATURE: To which, modern Divines have generally agreed to give the name of Theism, when professed by those who never heard of Revelation; and the name of Deism, when professed by those who would never give credit to it.

In this State our noble Philosopher sound the religious World; or, more properly, this was the language he heard re-echoed from one end of the Globe to the other; But it was a language, he tells us, he did not understand. It was to his ears, like the choirs of birds, who whiftle and sing, or scream, at one another: or the herds of heasts, who bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one another. He rejects it, therefore in the lump, as the inarticulate din of ENTHUSIASM and ABSURDITY; the brutal issue of pride and ignorance; and so, but with much greater of his own, crects the first Philosophy on it's ruins.

Canse made the world; and, by his physical and general Laws still governs it; but not by moral or particular.

2. He bids us to understand, that this World was

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nor was man made for any other World, nor confequently, (as Divines have dreamt) for happiness.

3. That, by the arbitrary constitution of things in the human fystem (which may have a contrary dispofition in other systems) Virtue promotes happiness and Vice brings on milery.

4. That THIS CONSTITUTION, together with the coactivity of CIVIL LAWS, contain all the rewards and punishments attendant on Virtue and on Vice.

5. That prayer, supplication, and every other office of Religion in use amongst men, to implore good, and to deprecate evil, are foolish and fanatical: for that all religious duty is comprized in fubmiffion to the

established order of things.

He sums up his whole System in these words. "A " felf-existent Being the first cause of all things, in-" finitely POWERFUL and infinitely WISE, is the God " of natural Theology. And the whole fystem of " natural Religion refts on it, and requires NO BROAD-" ER FOUNDATION [8]." That is, it is enough for bim who cometh to this new Religion, to believe that God is; and not that he is a REWARDER of them who feek bim. And again, "When men have proved the existence of an all-perfect Being, the Creator and Governor of the Universe, and demonstrated his " infinite POWER and WISDOM, from his works, " when they have done this, THEY HAVE DONE ALL; this includes the whole of natural Theology, and se serves abundantly to all the ends of natural Religion [9]."

[3] Vol. v. p. 316. [9] p. 453.

What these ends of natural Religion are he tells us very plainly. They are, to fit us for our flation bere, and to supply our real ewants in it. - " In like manner that is, as he expresses it, for the necessary uses of buman life and no more] " the knowledge of the Crea-" tor is on many accounts necessary to such a crea-" ture as man: and therefore we are able to arrive. by a proper exercise of our mental faculties, from " the knowledge of God's works, to a knowledge " of his existence, and of that infinite power and WISDOM which are demonstrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING GOD GOES NO has the mark of truth, what lot santaus

Now tho' we should be so complaisant to these Principles as not to call them ATHEISTIC, yet Lam afraid the Professor of them, whoever he be, must be content with no better a name. For tho' the Principles may be called NATURALISM, yet if Scripture has defined an ATHEIST right, to be one who HAS NO HOPE, and is WITHOUT GOD IN THE WORLD [11], our Professor of Naturalism comes within the description. For the he acknowledges the being of a God, yet as he is swithout a God in the sworld, that is, a Being who prefides over it, as the moral Governor of it, which is the foundation on which all Religion hands, Religionists will think of no other title for him. And furely he will be properly defined. For tho' the abstract term Atheism carries, as it's principal idea, a relation to God's BEING: yet, Atheist, in the concrete, seems to have it's chief relation to God's

[10] Vol. iv. p. 86. [11] Ephef. ii. 12.

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A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

GOVERNMENT. This is not observed for any kind of consequence it is to Religion, in what class the Public shall be pleased to rank his Lordship; but merely to set in a true light the honourable Person's ingenuity, in assuming the character of an Advocate for Religion, at the very time he is labouring to root it out of human Society.

Old NATURALISM, thus travestied in the garb of new Religion, his Lordship bestows, as his fast and most precious Legacy, on his own dear Country: if you will believe him, the only reformed Religion that can be called pure, and the only revealed Religion that has the mark of truth. What the World hath hitherto called by those names being, as he assures us, an evil in itself; and mischievous to man in it's essential constitution. And he proves it, as they say, in mood and figure. - "To keep up the fense of " it [i. e. of Religion] in the minds of men, there " feem to be but two ways. To STRIKE THE SENses frequently, by public and folema acts of reli-" gious worthip; and to HEAT THE BRAIN by no-"tions of an inward operation of the Spirit, and of a fort of myfical devotion, independent of out-" ward forms, and even inconsistent with them. One of these leads to Superstition, the other to ENTHUSIASM. Both are filly—Superstition is folly: Enthusiasm is madness. It is good to be " on our guard against both [12]." Without doubt. But how shall it be done? Reli-

Without doubt. But how shall it be done? Religion is an evil in itself, and so admits of no qualification. It necessarily requires, as his Lordship tells

[12] Vol. iv. p. 310-11.

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us, on man's part, public acts of worthing and on God's, the private operation of the Spirit? But these lead to superstition and enthusiasm; that is, to folly and madness; to the depravation, may to the destruction of our reasonable Nature. This is not all: these resembles are not only huntful but impracticable. You could not use them, was you foolish or mad enough to venture on them; for they are, he says, inconsistent, and destroy one another. What then is to be done? To be upon our guard; to keep Religion at arms length, till his Lordship brings up his reserve of Naturalism, to our relief. Let this be our Shield of Brass. Under this we may repose in peace, undisturbed by any frightful dreams of Hell and the Devil.

This, Sir, is the Enchiridion of his Lordship's FIRST PHILOSOPHY. How fimple, you will Tay, how close, how round, how full, is this new Difpenfation ? A dispensation of Religion shall we call it? No matter. The times are ripe for it under any name. Yet I can hardly agree to those fancies, I told you of, which had possessed his poetical Friend; who, milled perhaps by that obscure hint, that our World was only the Bedlam of every other system of intelligent Creatures [13], supposed, in good earnest, his Philo-Jobber and Guide to be fent down from some superior orb, as Physician to the Hospital. Without question he was made for the Age, and the Age for him. And they may well congratulate one another on their happy meeting. Yet, if we must be doctrinated by a Poet, (and, now-a-days, Milton is much oftener quoted

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by Divines, than Hooker) I should be rather difposed to give credit to the man who told me, that he heard the evil Genius of Britain address his Lordship on his first fetting out, in strains like these, viab I tant

"Be as a planetary plague, when Jove we attenuous

Will o'er fome high-wic'd City hang his poison ore Everelonkinded the where land ship ship both in Ist

But to return to his System. It rifes on these four you fee him feized upode and ready, as selquining

First, That we have no adequate ideas of the wo-RAL ATTRIBUTES of God, his goodness and his just and his wifdom.

Secondly, That a FUTURE STATE is a Pable. Onto

Thirdly, That the Jewish and the Christian Revelations are falle. And bus said to I aid nogo

Fourthly, That REVELATION ITSELF is impoferrew, and each recement aloth fible.

Indulge me with a few remarks on his Lordship's

management, under each of these heads.

1. Divines, in their proof of the moral attributes, having of late much infifted on the arguments a priori, as they are called, his Lordship suspected, and what he suspects of ill he always takes for granted, that these attributes could not be proved a posteriori, or from God's works; the way by which, he owns, his natural attributes may be demonstrated. So that having pronounced the arguments a priori to be jargon, nonsense, impiety and blasphemy; the moral attributes of God are fairly erased at once out of the intellectual system. And he had no farther trouble on this head than to decorate CLARKE, who was chiefly con-

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converfant in the reasoning a priori, with variety of abuffive names. As to the reasoning teleff, your great Man's respect for that is to profound and for distant, that I defy any one unacquainted with metaphysical arguments, even to guels what kind of things they are for which the famous Minister of St. James's is fo feverely handled. For while the Divine fuffers, the Reasoner, as we say, always escapes. Now indeed you fee him feized upon, and ready, as you would think, to be cut up alive, and immolated to the first Philosophy; when a fit of railing shakes his Lordthip; and the Storm falls upon the whole Body of modern Schoolmen: And fo the Doctor escapes for that time. He is again laid hold on, and every thing ready for execution; when a fit of learning comes upon his Lordship; and Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates, and the whole band of ancient Metaphysicians pals in review, and each receives a lash as he passes: And fo the Doctor escapes for the second time. After all thefe victories without blood flied, his Lordship, as is fitting, takes his ease, intent only on his future Triumphs; in the mean time, amidft much felf-applante, his Essays end, and the fubtile Doctor remains unhurt.

But when need requires, I would have you know, that nothing can keep him from his Logic. Marry, then, on fome great occasion indeed, as when the novelty of the subject invites him, or the true flate of it is little understood, you shall have no reason to complain of brevity: then you shall see him employ one half of his Volumes to prove the corrup-

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a resume for the second point, the doctrine of a resume of the which being supported by the great moral argument of "the unequal distribution of good and evil amongst men," his Lordship is as large in confuting this as he was sparing in his answer to the metaphysical proofs of the moral attributes.

He first endeavours to shew the argument to be founded on a miliaken fact, and that there is no fuch inequal distribution: He is almost tempted to tell you, that every thing is exactly regular and in order. But this is a paradox too unmanageable even for his Lordship. He therefore comes down somewhat lower; and appears to be tolerably contented, if you will but take his word that the inequality is not near fo great as pulpit-Declaimers would make you. believe that the diforders which follow the abuse of man's free-will are not to be placed to the account of that dispensation, which our ignorance and prefumption make us fancy God is obliged to alter and reform. However, equal or unequal, his capital maxim clears up all. WHATSOEVER 19, 18, RIGHT: and therefore the argument of these confederated Divines, which goes, upon a supposed wrong, is abfurd and blasphemous. Whatever answer this reasoning may deferve, I believe no man who understands, the world will expect that a well-bred man should give it.

But I cannot omit, on this occasion, to do justice to his poetical Friend; by shewing the difference between Mr. Pope's Philosophy and his Lordship's. They both employ the maxim of Whatever is, is

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right. But to know, with what propriety and judget ment, we must consider against whom they write. Mr. Pope's Effay on man is a real vindication of Providence against Libertines and Atheifts, who quarrels with the present constitution of things, and deny a future State. To thefe he answers that whatever is, is right; and the reason he gives, is, that we fee only a part of the moral system, and not the whole it therefore thele irregularities ferving to great purpoles, fuch as the fuller manifeltation of God's goodness and juffice, they are right. Lord Boling broke's Ef. Jays are a pretended vindication of Providence against an imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheifts; who use a common principle, namely, the inequalities in God's moral government here, for different ends and purposes; the One to establish a future State : the Other to discredit the Being of a God. His Lordthip, who opposes their different conclusions, endeavours to overthrow their common principle, by his Friend's maxim, that whatever is, is right; not because the present state of our moral world (which is part only of a more general lystem) is necessary for the greater perfection of the whole, but because our moral world is an entire system of itself. His Lordship applies the maxim no better than he understands it. Mr. Pope urges it against Atheists and Libertines, who fay the constitution of things is faulty: so that the reply, subatever is, is right, is pertinent. His Lordship directs it, against Divines, who say, indeed, that this constitution is imperfed, if consi-, fidered feparately, because it is a part only of a whole, but are as far as his Lordship from calling it faulty: therefore the reply, whatever is, is right, is D 4 imperath an A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S doub impertinent. In a word, the Poet directs it against Atheifs and Libertines, in support of Religion properly fo called; The Philosopher, against Divines, in support of Religion improperty so called, namely NATURALISM: and the success is answerable. Mr. Pope's argument is manly, systematical, and conwincing. Lord Bolingbroke's, confuled, prevaricating, and inconfifient. Thus, his Lordship will have nothing irregular or amis in the moral world; for this is impiety, the very bond of that confederacy fealed between Divines and Atheists. In vain you tell him of a future flate, to vindicate the providence of God; this is visionary nonsense. But, if you talk of phyfical evil, he has his answer ready, This world is but one wheel of a wast machine. You will ask, then, why Pope's folution, is not to be admitted, who fays the same of meral evil which his Lordship does of physical? For a plain reason; his Lordship can allow our physical fysiem to be only a part, without any hazard of his first Philasophy. But when once you allow as much to the moral, you are in danger of bringing in Religion.

But why, you will ask again, would his Lordship thus run himself a ground; sometimes by discrediting his reasoning with a filly paradox; sometimes by betraying it with an unwilling confession; and, at best, by only giving it the poor support of a misunderstood and misapplied maxim; when his great and noble principle of no moral attributes dissolves the Confederacy at once. For if we have no ideas of God's moral attributes, the issue of our reasoning on his ways will be the same as if he had none. And if he has none, they need not, sure, be vindicated: which

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which is the fole purpose of his reasoning on the state of the moral world. All I can fay to this is, that his Lording appears to have been to harraffed with this phantom of a PUTURE STATE, that no Charm. no Security was to be neglected that could contibute to his eafe or protection. Hence it is he willdepend on neither of his arguments, of - no inequality or - but a little: and therefore, to make all fure, casts about for a third of more acknow-

ledged efficacy.

This he finds in the soul's MATERIALITY. From whence, he contrives to perfuade himfelf that it can be no substance (which he calls pneumatical madness). but a mere quality of body, produced by the configuration of it's parts, and periffing with that disposition of them. I fay, he contrives to persuade bimfelf; and I mean no more. Had his point been to perfuade his Reader, we must suppose he would have ventured, at least, to confute the arguments of CLARKE and BAXTER: who, on the principles of the Newtonian Philosophy, have demonstrated that the foul is a substance, distinct from the body, and different from matter. Instead of this, he slies to his usual confolation, ABUSE. He calls them impious and blasphemers for prefuming to limit the Omnipotent when the highest of their Presumption amounts but to this, the Supposing God can exert no power, which implies a contradiction; fince this imaginary power is indeed impotency. Nay, he would willingly perfuade himself there were no such arguments in being. For, fpeaking of the reasoning, which induced men to conclude, the foul to be a substance' distinct from the body, he represents it thus, "Men betseen and on to D coving the taking STATE OF

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"taking it for granted that they knew all the per-"hecivable properties of matter, they concluded that' " fuch things as could not be accounted for by "thefe, were to be accounted for by the properties " of some other substance [14]." And again, " Va-" nity and prefumption determine Philosophers to " conclude, that because they cannot account for the phænomena of the mind by what they know very "fuperficially of folid extended substance, this mind "must be some other substance [15]." Such, indeed, was the state of the controversy when Locke skimed over the argument. But CLARKE and BAX-TER went deeper. They draw their conclusion, not on the prefumption that they knew all the knowable qualities of matter, and that between these and Thought, there was no perceivable connexion; but from this clear and folid truth, that from the little we do know of body, we see a contradiction in supposing intelligence to be a quality of matter. For thus they reasoned, tho' we know not all the powers of matter, yet we know certainly it cannot have inconfiftent and contradictory powers. It is allowed to have effentially, a vis inertiæ, or that it refifts a change of it's flate; it is impossible, therefore, that it should, at the same time, have spontaneous motion, or effect a change of its flate. If this be the case (and to deny that it is the case, is confounding all the principles of human knowledge) then it is impassible the faul fould be material - But his Lordship feasts us with the fame fine argument on the motion of body. " They are

" unable, (fays he) to conceive how body can act

[14] Vol. iii. p. 502. [15] Vol. iii. p. 508-9.

" at all, and therefore they suppose the immediate " preferre and action of an incorporeal agent inevery operation of corporeal nature of 16 ?!" Whereas the truth is, they fully conceive from the vis inertize of body or its reliftance to a change of its flate, the absolute impossibility that it should act at all and, from thence fee the necessity of an incorpercal agent in every operation of corporeal nature. Youwill think, perhaps, his Lordship knew no more of this question than as it stood in his Master Locke; and that he had never heard of Baxter, who has carried it furthest, and treated it the most profoundly. I fhould have thought fo too, but that I find his Lordthip, in one place, speaking with that contempt of Baxen's reasoning which is his wont, whenever any thing he cannot answer bears hard upon the first Philefebby. It is where he honours us with his own thoughts concerning ATTRACTION. Attraction, "(faith his Lordship) may be, notwithstanding all " the filly abstract reasoning to the contrary, 2 REAL " PROPERTY OF MATTER [17]." Now you are to understand that Baxter, when he has evinced the truth of Newton's idea of attraction (who makes it no real, or effential, property of matter) employs this idea to prove, that it implies a contradiction to suppose, the foul may be a quality of matter. This great truth, deep reflection and a thorough comprehension of the Newtonian Philosophy enabled Baxter to demonstrate. On the other hand, no reflection, no Philosophy, nothing but mere intuition made his Lordship conclude that it is so far from being a con-

[16] Vol. iv. p. 108. [17] Vol. ili. p. 547. D 6.

Madiction, that the fail is a quality of mattern that is is a felf-evident fact. But, you shall hear his own marvelous words? I am perfused that God can make material lystems capable of thought, be cause I must renounce one of the kinds of knowledge that he has given me, and the first, tho not the principal in the order of knowing, or admit that HE HATH DONE SO [18]." Locke only contended for a bare possibility: His Lordship sees the necessary to much wifer is the Disciple than his Master.

3. But let us now go on with his Lordship's system. His third great principle is the FALSHOOD of
the Jewist and Christian REVELATIONS. And here
you will find no argument omitted that bears with the
least force against either of them. It is true, they
are none of his own. They are borrowed from the
Minute Philosophers that went before him: of whom
it must be owned his Lordship is a very close and
humble imitator.

His attack on revealed Religion is in two parts. The first is a confutation of it's truth, as it lies in it's purity, in facred Scripture: the second, an infimuation of it's falshood, as it is seen in it's corrupt state amongst modern churches.

Judaism is attacked more fully and avowedly in the first way: and Christianity, in the latter.

1. All the arguments against Revelation, as represented in the Bible, are taken from BLOUNT, TOLAND, COLLINS, CHUBB, MORGAN, and their fellows. I must except, indeed, the atrocious terms

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in which they are always inforced. For the iniquity of the times would not fuffer those Confessors of truth to put forth more than half atheir Arength, as his Lord, thip assures as so of the When Lobserve, his reasoning here is taken from these men, it is not spoken in disparagement of it; for to say the truth, it is the best in all his Essure and at the initial sit.

One thing, indeed, falls out unluckily All his Lordship's great Originals, in common with the rest of Mankind professed to believe the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity. And, on this principle, inforced their arguments against the truth of revealed Religion: indeed, what other principle is there that will afford any ground for an objection against it? It is doubted. whether a moral dispensation come from the Author to whom it is ascribed. The doubt arises from our knowledge of his moral character; between which and the dispensation there is a supposed discordancy: But take away the moral character and the doubt Yet his Lordship professes to have no ceases with it. idea of these moral attributes. No matter, They were necessary to be taken into service here, for the sake of carrying on his schemes: and a Philosopher can drop his principle, as a Politician does his friend, when he is of no use, and renew his acquaintance again when he is. These discarded Attributes therefore are on this occasion taken into favour; soon indeed, to be dismiffed again, and his OLD PRINCIPLE of no morality in the Godhead, reassumed, when he wants to guard against the terrors of a FUTURE STATE; in which, to do it justice, it performs true Knights fervice.

. monibur opponent i tabésa i puderen. [19] Vol. iv. P. 163

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z. An historical deduction of the abuses and corruptions of Christianity in the Church of Rome, to advance superstition, fanaticism, and spiritual tyranny, makes the second part of his Lordship's reasoning against Revelation; and the subject of the largest of his four Essays.

On this head he expatiates in all the forms of Piety, Patriotism, and Humanity. He bewails the dishonours done to Religion; he resents the violations of civil Liberty; and he vindicates the common sense of mankind from the scholastic jargon of an ignorant, debauched, and avaricious Clergy.

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[&]quot;Moribus opponunt: habeat jam Rom a puderem.

On fortite a topic, the triumph of every true Protest ant from For to Mrin Chandler otheroist from their first to the last good writer upon the subject his Lord and hip may be well excused for unloading his Commonplace. Whatever there is of a better taffel he has taken from Hooker, Stillingfleet, Barrow, and fuch other of the English Clergy who have most such cessfully detected the errors, and fet bounds to the usurpations of Popery. But as the object of our Divines in this detection was to recommend the Gof pel-truth; and of his Lordship, to diforedit it; he had need of other helps . And thefe, too, were at hand; fuch as Hobbes, Toland, Tindal, and Gordon; whom he faithfully copies, both in exage gerating the abuses, and in drawing falle confe quences from the reform of them. Thus, acid cording to those Divines who wrote for truthes school Philosophy was modefly complained of as hindering the advancement of real knowledge as as keeping men busied in trifling controversies, and as making them often miftake words for things. But with my Lord, and these his better guides, who wrote against Revelation, school Philosophy is boldly accused to have blotted out all knowledge, and to have left nothing in it's flead but madness frenzy, and delirium. So again, The end of those Divines in opposing Church-Tyranny was to introduce a RELIGIOUS SOCIETY on the principles of Gospel-liberty: but the end of these Philosophers in decrying Popery is to establish a civil, in the place of a religious usurpation, and to make the Church A CREATURE OF THE STATE. In the mean time, he fays boldly and well, " That some men are IMPU-

" DENT enough to pretend, others silly enough to believe, that they adhere to the Golpel, and main-" tain the canic of God against infidels and heretics " when they do nothing better nor more than expose the concerts of men [20]. But while he is thus bufy in observing what happens at one end of this common fallacy, where the conceits of men are miftaken for the cause of God, he suffers himself to flip in, at the other: and does just the same against the Gospel, which these impudent and fifty men do for it. He exposes the knavery of powerful Churchmen, and the folly of profound Divines; and then. pretends, or believes, that he hath discredited Revelation itself.

However, to part friends with the DIVINES, after fo many hard words, he teaches them how to prop up, in some plausible way, their bungling systems of Archiercial Turology, just as he had before taught God Almighty himself to mend his two Difpensations. " Let us (says he) suppose a Theist objec-" ting the believer might reply he might add he " might add - and all this with great plausibility at. " leaft [1]." You will fay now, I envy my Lord the glory of his instructions, so well calculated to defend artificial theology, or otherwise I, who am not fparing of my quotations, would have given them at. large. To tell you the truth, I suppressed them with design; and in order to excite the Reader's curiofiey. I am told there is need of it; and that this first Philosophy, this physic of the foul, is not swallowed with that eagerness which might he expected or hoped

[20] Vol. iv. p. 385.

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for, on the first appearance of so great a bleffing. You will suspect, by what you have observed in my former Letter, that the Public may possibly be overdosed. But what if they be? It is only making it a little more palatable, and his Followers will soon reconcile them to their Physic.

4. His Lordship's fourth and last great Principle is the IMPOSSIBILITY of REVELATION in general.

He has refused no arms, we see, to combat the Revelations God hath actually given. He would seem to relax a little of his hossility, as to those which God may possibly give: for in one place he says, he will not absolutely pronounce against the possible of God's revealing his will to man. But whether he equivocates, whether he altered his mind, or whether he simply forgot himself to matter of little consequence) most true it is, that he hath sormally laid down, and largely insisted upon, certain Principles, which make revealed Religion a thing OTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE.

First, As to Inspiration, He not only denies all reality in the Thing, but will not allow so much as any meaning in the Word. And a Miracle, he holds amongst matters impossible; what never did, nor ever can exist.—But now, Without the first, no divine Messenger could be sent; for he must receive his Orders from God; and, without the second, no divine Messenger would be believed; for he must have his Credentials to Man; and these credentials, on his Lordship's own principles, can be no other than nursels.

But here again you are to observe, that on this subject likewise, Insidelity is no more indebted to him than

than for his good will. All he arges against Infpiration and Miracles having been first arged by House's and Spinozaguby the one, with more fabrilty and exact noted to by the other, with infinite more elegancely will assure the start of the property of the start of the star

Secondly, As to NATURAL RELIGION, His Lord-ship holds it to be full, perfect, and well understood. He holds, likewise, that the only conceivable purpose of Revolution must be to republish this natural Religion. The consequence is, and this his Lordship gives us to understand, that the use of Revolution is superseded. For if it teaches more than natural Religion taught, or different from what it taught, the Revelation is evidently safe; If only the same, it is evidently supershuous.

This, his Lordship attenty rejects. But sounded Religion is nothing effection that exercise of that very Providence, to some declared and perpose in the moral System.

On all these accounts, he concludes, and consequentially enough, that REASON HAS NOTHENG EURTHER TO DO, WHEN REVEL A THOM BERSES [2.]

You have now, Sir, the whole of his loadship of System, together with his principal topics for the support of it; both indeed very succinctly delivered; enough however to shew you that these famous Essays, which you have so often heard cried up as the very Mine, and Treasury of all divine and human.

But here again you are to observe, that on this subjest likewise, Infide 1972.9 w. 1980 El nachted to him

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Warehouse of other men's lumber on (not to dischange honour his Londship by a low comparison) like ther mouth of your neighbouring Sevens, turbulent and dirty: which, let fabling Poets say what they please, we are sure never derived it's source from the pure and perennial Urn of a Demi-God: but, if one may guess by the taste and colour, became thus considerable from the constuence of shallow brooks and bab, bling rivulets, of stagnant ditches, common-sewers, and yet stranger mixtures, scoured off and put into a ferment by the hasty rage of some peevish land-torrent.

Revolution is bridged at the literal of the words at a

THE main pillar of his System, you fee, is this extravagant paradox, That we have no a brow are ideas of Gad's meral attributes, bis goodness and jus-TICE, as we bave of his natural, his Wifdom and Power. And here, let me observe once for all, that his Lordship uses the words, inadequate ideas, and, no ideas, as terms of the same import. And I. think, not improperly. I have therefore followed, him in the indifferent use of either expression. For the reason of his calling our ideas of God's moral attributes, INADEQUATE, is, because he denies that. goodness and justice in God, and goodness and justice, amongst Men, are the same IN KIND. But if not the fame in kind, we can have no idea of them; because we have no idea of any other kind of goodness. true last trian the product of telled who of and human

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As the reasoning on this head, contrary to his usual wont, is intirely his own; and extremely curious in itself, I will once more go a little out of my way to set it in a true light; that it may neither impose by it's novelty; nor too much shock You and all good men by it's unchecked atrocity.

His three Positions are,

we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

2. That our knowledge of his attributes are to be acquired only by a contemplation on his Works, or by the reasoning a posteriors.

3. That in this way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his natural attributes, not of his moral.

"Ir is from the constitution of the world ALONE.

(fays his Lordship) and from the state of mankind.

in it, that we can acquire any ideas of the divine attributes, or a right to affirm any thing about them [3]."

The knowledge of the Creator is on many accounts necessary to such a creature as man: and therefore we are made able to arrive by a proper exercise of our mental faculties, from a knowledge of God's works to a knowledge of his existence, and of that infinite power and wisdom which are demonstrated to us in them. Our knowledge of concerning God goes no further [4].

Artificial Theology connects by very problematical reasoning a priori, MORAL attributes, such as we conceive them, and such as they are relatively to us, with the physical attributes of God; tho

[3] Vol. v. p. 331,

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[4] Vol. iv. p. 8 ..

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"there be no fufficient foundation for this proceed"ing, nay, tho the phanomena are in several cases are
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Having thus affored us that the ideas of God's moral attributes are to be got by no consequential reargoning at all, either a priori or a posteriori, the only two ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if Man hath such ideas, they were not found but invented by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full disucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the authors of the FICTION, and how strangely the thing came about.

Some of the Philosophers (says his Lordship).

"having been led by a more full and accurate contemplation of Nature to the knowledge of a surpreme self-existent Being of infinite power and wildow, and the fiest Cause of all things, were not contented with this degree of knowledge. They made a System of God's moral as well as physical attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his providence [6]."

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These Philosophers then, it seems, invented the system of God's moral attributes, in order to account for the difficulties arising from the view of God's moral government. If the World till now had been so dull as to have no conception of these Attributes; his Lordship's Philosophers, we see, made amends; who were so quick witted to conceive, and so sharp sighted to find out, the obliquities of a crooked line before they had got any idea of a straight one. For

[5] Vol. v. p. 316.

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just to this, neither more nor lefs, does his Lordship's observation amount, that they made a System of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedingu of his Providence. "Till now, no man could conceive how any doubts concerning moral Government could arise but on the previous ideas of the moral attributes of the Governor. This invention of his Lordship's old Philosophers puts us in mind of an ingenious Modern, the curious Sancho Pancha; who, as his historian tells us, was very inquisitive to discover the author of that very useful invention we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magistrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the First Philosophy. Now the things fought after by Sancho and his Lordship were at no great distance: for if Sleeping began when men first thut their eyes, it is certain the idea of God's Goodness appeared as foon as ever they opened them. 31110897

Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the moral attributes a priori, I shall leave, as his Lordship is pleased to do, in all it's force. If the Doctor's followers think their Master's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a fafe to fhew their prowefs. I rather chuse to undertake the noble Philosopher on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments a posteriori. For he is such a Champion for the good Caufe, that he not only appoints his Adversaries the Field, but prescribes to them the use of their weapons are religious Policians

But his Lordship, like other great men, is not easily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be feen. You catch his PIRST PHILOSOPHY, as Butler's Hero did Aristotle's FIRST MATTER, undressed, and without a ray of form, however flaunting and flutterfaui.

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entire neglect of method betrays him into endless at retire neglect of method betrays him into endless at retirems: and in these, whether for want of precision in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his composition, the question is perpetually changing; and rarely without being new covered by an equivocal expression. If you add to this, the perpetual contrant tons into which he falls, either by defect of memory, excess of passion, or distress of argument, you will allow it to be no easy matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to represent him to the best advantage: in none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done this, the business is over; and his Lordship's reasoning generally consutes itself.

When I reflect upon what this has coff me, the reading over two or three bulky volumes to get poffession of a single argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you lofe; which meets you full when you least expect it; and slips away from you the very moment it promifes to do most: when, I fay, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of the English CLERGY, who, tho apparently least fit, as being made Parties; certainly least affected, as there is nothing that can impose on a Scholar, and a great deal that may millead the People, are likely to be the men most engaged with his Lordship in this controversy. Time was, when if a Writer had a disposition to seek objections against Religion, tho' he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digest his thoughts, and methodize his reasoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to answer him, if they found themselves able. But fince this flovenly custom (as Lord SHAFTS-BURY calls it) has got amongst our Free thinkers, of taking their physic in public, of throwing about their loofe and crude indigestions under the name of FRAGMENTS, things which in their very name imply not so much the want, as the exclusion of all form, the Advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he must work them into consistence, he must mould them into shape, before he can fafely lay hold of them himself, or present them handsomely to the Public. But these Gentlemen have provided that a Clergyman should never be idle. All, he had of old to attend, was the faving the fouls of those committed to his care. He must now begin his work a great deal higher; he must first convince his slock that they have fouls to be faved. And the spite of all is, that at the fame time his kind Masters have doubled his task, they appear very well disposed to lessen his wages.

WE have observed, that the DENIAL of God's moral attributes is the great barrier against Religion in general: but it is more especially serviceable in his Lordship's idiosyncratic terrors; the terrors of a future State. To these we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, composed occasionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each stronger than the other, to support himself under his frequent parox-For, let the moral attributes aside, and we can neither form any judgment of the end of man, nor of the nature of God's moral government. All our knowledge will be confined to our present state and condition [7]. It is by these Attributes, we learn,

^[7] One of his Lordship's Corollaries therefore from the Proposition of no moral actributes, is this, " Our Knowledge that able.

All the world have been been as the

that man was made for bappiness; and that God's diffentation to us here is but part of our moral fyllem: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates

our knowledge in, Futurity.

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The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the question of God's moral attributes, I hold it of much importance to prove against his Lordship, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM IN the fame way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's natural attributes: And the knowledge of thele, his Lordship deduces from its orginal in the following words.

All our knowledge of God (fays he) is derived " from his works. Every part of the immense Universe, and the order and harmony of the Whole, are not only conformable to our ideas or notions " of WISDOM and POWER, but these ideas and no-" tions were imprefied originally and principally by " them, on every attentive mind; and men were led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite wisdom and power made, preserved, and governed the fystem. As far as we can discover, we discern these in all his works; and where we cannot difcern them, it is manifefuly due to our imperfection, not to his. This now is real knowledge, or there is no fuch thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themselves, in God, and in Nature, the work of "God. We know what suifdom and power are: we " know both intuitively, and by the help of our fenfes, that fuch as we conceive them to be, fuch

concerning God goes no further than for the necessary use " of human life," Vol, iv. p. 486,

" Worker [8]."

All this is mighty well: and on these very grounds I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and precise ideas of God's GOODNESS and JUSTICE.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are gone thus far, rather to redress all ambiguity in the terms, and equivocation in the use of them; it will be proper to explain what true Philosophy means by Gop's works, whether physical or moral.

Now, it means, if I am not mistaken, that con-STITUTION OF THINGS which God hath established, and directed to a plain and obvious end: no regard being had to those impediments or obstructions in it's course, which the Author of nature hath permitted to arise from any part of the material, or intellectual Creation.

Thus, when we consider his physical works, in order to make our estimate of his wisdom and power, we conceive them as they are in themselves; and in the perfection of their constitution; tho' the greater portions of the physical system may, from the intractability of Matter, be subject to some inconsiderable irregularities; which, as the true PHILOSOPHER [9] obferves, will be apt to increase till this System wants a reformation: and tho' the smaller Portions, such as the bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in their conception and birth, often want that convenient formation and adaption of their parts, from the won-

[8] Vol. v. p. 524. [9] Newton,

luftesbecoming Cod yous no further than for the necessary was

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derful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of animals in general, arises so illustrious an evidence of the wisdom and power of the Workman.

Surely, then, common sense and all equitable meafure require us to estimate God's moral Works upon
the same standard: to consider what the moral constitution is in itself: and (when the question is of God's
goodness and justice) to keep that view distinct: and
not suffer it to be disturbed or broken by any interruptions occasioned by the perverse influence either
of the passion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For, here, Both concur to violate the Constitution: In the natural system, man's Free-will has no
place: in the moral, the abuse of Free-will occasions
the greatest of it's disorders.

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In profecuting this question, therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's wisdom and power, we consider the natural system so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by the general Laws of matter and motion: so, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his goodness and justice, we should regard the moral system so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by that GENERAL LAW, which annexes happiness to wirtue, and to wice, misery.

Thus much, and only thus much, is God's work, in either system: and it is from God's work we are to demonstrate his Attributes. The rest, (where disorders real or apparent obtrude themselves to obstruct our views in these discoveries) proceeds from Matter and the buman Mind.

And it is not to be forgotten, that the conclusion we draw from hence, in support of our adequate ideas

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of God's moral attributes, has the greater strength upon his Lordship's own principles; who holds, that this Constitution arises folely from the WILL of God: For then we are fure that the WILL, which annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice, must arise from God's moral rather than from his first physical nature, or is modified the question is o stuten

Having premised thus much; no more, indeed, than necessary to obviate one continued Sophism, that runs thro' all his Lordship's reasonings, against the moral attributes (where, the course and operation of that moral Conflitution, as it appears under the disturbances occasioned by man's free-will, is perpetually put for the Constitution itself) I now proceed to shew, from God's works, that we have as precise ideas of his GOODNESS and JUSTICE as of his power and wifdom.

His Lordship observes, that from every part of the immense universe, and from the harmony of the whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmost certainty, that a Being of infinite wisdom and power made, preserved, and governed the fiftem. This, he observes in favour of the natural attributes. And what should hinder men from making the same observation in favour of the moral, viz. That the happiness and misery, by the very constitution of nature, attendant on Virtue and on Vice, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite goodness and justice made, preferves, and governs the system?

The existence of this moral Constitution his Lordship acknowledges. Let us confider it, therefore, both as it respects BODIES of men, and INDIVIDUALS.

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That Communities are always happy or miferable in proportion as their Manners are virtuous or vicious, his his Lordship himself is the readiest to demonstrate. If such a Constitution of things does not be speak the Author of It good and just, how is it possible to conclude any thing of the character of the Creator from his Works? His Lordship thinks, that from the marks of wisdom and power in the physical system we learn with the utmost certainty that God is wise and powerful; and he says, that we acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our senses. Are there not the self-same marks of goodness and justice in this part at least of the moral system that respects Communities? And do not we come to know as immediately by our senses, and as certainly by our reason, that God is good and just ?

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If we consider the moral Constitution, as it respects Particulars, we see virtue and vice have the same influence on our happiness and misery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions in the means to the end than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual Natures have here more power to disorder the harmony of the System. In Communities, it can rarely be disturbed, but by a Pestilence, or that other moral Plague, a Hero or a Conqueror: Amongst Particulars, indeed, physical evil and the abuse of free-will operate more strongly. But when once the demonstration of the moral attributes is clearly made from that part of the Constitution which regards Communities, it can never be shaken by the disorders in that, which regards Particulars. The established truth is now a Principle for further discoveries; and all we can fairly deduce from these disorders is the CERTAINTY of a future State. But this by the way.

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What I infift upon at present is, that, to decide the question concerning God's Attributes, we are to consider the Constitution of things, as it is in itself, simply. This is, properly, God's work. The disorders in it, occasioned by the abuse of man's free will, is not his work, but man's. This, his Lordship too, upon another occasion, namely, when he combats the argument of a future state, from an unequal Providence, is perpetually repeating. So that these disorders must, even on his Lordship's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we estimate God's Nature and Attributes from his Works.

" But we fee not those disorders in the natural world, which we both fee and feel in the moral." This would be some objection did God in the moral, as in the natural system, direct immediately, or constitute things mechanically; or had Free-will the same influence on the natural as on the moral system. - Did God direct in both Constitutions, immediately or mechanically; or did he direct immediately and mechanically in neither, and that yet the moral remained more subject to disorder than the natural, it might indeed follow that we had not so clear ideas of God's goodness and justice as of his wisdom and power: But fince he has thought fit to Jeave man, FREE; and has been pleased to suffer the abuse of free-will to affect the moral system, and not the natural; as this, I fay, is the cafe, the superiour irregulatities n the one do not take off from the equal clearness of the demonstration, which re sults from the nature of bath Constitutions. This difference (to speak in the words of a late writer) is not to be ascribed to a contrary conduct in the Governor of the two " Systems, but to the contrary natures of the Subthe plant benefit to

if jects. Paffive matter being totally inert, it's re-" fistance to the Laws impressed upon it, must be " extremely weak: and confequently the diforders " arifing from that refiftance proportionably flow and "unheeded: while that active felf-moving principle, " the Mind, flies out at once from the centre of its " direction, and can every moment deflect from the " line of truth and reason. Hence moral disorders " began early, became excessive, and have continu-" ed, through all ages, to disturb the harmony of " the System [10]."

What is here faid will, I suppose, be sufficient to confute the following affertions; and to detect the mistake on which they arise.

" Every thing (fays his Lordship) shews the wif-

" dom and power of God conformably to our ideas

" of wisdom and power in the physical world and in " the moral. But every thing does not shew in like

" manner the justice and goodness conformably to our

" ideas of these attributes in either. The physical attri-

butes are in their nature more glaring and lefs equi-" word [11]:" mest bland switch too View with

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And again, " There is no fufficient foundation in the " phænomena of nature to connect the moral attri-" butes with the physical attributes of God. Nay,

" the phanomena are in several cases repugnant [12]."

But fince he goes fo far as to talk of the want of a foundation, and even a repugnancy; Before I proceed with the main branch of my reasoning, I will just urge one fingle argument for the reality and full evi-

. The parties of the state of the special content out the [10] The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a course of Sermons at Lincoln's-Inn. Vol. i. p. 66.

[11] Vol. v. p. 524. [12] Vol. v. p. 316.

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dence of the moral attributes: and it shall be taken from himself, and shall conclude on his own principles.

He tells us, that such as he, "who apply themfelves to the first Philosophy, apply themselves to the
noblest objects that can demand the attention of
the mind — To the signification of God's will,
concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one
another [13]."

And again, "It is sufficient to establish our moral obligations that we consider them relatively to our own system. From thence they arise: and since they arise from thence, it must be the will of that Being who made the system, that we should observe and practise them [14]."

Let me alk then, How it is that we collect this WILL from the objects which his Lordship allows us to contemplate, namely, his works in this fiftem? He will say from certain qualities in those objects. -What are those qualities ? He will reply, the finesses of means to ends. - Who was the Author of these fitnesses? He hath told us, the God of nature - It was God's will then, that we should use the means, in order to obtain the ends. Now, in the moral System, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happiness. Virtue therefore must needs be pleasing to him; and Vice, as it's contrary, displeasing. Well, but then, as to this like and diflike; it must be either capricious, or it must be regulated on the nature of things. Wifdom, which his Lordfhip condescends to give his Maker, will not allow us to suppose it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things. But if the nature of things be. as his Lordship holds it is, the constitution of God, and depend u on his will, then he who is pleased with

[13] Vol. v. p. 447. [14] Vol. v. p. 452. virtue.

virtue, and displeased with vice, must needs be himfelf good and just.

To proceed now with the principal branch of our reasoning. His Lordship goes on this. But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the physical system, but in effect they did: and all men, at all times, had these notions so strongly impressed on them, that they were led to conclude with the utmost certainty for a Being of infinite power and wisdom.

I defire to know in what time or place it ever happened, before his Lordship philosophised at Battersea, and could find no foundation, in the phanomena of nature, to connect the moral with the physical attributes of God, that a Man, who believed God's infinite wildom and power, did not with equal confidence believe his infinite goodness and justice? In truth, these two sets of ideas, the physical and moral attributes of the Deity, were equally extensive, they were equally steddy, and, till now, they were always inseparable.

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He says, that as far as we can discover, we discern infinite wisdom and power in all God's works: and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection, not to his.

What his Lordship here says will deserve to be considered. A comparison is infinuated between our discovery of infinite power and wisdom from the physical works of God; and our discovery of infinite goodness and justice from his maral works; in which, the advantage is given to the former. Now, in order to come to a just decision in this point (omitting at present the notice of his general Sophism which operates in this observation, as in the rest) we must

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diffinguish between the means of acquiring the knowledge of God's Attributes, and that knowledge when ecquired and hairs in adidio won Lugare o

As to the first, (the means of acquiring,) there feems to be fome advantage on the fide of God's PHYSICAL works. For, as his Lordship rightly observes, where we cannot discern wisdom and power in the physical works it is due to our impersection, not to his: for as men advance in the knowledge of nature we fee more and more of wisdom and power. And he infimates, we cannot fay the fame concerning the difficulties in the moral fustem. It is true, we cannot. But then let us tell him, neither can we fay the contrary. The reason is, The physical system lies open to our enquiries; and by the right application of our fenfes to well tried experiments, we are able to make confiderable advances in the knowledge of Nature. It is not so in the moral system; all we know here are a few general principles concerning its Constitution; and further than this, human wit or industry is unable to penetrate. These general principles are, indeed, amply fufficient to deduce and establish the moral attributes from the moral fyftem; but not fufficient to remove all difficulties that arise from what we see of the actual administration of that fyslem. So that, tho' we cannot fay, that as we advance in the knowledge of the moral fystem we fee more and more of goodness and justice; So neither can bis Lordsbip fay (tho' his words feem to infinuate he could) that as we advance, we fee less and less. Whereas the truth is, beyond those general principles, we cannot advance areall. The long tagenery and to points will ambient an operates in this oblivedon as in the self we mint

But hen, as to the second part in the distinction, (the knowledge, of the attributes, suber atquired.) I hold the advantage, and a great one it is, lies altogether on the fide of the MORAL. And this, I cannot better explain to you than in the words of the writer, quoted just before : " Tho' the idea (fays " this Divine) of God's natural attributes be as clear " in the abstract, as that of his moral, yet the idea. " of his moral attributes is, in the concrete, more. " adequate than that of his natural. The reason " feems convincing. The moral relation in which " we stand to God, as free agents, is just the same whether man exists alone, or whether he be but a link in the chain of innumerable orders of intelli-" gences furrounding the whole Creation. Hence " we must needs have a full knowledge of our duty " to him, and of his disposition towards us: on " which knowledge is founded the exactness of our " conceptions of his moral attributes, his justice and " goodness. But the natural relation in which we, or "any of God's creatures, stand towards him, as " material Beings, is not the same when considered "fimply, as when a portion of a dependent and " connected whole. Because whenever such a whole " exists, the harmony and perfection of it must first of all be consulted. This harmony ariseth from " the mutual subserviency and union of its parts, "But this subserviency may require a ministra-"tion of government, with regard to certain por-"tions of matter thus allied, different from what " might have followed had those portions flood " alone, because that precise disposition, which might " be fit in one case might be unfit in the other. " Hence E 6 a proper :

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"Hence we, who know there is a Whole, of which

" our material fystem is a Part; and yet are totally " ignorant both of it's nature and extent, can have

" but a very confused idea of that physical relation

in which we fland towards God; fo that our con-

" ceptions of his natural attributes, his power and

" wildom, which are founded on that idea, must in

"the concrete be proportionably vague and inadere quate [13]." ell el . el mante le com rein es .

But you will ask, perhaps, whence arises this reciprocal advantage which the moral and the natural attributes have over one another, in the means of acquiring the knowledge of them, and the precision of that knowledge when acquired? I will tell you in two words. Of our own physical fystem, we know many particulars, (that is, we discover much of the means, but nothing of the end) and of the univerful physical fystem we are entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we know but few particulars of our own moral fystem, (that is, we discover only the end, and not the means) and of the universal moral system we understand the general principles.

His Lordship proceeds. This now [the knowledge of God's natural attributes] is real knowledge; or there is no fuch thing as knowledge. We acquire it imme-Miately in the objects themselves, IN Goo, and in nature the work of God up has mousingly it last un our

What his Lordship means by, in God, in distinction from the work of God, I confest I do not understand: Perhaps it may be intended to infinuate, in honour of the natural attributes, that they may be even proved

[15] The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a course of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn, Vol. i. p. 58, & feg. Hence

a priori; for this is not the first time by many, when after having heartily abused a person or thing, he has been reduced to support himself on the authority, or the reasoning they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only used to round the period, and set off his eloquence. However, I agree with him, that this is real knowledge. And so too, I think, is the knowledge of the moral attributes, so gained. Why truly, says his Lordship, I do allow just so much goodness and justice in God as we fee in that CONSTITUTION, which annexes bappiness to virtue and misery to vice. But this. fays he, I think, bad better be called WISDOM. think so too; if by so much, he means no more than what concerns God's natural government: and that he means no more is plain from his making the natural consequence of vice and virtue the only fanction of the moral Law. But I will venture to go further, and fay, that, from what we fee in this Conflitation, we may collect PERFECT goodness and justice. Matter and man's Free-will disturb the Syftem : But if the Constitution be the effect of God's Will, as his Lordship holds it is; and the mark of his Wisdom, as all mankind hold with him; Does not that Wisdom require that his Will should not be defeated? Would it not be defeated, if the disorders occasioned by the perversity of his Creatures were not remedied and fet right? And is not a REMEDY the clearest mark of PERFECT goodness and justice?

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Take it in another light. Free-will croffes the Conflictation, which God, by establishing, shows he intended should take place. This present disturbance could not have been prevented, because, according to my Lord and his Poet, it was necessary to the

fchemes"

86 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGEROKE's fchemes of divine wisdom, that there should be such a creature as Man:

" For in the scale of reasoning life, 'tis plain'

"There must be, somewhere, such a rank as man."

The consequence is, that the disorder will be hereafter rectified.

Had Man indeed been made unnecessarily; and this Man had broke in upon God's general System, his Lordship might have had some pretence to say, as he does, that GOD MEANT THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER PURSUED; that is, that the scheme which annexes happiness to virtue and misery to vice, should remain in it's present condition of an incomplete dispensation, to all eternity. But since Man is acknowledged to be a necessary part of a general System, complete in all it's members, it is nonsense to talk of God's not meaning the particular System should be further pursued, when that further pursuit is only to bring it to it's natural period; short of which, it would remain unfinished nay, unformed. his Lording-history in is and

He goes on. We know what WISDOM and POWER are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the WORK; and therefore we know demonstratively that such they are in the WORKER.

And do we not know what GOODNESS and JUSTICE are? Do we not intuitively, and by the belp of our senses know, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work, namely, in that constitution of things, which, his Lordship tells us, annexes happiness to virtue, and misery to vice? And may

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we not demonstratively collect from thence that such they are in the WORKER? fince this Constitution, his Lordship tells us again, is the effect of God's WILL. On his own principles, therefore, applied to his own state of the reasoning a posteriori, it appears, that God is of infinite goodness and justice, as well as of infinite wisdom and power.

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But to give AUTHORITY to his partial reasoning, (the usual support of all partialities,) He, in one place, puts it into the mouth of Anaxagoras. " Should you " ask Anaxagoras (says he) what goodness is, or jus-" tice? He might bid you, perhaps, turn your eyes " inward, first; then, survey mankind; observe the " wants of individuals, the benefits of fociety, and, " from these particulars, frame the general notions " of goodness and justice. He might go a step fur-" ther: and add, this is buman goodness and buman " justice, such as we can comprehend, such as we can exercise, and such as the supreme mind has " made it both our duty and interest to exercise, by " the constitution of the human fystem, and by the relations which arife in it: from all which our notions of goodness and justice result, and are compounded.

We know then, what goodness and justice are, as well as what wisdom and power are; we know both intuitively and by the help of our senses, that such as we conceive them to be, such they appear in the work. For he bids us turn our eyes inward; then survey mankind; and laftly, observe how reason, from the confitution of buman nature, confirms our intuitive knowledge, and that which we gain by the bels of our fenfes. But what does all this fignify, if Andragoras or his Lordship be in an humour of concluding against their own premisses? Hear then how the speech ends, - " Of divine goodness and divine juf-" tice might this Philosopher conclude, I AM UN-ABLE TO FRAME ANY ADEQUATE NOTIONS [17]. What? Unable to frame those notions which God. by his moral Constitution, has put into our hands; and by the declaration of his will has taught us to apply? __ This old Philosopher, I suppose, was not brought in to be laughed at, like his drunken Church-HELOTES [18]; yet he plays the fool to admiration.-We DO KNOW, fays Anaxagoras, what Goodness and Justice are : we know both intuitively, and by the belp of our fenfes, that fuch as ave conceive them to be, such they appear in the WORK; and THERE. FORE we DO NOT KNOW that fuch they are in the WORKER.

Might I be permitted to address myself to this Renegado Sophist, I would say, —Your brethren, the antient Philosophers, reasoned a posteriori in this manner, "Can you think there is wisdom and power in you, and none in your Maker? —By no means. They reasoned well.—Let me ask you then, is there goodness and justice in you, and none in your Maker?" His answer, I suppose, would be the same. But, prompted by his Lordship, into whose service he is now entered, he perhaps might add, That, from human goodness and justice we cannot come to the NATURE of the divine. What hinders us, I pray you? Is it not from our intuitive conception of our own wisdom and power that we gain an adequate idea of

[17] Vol. iv. p. 126, 176 [18] Vol. v. p. 446.

God's?

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God's? Are wisdom and power MORE PERFECT, as they are found in man, than goodness and justice? If therefore the IMPERFECTION of these attributes in Man hinder our acquiring an adequate idea of those in God, we can have no adequate idea of his wistom and power: If the IMPERFECTION does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his goodness and justice.

But, the inference to God's power and wisdom, his Lordship says, is supported by what men see of the effects of them, in his Works; the order and harmony of the physical System. Do we not see likewise the effects of God's goodness and justice, in the order and harmony of the moral, in the happiness that naturally attends virtue and the misery consequent on vice? And is not the moral System as much God's

Work, as the physical?

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Thus, Sir, you see, that by the very reasoning, his Lordship EMPLOYS to prove the natural attributes, and by the very method he PRESCRIBES to us for prove ing the moral, we have demonstrated these with a precision and a certainty, at least equal to the other. His Lordship seems to have been aware of the event; and therefore when he had fet us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, under pretence of reminding us, that the moral attributes should be examined by, or applied to, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD AND THE STATE OF MANKIND IN IT [18] I had full as much reason to be aware of his Lord-And therefore, in stating the question, at my entrance on the subject, I obviated this miserable Sophism. I call it by no better name, because it is not the constitution of the world or the state of mankind? [18] Vol. v. p. 331...

in it, but the CONSTITUTION OF THE MORAL SY STEM, or the nature of Virtue and Vice, as they effentially operate to produce happiness and misery, by which God's moral attributes are to be tried and afcertained. But this, which is a fleddy, uniform view. he would have us turn from; to contemplate that obscure, diffurbed, and shifting Scene, the actual flate of vice and virtue, of mifery and happiness; amongst men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his VOLUNTARY CONSTITUTION of things, but from the BREACHES in that constitution made by the abuse of man's freewill: which yet, (when he is arguing for an equal providence) he again and again confesses ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently against the folly of those who impute the effects of that abuse to him. Tho' here, (in his various attempts to blot out the idea of God's moral attributes) he be full of the disorders of the moral System considered as part of God's defign.

But fince I have mentioned his arguments for an equal providence, I should be unjust to You, who expect a fair view of his Lordship's Philosophy from me, if I concealed another of his contradictions.—
He had both Man's future State and God's moral attributes to throw out of the religious world; or, to speak more properly, he had Religion to overturn, by taking away it's very ESSENCE: and as the irregularities in the present administration of Providence stood in the way of his first attempt; and the consistency of the moral System, in the way of the other; when he argues against a future State, You would think there were no irregularities; and when he ar-

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gues against the moral attributes, You would think there was no consistency.

We now come to his Lordship's particular objections against the moral attributes. One of them is that they are BOUNDED.

They [the Divines] go further. As God is perfect and man very imperfect, they talk of his infinite goodness and justice, as of his infinite wisdom and power; the the latter may preserve their nature without any conceivable bound, and the former must cease to be what they are, unless we conceive them BOUNDED. Their nature implies necessarily a limitation in the exercise of them. Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, requires infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another; greater profusion in bestowing benefits and rewards, greater vigour in punishing offences [19]."

You have here his Lordship's own words; and now thing less could induce any one to think so disadvantageously of this Righter of wrongs and Redresser of grievances, as they necessarily imply. Let us consider the premisses and examine the inferences both implied and expressed.

He fays, 1. That the moral attributes are bounded; 2. That the natural are not bounded. Let us see to what the first proposition amounts; and how much truth there is in the second:

1. The maral attributes are considered by us as relative to intelligent creatures: The natural are not

combined and connected, and not infinite like the market of the said that of the market of the said said the said that the said

fo considered. Thus the goodness and justice, when relative to man, are greatly bounded; a certain low degree of reward suffices for his good; a certain low degree of punishment for his roil actions. Let God's goodness and justice respect a higher rank of intelligent Beings, and they will be then less bounded; for greater rewards and punishments will be required: and so on, to the highest rank of intelligent creatures. Yet as the highest is at infinite distance from the Creator, the exercise of the moral attributes, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures, must be still bounded.

2. His fecond proposition is, that the natural attributes are not bounded. It is true, these cannot be considered as relative to God's intelligent creatures; yet since, in their exercise, they must be considered as relative to his Creation at large; and since Creation, however immense, is not infinite, the natural attributes so considered are not infinite; but if not infinite, they are bounded. There is no difference therefore, in the exercise of God's attributes, between the moral and the natural, save only in the degree.

But if we confider God's moral and natural attributes more abstractedly, not as they are in the exercise, and relative to intelligent Beings, and to actual Creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both unbounded. Thus we see his Lordship's notable distinction is both imaginary and useless.

However, let us give him all he asks; and then see what he will be able to infer from it.

attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the natural, our idea of them must be obscure and inadequate.

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What! because they are better adapted, as things bounded certainly are than things infinite, to human contemplation? Our idea of such of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whose nature and properties we know, namely MAN, must needs be more adequate and better defined than the idea of such attributes as bear relation to Beings, whose nature and properties we know not, namely the UNIVERSE.

2. His other inference, is expressed in these words: Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, requires infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exercise to one another. To fay, the moral attributes, according to Christian Theology, or, as he is pleased to call it, artificial Theology, requires INFINITELY more, is a wretched calumny. To fay, it requires more, is true. And for this plain reason: the relation between Creator and Creature is very different from that, between Fellow-creatures: therefore the goodness is more abundant: The relation between Lord and Servant is very different from that between Fellow-fervants; therefore the justice is more fevere. And if it would not be deemed too IMPU-DENT to refer his Lordship to Scripture, for instruction tespecially in a matter where the abuse of Scripture was chiefly intended) he might there have found a Parable which would have fet him right: and has always kept artificial Theology, whatever he might think, from going wrong. But infinite, when applied to the exercise of a moral attribute in reference to man, is his Lordship's nonfense, with due reverence be it spoken, not the nonsense of artificial Divines. They were not ignorant that the rule, infir--191kg 19.

miorem vel deteriorem partem seguitur consequentia, held as well in Morals as in Logic. Tho' God be infinite. man is finite; and therefore, with respect to him, the exertion of a moral attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordship himself saw something of this, as appears by his own words. The nature of the moral attributes implies necessarily a limitation in the use of them. And why would he suppose Divines could not see as far into this matter as himself?

But if there be an error in artificial Theology he is as fure, at one time or other, to espouse it; as he is, at all times ready to calumniate the Divine who holds Men, in their ill advised zeal to defend the Scripture-doctrine of the Son's divinity, were not always fufficiently careful in felecting their arguments. Amongst such as had perhaps been better let alone, they employed this; That as man's offence was against an infinite Being, it required an infinite satisfaction; which none but fuch a Being could give. Now his Lordship, we see, espouses this very principle, to discredit God's moral attributes, and the artificial Theology of Jefus Christ; which speaks, indeed, of infinite rewards; but not as matter of due, but of grace.

As the being bounded is one of his Lordship's objections against the moral attributes, so the being merely HUMAN, is another. I an Thomas Washing any other 1

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"After Dr. CLARKE (fays he) has repeated over and over that all the moral attributes are the same " in God as in our ideas; and that he who denies " them to be so may as well deny the divine physical " attributes, the Doctor infifts only on two of the " former, on those of justice and goodness. He was " much in the right to contract the generality of his " affer-22.61 623

" affertion. The absurdity of ascribing TEMPE"RANCE, for instance, or FORTITUDE, to God,
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"eyes that prejudice had blinded the most. But
"that, of ascribing justice and goodness to him, ac"cording to our notions of them, might be better
"covered, and was enough for his purpose, tho"
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his TerWhich shall we most admire: His Knowledge or his Ingenuity? Or shall we follow the advise of his Motto, and Wonder at nothing [1].

When men contemplate what they call moral virtue, or the attributes of Humanity, they divide them into two classes, perfectly distinct from one another, In the first are comprized those which belong to man under the idea of a free intelligent Being, such as goodness and justice: in the second, those which belong to him under the idea of a creature of his own imperfect species, such as temperance and fortitude. The first belong to all free intelligent Beings; the latter, only to such a Being as man: Those arise out of the nature of free intelligence, and fo are common to all: These, from the imperfections of a very inferior creature, and so are peculiar to Humanity; for we eafily conceive a higher Order of free intelligences, in which the moral virtues of the fecond class have no place. They are superior to the impressions of fear, and so have no occasion to exert fortitude: They are removed from the temptation of excess, and so have no room for the exercise of temperance. Now when CLARKE, or any other Di-

[10] Vol. v. p. 311. [1] Nil admirari.

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[10] Vol. v. p. 314. [1] Nil admirari.

vine, had faid, that the moral attributes are the fame in God as in our ideas, What attributes could they poffibly mean but those of the fift class; those which belong to Beings under the idea of free intelligences? Saured as his Lordship is pleased to make Divines, they could never blunder at fuch a rate as to conceive, that those virtues or moral attributes, which proceed from the imperfection of the Creature, might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they supposed to be all perfect. They held, with his Lordship, and they will hold without him, that the great God is infinitely wife and powerful. Were they then in any danger to give him temperance, which implied his being obnoxious to folly; or fortitude, which argued impuisance? Infinite wisdom, therefore, and infinite power, exclude from God the very ideas of remperance and fortitude. But do infinite wifdom and infinite power exclude from God the ideas of goodness and justice? On the contrary, his Lordship, as we shall fee prefently, is reduced to the poor thift of owning goodness and justice to be contained in infinite wisdom 1997 Decision 1997-1997 and power.

At present I leave His Lordship's Admirers to their own meditations on their Master's iPSE DIXIT, That the inferibing goodness and justice to God is NO LESS REALLY ABSURD than the afcribing temperance and fortitude to him Fut sin yould be sould on sould

-But CLARKE contracted the generality of the affertion to ferve a purpose. I think he did : and for one of the best purposes in the world, that of COM-MON SENSE? Had his Lordship been pleased to contract himself on the same principle, he had passed,

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perhaps, for a greater Philosopher; tho' he had cer tainly been a less Writer.

But then, if you ask, What purpose his Lordship had to serve, when he used the equivocal word ALL, (which may signify either all of one kind, or all of every kind) where he observes, Clarke holds, that ALL the moral attributes are the same in God, &c? I answer, it was to give himself the poor pretence to say, that Clarke afterwards contrasted his generality, or, in other words, contradicted himself.

A third objection against the moral attributes is, "That PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS mix with our goodness and justice; which therefore cannot be supposed to be the same in kind with God's; tho' our wisdom and power, with which no passions or affections mix, must be the same in kind with his."

Were passion and affection inseparable from human goodness and justice, the objection might seem to have some force; indeed, not much even then. But how miserable must the objection appear to those who see, as all men may, that they are separable? Separable, I mean, in practice as well as speculation. The true idea of human goodness and justice excludes all passion and affection. What hinders then our rising, from that idea, to divine goodness and justice, any more than our rising, from the idea of human wisdom and power, to the divine wisdom and power; and from perceiving, that as well the moral, as the natural attributes, are the same in kind, both in God and man?

But, this is not all that may be faid in favour of our adequate idea of God's moral attributes, when compared with the natural. For the passion mixes not with the human attributes of wisdom and power,

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foreign combination hinder us from feeing that good-

ness and justice are the same in kind?

Still, further. The MANNER of knowing in God, on which depends his natural attribute of wishom, is confessedly different from what it is in man; and, at the same time, is a thing of which we have no conception .: yet this, according to his Lordship's account, does not hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of diwine wisdom, tho' it rises from what we see of the human.

How happens it then, that, in both these cases, notwithstanding the foreign mixture of the instrumentality of matter, and the manner of knowing, we attain an adequate idea of God's wisdom and power? His Lordship will tell you, it is by separating what is foreign, from what is native to the ideas of wisdom and power. And shall not I have as much credit with You, when I tell you we acquire an adequate idea of God's goodness and justice, by separating from the idea of human goodness and justice the foreign mixture of passion and affection?

But his Lordship has a greater quarrel than all this, with the moral attributes. They give rife to embarrased questions, dishonourable to God, and mischievous to Religion.

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As they [the Divines] modeled God's government on a human plan, so they conceived his perfections, moral as well as physical, by human ideas.

Thus God was said to be the first good:
but then the general notion of abstract idea of this
good was not only taken from human goodness,
but was considered too with little or no other relation than to man — A question arose therefore
on these hypotheses, How could evil come into a system of which God was the author? — this question
made a further hypothesis necessary; another first
God, another coeternal and coequal principle was
introduced to solve it; a first cause of all evil, as
"the other was of all good [3]."

The falle representation of this fact I reserve for another occasion: the falle inference from it is what I now propose to consider.

His Lordship supposes, that the notion of God's moral attributes gave birth to an insoluble question concerning the origin of evil; and that this occasioned the invention of the mischievous hypothesis of the two Principles. Who would have suspected all this evil to arise from the first Good! Yet so it was: And therefore the notion of such a good must be false; or at least, very burtful.

ight, it will unsettle all useful knowledge; because there is no great principle, either in physics, or in natural Theology, but which, if we be not on our guard, and wise enough to stop at the extent of our ideas, will lead us into inextricable embarras: As one might instance in a point that arises out of both these sciences,—The agreement between free-will and prescience.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 88.

This is a well-known cale: And as one of the principal designs of this VIEW is to illustrate his Lordship's great talents, I chose it before any other, because he pretends to untie this knot, which hath so long kept the learned world intangled. "Our ideas slays "he) of divine intelligence and wisdom may be neither fantastical nor false, and yet God's MANNER of knowing may be so different from ours, that fore-knowledge, as we call it improperly in bim, may be consistent with the contingency of events; althose that which we call properly fore-knowledge in ourfelves, be not so [4]."

I have two or three remarks to make on these

words.

Our ideas of God's moral attributes, his goodness and justice, he makes fantastical and false, on account of distinctives arising from them: yet God's natural attributes, his intelligence and wisdom, may, he says, be neither fantastical nor false, tho' a distinctive as great arises from them; namely, the apparent discordancy between free-will and prescience.

My fecond remark is, that his folution is more fantafic and false than the wildest chimera of School-metaphysics. The difficulty in reconciling God's prescience to man's free-will does not arise from our ignorance in God's MANNER OF KNOWING, but from

God's ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

My third remark is, that his Lordship, who is here so penetrating, that he can easily reconcile preficience and free-will, is yet, in another place, so cloudy, that he cannot see how an equal providence and free agency may stand together [5]."

[4] Vol. v. p. 525. [9] See Letter iv.

My last remark is (and it rises out of the foregoing) that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordship sees no dissipulties in any part of the system of Creation: But as soon as ever Religion appears, then dissipulties start up by dozens.

Of this, take an instance from the case in hand, Our ideas of God's moral attributes, he fays, must needs be false, because the conceiving of them by human goodness and justice leads to the question of the origin of earl, confidered morally. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's physical attributes, by human wifdom and power lead to the question of the origin of evil, confidered naturally? Yet our ideas of the physical attributes are neither false nor fantastical. But to this, his Lordship replies, Evil, considered naturally, is not real, but apparent only. Why fo? Because it contributes to the greater good of the May not the same thing be said of Evil, confidered morally? Nay, hath it not been actually faid, and proved too, on the same principles? It follows then, that they are either both real, or both fantaftic.

In a word, the truth is no more than this, Prefumptuous man knows not where to stop. He would penetrate even to the Arcana of the Godhead.

For Fools rush in, where Angels fear to tread."

And this impious humour it was which gave birth to the absurd hypothesis of Two PRINCIPLES. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the moral attributes? Ridiculous! We see it's cause is in vanity and self-conceit; passions that operate alike on all principles.

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As to his Lordship's second inference, that this idea is at least productive of much mischief, and therefore it would be better to have none at all : Let me observe, that the idea of God's very existence is productive of mischief, even all the mischiefs of Supersition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who, befides his Lordship, would fay to [6]? Why then should we think it better to be without the idea of the moral attributes, even tho' the evils it produced were necessary? But that is not the case. They are cafual only: the illue of pride and prefumption; which this idea does not at all influence.

3. However, these moral attributes, if not hurtful, are useress; and this is his next cavil. "In-" finite wisdom and power (says his Lordship) have " made things as they are: how goodness and justice " required they should be made is neither coran ju-" dice, nor to any rational purpose to enquire [7]." To inquire how the universe of things should be made, serves indeed to no reasonable purpose. But to inquire concerning our own state and condition in this Universe, is either coram judice, or we were fent into the world to stare about us, and pass judgment upon nothing. His Lordship's sophistry seems to confound two things that common fense has always diffinguished; our own business from other men's. When the King holds a bed of justice, 'tis not for every Particular to inquire into all his measures : But every Particular who is summoned to attend the Court, is much

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^[6] He indeed fays, be bad rather be an Atheift than acknowledge the Christian Theology, and we may believe him. See Vol. iv. p. 34. Printed Seeding with the seed of

^[7] Vol. v. p. 363.

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concerned to know how he himself shall be dealt with. His Lordship, indeed, is ready to say, We are not summoned; that is, we are not accountable creatures. But this is begging the question.

Again, to inquire, much more to prescribe bow things should be made, in any particular system, has all the folly, prefumption, and impiety, which his Lordthip charges upon it : Because the Parts having a relation to the Whole, an all-wife Architect makes them in conformity to that Whole, of which, we know nothing; and therefore our only conclusion should be, that the Part we do know, is conflituted for the best. But it is another thing to fay (which is all that Divines have faid, how differently foever his Lordthip is pleased to represent the matter) that God will act equitably with his rational Creation, by distributing good and evil to them according to their deferts; because this does not depend upon any Whole, of which we know nothing, but on his attributes of goodness and justice, of which, we know enough to determine with certainty concerning his final dealing with men. To pass our judgment here is fo far from folly or impiety, that not to do it would be flupidity or hypocrify. To call this proceeding, as his Lordship does, the patching or botching up one System with another, is a gross misrepresentation. It is fairly taking in the Whole, to determine concerning the destination of the Parts.

AT LENGTH, he ends just where he set out, That we have NO IDEAS of the moral attributes at all. "Upon the whole matter (says he) we may conclude fasely from error, and in direct opposition to CLARKE, that goodness and justice in God cannot be conceived,

or quithout manifest presumption and impiety, to be the same " as in the ideas we frame of these perfections when we "consider them in men, or when we reason about them " abstractedly in themselves: but that in the supreme "Governor of the World they are something TRANscendent, and of which we cannot make any " true judgment, nor argue with any certainty about "them [8]." And in this, his Lordship tells us he is justified by the authority of St. Paul and Dr. BARROW. These true great Diwines (fays be) are on my fide [0]. Who would have thought of two fuch honograble Supporters for his Lordship's Atchievements? One thing I have observed, which may be worth reflecting on? A ftrange propensity in Freethinkers to mistake their enemies for their friends; and as firange a propenfity in the Clergy to mistake their friends for their enemies. The turn is odd enough on both fides; and, at first view, feems a little mysterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in it than this, - Free thinkers have invented this trick, to amuse the Clergy, in order to kindle their suspicions, and inflame their jealoufy against their best friends: And, unhappily, the Clergy have, now and then, fallen into the foare.

But, after what has passed, who would expect that the leather-dreffing Pontiff of all men should have been thought worthy to support the first Philosophy ! What has St. PAUL done at last to deserve this honour? Why, in answer to the objections against God's difpensations in the religious World, the Apostle refers us, " for entire fatisfaction, to the incomprehenfible rogg exer, and in dued oppolision to District.

Ampakheus

^[8] Vol. v. p. 250. a. [9] Vol. v. p. 362.

" wildom of God, who frequently in the course of his " providence ordereth things in methods transcend-"ing our abilities to discover or trace [10]." This folution, which is here extolled for it's great modefly. is referred to, in another place, for it's greater impu-DENCE [11]. It may be either, just as his Lordship is in humour; who, notwithstanding his long study of Locke, feems totally to have lost all ideas of moral moder. How elfe was it possible, after having treated the whole body of Mankind in the manner he has done, he should gravely tell his Friend, "That few men, he be-" lieves, have consulted others both living and the " dead, with DESS PRESUMPTION, and in a GREAT-" ER SPIRIT OF BOCILITY, than he has done [12]." I fometimes thought a word was wrong printed; and that for confulted, we should read, infulted; for in a great man, there is no prefumption, whatever meanness there may be, in insulting his inferiors. And as for his docility, that will hardly be disputed, it being certain that from the Author, whom he has infulted most, he has condescended to fleat more.

But St. PAUL fays, we must have recomfe to the incomprehensible wisdom of God. In good time. But
how does this prove that, in Paul's opinion, we have
no adequate idea of the moral attributes? Unless the
quality of an Agent, and his action, be one and the
fame thing. You, Sir, have an adequate conception,
I am fure, of our gracious Monarch's goodness and
justice; but you have a very imperfect comprehension
of several of his State-measures. I frequently at-

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^[10] Vol. v. p. 360. [11] Vol. iii. p. 307.

every species of fallerreasoning was to be the fallent Dr. Barrow, I prefume, will fland his Lordfhip in ho better flead than St. Paul. As the dealings of every wife man (fays the Doctor) are fometimes of founded upon maxims, and admit justifications not " obvious or penetrable by vulgar conceit, fo may. "God act according to rules of wisdom and inflice. "which it may be quite impossible by our faculties "to apprehend, or with our means to descry. As " there are natural modes of Being and operation, fo "there may be prudential and moral modes of pro-"ceeding, far above our reach, peculiar objects of "divine wifdom not to be understood by any crea-"ture, especially by creatures who stand in the low-"reft form of intelligence; one remove from beafts. "In fine, those rules of equity and experience which I we in our transactions with one another do use, if " they be applied to the dealings of God will be "found very incongruous or deficient, the case be-" ing vaftly altered from that infinite diffance in na-" ture and flate between God and us, and from the " immense difference which his relations, towards us " have tempted

"have from our relations to one another blig 3 What now has all this, which relates only to the incomprehenfible nature of God's providence) to do with our inadequate ideas of bis moral attributes? At least, if his Lordship will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence incomprehenfible, must needs think our ideas of his moral attributes inadequate; he must go a flep further; and confess, that Barrow supposed our ideas of the natural attributes to be inadequate likewife; for he puts both on the fame footing . As there are NATURAL modes of Being and operation, flays the Doctor) fo there may be prudential and MORAL modes of proceeding far above our reach. But as this would beigoing too far, farther than the first Philosophy will allow of, I suppose he would be content to give up this quotation from Barrow, as nothing to the purpole. ATLAST, and when you would leaft expect it. Common fense and Common-fentiments return. And God's moral attributes, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. At Where Religions (fays his Lord-

God's moral attributes, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. It Where Religions (fays his Lord-thip) which pretend to be revealed, prevail, a mew character of God's goodness arises—an artificial goodness which stands often in the place of the Man rua at [14]. And this, after he had so often told us, that we have no adequate idea of any goodness at all Well, but as awkwardly as God's natural goodness and, in every sense, a posteriori, yet it comes, and deserves to be made welcome. All the knowledge (says he) that God has given to us the means to acquire, and therefore all he designed we should have of his physical and MORAL.

a [13] Vol. v. p. 361, 2. . . . [74] Yol, v. P. 431-

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es nature and attributes, is derived from bis works. and from the remode or THAT PROVIDENCE by which he governs them [ay] all You will observe the words - the remove of that Providence - I have detected the fophishy of them before, where I have flated the meaning of the terms, God's works, b I bid you observe them now, to judge of the following climax, (if I may fo call it) or walk down frairs, " The " wifdom is not fo often difcernible by us fin God's works as the power of God, nor the goodness as the " wifelom \$16] " As feanty and flender as the knowledge in of God's moral attributes, which his Lordship here allows us to collect from his works, yet it flatly contradicts what his System had obliged him over and over to maintain particularly in the following words an Of divine goodness and divine justice tlays his Lordship in the person of Anaxagoras) Lan unable to frame any adequate nations [19], fram God's to the month actual the second and actual process and the second t

This Mock-concellion is again repeated, and as earefully guarded. By natural Theology (fays his Lordship) we are taught to ack nowledge and adore the infinite missions and power of God, which he has manifested to us in some degree or other in every part, even the most minute, of his Creation. By that the, we are taught to notice guadness and justice to him, wherever he intended we should so as forthe dispensations of his providence do as a seasth at my communicate these notions to our minds, as

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^[15] Vol. v. p. 523, 4. [16] Vol. v. p. 335.

those of wildom and power, are communicated to

What his Lordship would have you infer from this is, that we are no where taught to afcribe goodness and justice to God; fince the dispensations of his provisdence do no was a s, in his Lordship's opinion, sel-CESSARTEY communicate thefe notions. But allow him his premifes, that neither God's Works nor Difpenfations do NECESSARILY communicate to us the notions of God's goodness and justice : Would his conclusion follow, that therefore we are no where taught in these works and dispensations to ascribe those attributes unto him? Suppose these works and dispensations did only PROBABLY Communicate these notions to our minds, will not this probability teach us to ascribe goodness and justice to him? God hath so framed the confliction of things, that man, throughout his whole conduct in life should be necessarily induced to form his judgment on appearences and probable arguments. Why then not in this, as well as the reft? or rather, why not in this, above the rest? if so be that indeed God had not (as I have shewn he hath) necessarily communicated these notions. - But fill, what is this to our adequate idea of the moral attributes, the point in question? God's not necessarily commencating affects only the reality, not the precifien of the idea. All therefore we learn by the observation, which would thus put the change upon us, it, that his Lordship has a very strong inclination, that God should have neither goodness nor justice , so far as they carry with them any DISPOSITION to reward or

[18] Vol. V. p. 4274

punish.

panish, wiferas to the Attributes thenselver, divelted of their confequences , and undiffurbed by our merious IMITATION fight he has little or no quarrel with them : His bondship certainly never intended to teach the common Readen more of the fecrets of his Philosophy than what NECESSARIDS arises from his professions. But to make God treat Mankind in this manner, communicate to their minds the appearance of Attributes which he has not, is drawing an image of the Deity from his Lordship's own likenes; the very fault he fo much centures in Divines. But if it must needs be that God is to be represented either after Them, or after his Lordship, I should chuse to have the Clergy's God, tho' made out of no better fuff than ARTIPICIAL THEOLOGY, because this gives him goodness and justice, rather than his Lordthip's God, which has neither, altho' composed of the more refined materials of the FIRST PHILOSO-PHY. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he fays, That men conceive of the Deity, more humano; and that his Lordship's God and the Clergy's God, are equally faithful copies of themselves, and his stalls benefingapance will ism

In a word, if God teaches, whether clearly or obfeurely, he certainly intended we should learn. And what we get even by appearances, is real knowledge, upon his Lordship's own principles. For if Truth be, as he affures us it is, of fo precarious a nature as to take it's Being from our own System, it must be real as far as it appears. " Our knowledge (fays this

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^[20] OUR OBLIGATION TO IMITATE GOD IS A FALSE AND PROFANE DOCTAINE. Vol. V. P 65. spinite.

"ogreat Philosopher) is so dependent on our own which system that a great part of hit would not be described the ledge perhaps, but error in any others [20]. It was

It is thus he involves himself in perpetual contradictions: And it is always thus, when men dispute (for believe they cannot (1),) against common notices; and the most obvious truths; such as liberty of will; the certainty of knowledge; and this, which, I reckon, obtrudes itself upon us as forcibly as either, the more not always of the Delta of the delta to the contradictions.

But the game is now on foot. Let us follow clofely. We have unravelled him through all his windings; and we may foon expect to fee him take thelter in the thick cover of God's incomprehensible Nature; and rather than allow, more than in jest, the moral attributes of the Deity, ready to resolve all his Attributes, both natural and moral, into one indeption of the Perfection.

But fost. Not yet. We must come to it by degrees and regular advances. First, the moral attributes are to be resolved into the natural.

"may be confidered separately, as we are apt to confider them; and if the LATTER and every thing we ascribe to these, are not to be RESOLVED rather into the former; into his infinite intelligence, wisdom, and power [2]. It is yet, we see, but

od 20 de likepie 356, i kan dat were ademan tal ik in de

will of man no one can deny be bas, without LYING, or renouncing his intuitive knowledge. Vol. v. p. 406.

^[2] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.

a question; and that only, whether the moral attributes are not to be resolved into the natural. In the next passage the matter is determined. If think (and what he thinks, he holds it but reasonable we should all think) "that the moral attributes of the supreme Being are absorbed in his wisdom; that we should consider them only as different modifications of this physical attribute [3]."

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go any higher, let us fet together his INCONSIS-TENCIES, as they appear in this fituation. Sometimes the ideas of divine wisdom are better determined than those of divine goodness [4] : Sometimes we have no ideas at all of divine goodness [3] . And sometimes again, (as in the place before us), the divine goodness is the fame as wisdom, and therefore, doubtless the idea of it as well defined. Now, of all thefe affertions, to which will his Lordship fick? To which, do you ask? To none of them, longer than they will flick to him : And flraggling, undisciplined Principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to flick long to any fide: As foon as they begin to incline towards the enemy, he has done with them. Come, if you will needs have it, you shall, The fecret is this. The attributes are mere wasnes and there is an end of them. All that remains, worth fpeaking of, is one undefined ETERNAL REASON: and fo the Farce concludes.

"The moral ATTRIBUTES (fays he) are barrly wames that we give to various manifestations

^[3] Vol. v. p. 335. [4] Vol. v. p. 341, 526.

of the infinite wifdom of one fimple uncompounded butes are not to be retolved into the watif. [6] guird on

Of divine goodness and divine justice I am un-" able to frame any adequate notions ; and inflead of conceiving such distinct moral attributes in the " fupreme Being, we ought, perhaps, to conceive no-" thing more than this, that THERE ARE VARIOUS

" APPLICATIONS OF ONE ETERNAL REASON, WHICH

"TT BECOMES US LITTLE TO ANALYZE ENTO

"ATTRIBUTES [7]. TO ASPENDE AND ASPENDENCE AND ASPE

To this miferable refuge is his Lordhip reduced to avoid divine justice. But why, you fay, did he not speak out at first, and end his quarrel with the morel attributes at once? Your humble fervant for that Barefaced NATURALISM has not fuch charms as to make her received when and wherever the appears. There is need of much preparation, and not a little difguife, before you can get her admitted even to what is called good company - But then, after he had refolved to speak out, Why, you ask, does he flop again in his career, and, when his premiffes are general against all attributes, his conclusion is particular, against the meral only ? Not without reason, I affure you. He had need of the natural attributes, to fer up against the moral; and therefore had himself analyzed this eternal reason into the specific attributes of wifdom and power. But when he faw his Adverfaries might, by the same way, analyze it into goodness and justice, he then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method: But it was to be done obliquely: and hence arifes all this embarrais and tergiversation.

and bear relation to one alreed and then are fay [6] Vol. v. p. 453.

the would willingly, if his Reader be to pleased, analyze the eternal reason into wisdom and power but there he would stops and leave the other side of the heards reason, unanalyzed and if goodness and justice should chance to flort out, he has a trick to resolve and absorb them into wisdom and power, as only different modifications of the physical attributes. But if this revolts his Readers, and they expect equal measure; then, rather than give them back the goodness and justice which he has been at all this pains to proscribe, he will throw swiftom and power after them, and resolve all into the one eternal power after them,

Bashful Natural has now thrown aside her Veil; and is, we see, ready to sace down and defy her Rival; whom till now she was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to represent his last effort of her insolence by another passage from the Section quoted once or twice already

We have been told, and with airs of supe-

sas they are commonly specified, and distinguished

" into natural and moral, are a mere human fiction;
" invented, by aid of analogy from the actions,

paffions, and qualities observable in man and

" that the simple nature of Deity is one uniform per-

fection; of which, Infinity being the bafe, we can

" have no diffinct idea or conception, have said to

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"To this it will be sufficient to reply, that it is indeed true, that these specific attributes, from
which we deduce all our knowledge of the nature and will of God, are somed on analogy,

" and bear relation to ourselves. But then we say

fuch attributes are not, on that account, the lefs off real or effential. The light of the Sun is not in the orbitself, what we fee it in the Rollnow. There it is one candid, uniform perfect blaze of " glory: here, we separate it's Perfection into the various attributes of red, yellow, blue, surple and "what else the subtle optician so nicely distin-" guishes. But still the folar light is not loss real in the Rainbow, where it's rays become thus un-"twifted, and each differing thread diffinelly feen in thits effect, than while they remained united and " incorporated with one another in the Sun: bluft " fo it is with the divine Nature: it is one simple " individual Perfection in the Godhead himfelf: but when refracted and divaricated, in paffing "through the medium of the human mind, it be-"comes power justice, mercy; which are all fe-" parately and an aquar sur represented to the "understanding [8]." But that his Lordship fo frequently discards his own principles. I should hope he would fubmit to this illustration, fince he owns that we fee the Deity in a reflected, not in a direct light [9].

knowledge it conveys is real, not fantastic: For mirrors are not wont to reflect the species of the mind's visions, but things exterior and substantial. To turn us, therefore, from God's attributes, (tho' the indirect, yet the well-defined, Image of him) because they discover something to us we may not like, a mall and a future judgment, to turn us, I say, [8] The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a saw set Sermons as Lincoln's Inn, Vol. i. p. 57, 18.

This is confficet, Tage.q.v vol [6] he

from thefe, to the undefined eternal reason is doing like certain french Philosophers, who when they quarrelled with Newton's Theory of light and colours, contrived to break the Prism by which it was demonstrated on part of a process with a works

And now, Sir, to conclude my long Letter Who is there that deferves the name of MAN, and will not own, that they are the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity which make him AMIABLE; just as the natural attributes make him revered and adorable? What is his Lordship's quarrel with the God of Mo-Exs and PAUL, but that he is made unamiable, and represented without goodness or justice ? Their Gad, therefore, he expresly tells us, shall not be bis God. Well then: He has his God to make. And who would not expect to find him, when made by fuch a Workman, a God of infinite goodness and justice. No fuch matter: These qualities come not out of his Lordship's hands; so, cannot enter into the compofition of his God : They are barely NAMES that men give to various manifestations of the infinite wildem of one simple uncompounded Being. The pretended want of them in the God of the Jews afforded his Lordthip a commodious cavil; for he had Relicion to remove out of his way : But when he came to erect NATURALISM in it's flead, it had been very inconvenient to give them to his own Idol. weive settle or

Honest Plutarch, tho' a Priest, was as warm an enemy to PRIEST-CRAFT as his Lordship. He derives all the evils of Superstition from men's not acquiring the idea of a God infinitely good and just. And proposes this knowledge as the only cure for Superstition. This is confiftent. But what would the most

ancient World have thought of their Philosopher. had his remedy, rafter hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodness and Lours, contrived to break the Was by offer soifui

NATURE tells us, that the thing most definable is the knowledge of a God whose goodness and justice gives to every man according to his works. His LORDSHIP tells us, that REASON OF NATURAL RE-LIGION discovers to us no such God. Now, if both speak truth, How much are we indebted to REVE-LATION! Which, when natural Religion failed us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and just; and gives us an adequate idea of those attributes ! I fay no more than his Lordship has confessed. Christianity, fays he, DISCOVERS the love of God to many bis infinite justice and GOODNESS [10].

Is this a bleffing to be rejected ? His Lordfhip has no room to fay fo, fince the discovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his own Principles, it only could be made. He pretends, "We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God but from his works. By thefe, he fays, we gain the idea of his physical attributes; and if there be any thing in his works which feems to contradict those attributes, tis only feeming. For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vanish. It is not fo, he fays, with regard to the moral attributes. There are fo many phenomena which contradict these, and occasion difficulties never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an adequate idea of the moral attributes." Now admitting all this to be true, (for generally, his Lordship's affertions are fo extraedi bluow at [16] Vol. r. p. 532.

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vagant, that they will not even admit a supposition of their truth, tho' it be only for argument's fake. What does it effect but this, additional credit to Revelation? The physical difficulties clear up as we advance in our knowledge of Nature, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the moral difficulties never clear up, because they rise out of the Whole System of God's moral dispensation; which is involved in clouds and darkness, impenetrable to mortal fight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The affiftance must come from another quarter. It must come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Difpensation. Well; Revelation hath drawn this veil, and fo, removed the darkness which obstructed our attaining an adequate idea of the moral attributes. Shall we yet stand out? And, when we are brought hither upon his Lordship's own principles, still withhold our affent? Undoubtedly you must. Beware, (fays he) of a pretended Revelation. Why fo? "Be-" cause the Religion of nature is perfect and absolute: " and therefore Revelation can teach nothing but what-" Religion hath already taught [11]." Strange! Why, Revelation teaches those moral attributes; which you, my Lord, own, natural Religion does not teach-Here the dialogue breaks off.

"Dic aliquem fodes, dic, Quintiliane, colorem :

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vigant,

And here, we are like to flick. His Lordship leaves us in a Riddle. Will you have the solution? It is foolish enough; as such kind of things generally are. But if you have kept your good humour, which,

[11] Val. v. p. 544.

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I confess is difficult amidst all these provocations of impiety, it is enough to make you laugh. I told you before, that his Lordship borrowed all his reafoning against Revelation, from such as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This folemn argument particularly, of the PERFECTION OF NA-TURAL RELIGION, and the superfeded use of Revelation, he delivers to us just as he found it in Tin-Now Tindal, who held, that natural Religion taught both the moral attributes and a future flate, had some pretence for saying that it was perfect and absolute. But what pretence has his Lordship to say it after him, who holds that natural Religion taught neither one nor the other? The truth is, he refused no arms against REVELATION; and the too eager pursuit of this his old enemy thro' thick and thin has led him into many of these scrapes.

I have now confidered all I could find urged by the Noble Writer in Support of his great principle of NO ADEQUATE IDEAS OF GOD'S MORAL ATTRIBUTES; on which the whole fystem of NATURALISM is, and _ must be, founded; and you see to what this all, amounts: If I should say to just nothing, I shall speak more favourably of it than it deferves; for it tends. as I have shewn you, in many instances, to confirm the great TRUTH it is brought to overthrow. And now what I proposed for the subject of this second Letter is pretty well exhausted. My first was employed in giving you a specimen of his TEMPER; This undertakes to explain his System; and I'reserve the two next for a display of his marvellous TALENTS; tho', it is true, I have a little anticipated the Subject. For you cannot but have con-

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ceived already a very uncommon idea of his abilities, on seeing him use Tindal's arguments against Revelation, and for the persection of Natural Religion, along with his own principles of no moral attributes and no suture State. The first of which principles makes one entire absurdity of all he borrows from Tindal against Revelation; and the second takes away the very pretense for persection in natural Religion.

His Lordship's friend, Swift, has somewhere or other observed, that no subject in all nature but Religion could have advanced Toland and Afgill into the class of reputable Authors. Another of his friends feems to think that no fubject but Religion could have funk his Lordship so far below it: 1F EVER LORD BOLINGBROKE TRIFLES, (fays Pope) IT WILL BE WHEN HE WRITES ON DIVINI-TY [12]. But this is the strange fate of Authors, whether with wit, or without, when they chuse to write on certain subjects. For it is with Authors, as with Men: Who can guess which Veffel was made for bonour, and which for dishonour? when sometimes, one and the same is made for both. Even this choice Veffel of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, his Lordship's facred pages, may be put to very different uses, according to the different tempers in which they chance to find his few Admirers and the Public; like the China Jordan in the DUNCIAD, which one Hero piffed into, and another carried home for his Head-piece.

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[12] Pope's works, Vol. Ix, Letter xiv.

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Let me first claim your thanks for sparing You fo long on the chapter of Lord Boling Broke; and then ask, what You now think of this Paper Meteor, which so slames and sparkles, and, while it kept at distance, (like a Comet, traversing the celesial Orbe, and domineering over the established System) drew after it the admiring Croud; divided in their opinions between the presage of superstitions Divines who saw it threaten pestilence and ruin to the world beneath, and the more philosophic determination of his Followers who judged it, was to recreate and revive the dryness and sterility of exhausted Nature.

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But your love of Mankind makes you view this frange Phænomenon with horror. Is it for this, you say, that such a torrent of abuse has been poured out upon every private Character, upon every public Order, upon every branch of Learning, and upon every Institution of Religion?—They were not poured out at hazard, for all these Things stood in his way: they were not poured out in vain, for they are given for Arguments, and will, I make no doubt, be so received.

The wife Quintilian, it is true, has observed, Propriam MODERATIONEM QUEDAM CAUSE desiderant. And it must be confessed, that if ever Mode-

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A VIEW of LORD BOLINGEROKE'S

ration, or temperance of expression, became an Author, or was well fuited to his Discourse, it was when the purpose of his Work, like that of his Lordship's, was to overturn all ESTABLISHED RELIGION, founded in the belief of a Sovereign Master, supremely just and good; and all AUTHENTIC LEARNING, employed for the defence of fuch Religion: and, on their ruins, to erect NATURALISM, inflead of real Theism, and a FIRST PHILOSOPHY, instead of real Science. When, I fay, a Writer had thought fit to infult the common fentiments of Mankind on points: effected fo effential to their well-being, common policy as well as common decency required that it should be done by the most winning infinuation and address; and not by calling MADMAN, KNAVE, FOOL, and BLASPHEMER, every man who would not take his System upon trust. ... Alapaned blow ;

But superior Genius's have always thought themfelves above the restraint of rules. Tully observes that ARCESILAS, fitted by a turbulence of temper to confound the peace and overturn the established order of things, had done that mischief in Phi-LOSOPHY which TIBERIUS GRACCHUS had projected in the REPUBLIC [1]. But his Lordship, prompted by a nobler ambition, would play both parts in their turns, and shine an Arcesilas and a Graechus too and frede lin vol bekendt ar our born

His ill success in business made him turn his great

Marian's

talents from Politics to Philosophy. But he had

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^[1] Tum exortus eff, ut in Optima Rep. Ti. Gracchus qui etiam perturbaret, fic Arcefilas, qui conflitutam Philosophiam everteret. And it must be confided, that if ever

prompting him to aspire at Superiority: and he carried with him that sufficiency and those resentments which had proved so ill suited to the Cabinets of Princes, into the Closet of the Philosopher. We may add, that he entered upon Letters in an advanced age; and this still surther viciated his natural temper by an acquired infirmity, to which, as Tully observes, these untimely Adventurers are extremely subject. CHIMAGETE autem bomines scis QUAM INSOLENTES sim: "You know, says he, how insolent "those men generally are, who come late to their "book."

But now having given you my thoughts of his Lordship's assuming temper, it would be unfair not to give you his own. He had kept, it seems, ill company; and his natural candor and modesty had been hurt by it. But let him tell his own story: "I grow "VERY APT TO ASSUME, by conversing so much "with Ecclesiastical Writers, who assume "much oftener than they prove [2]."

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But whatever causes concurred to form this overbearing humour, certain it is, that his contempt of others was become so habitual to him, that it operates where no reasonable provocation can be assigned. I have shewn you, in my first Letter, at what a rate, his disgust to the Morals and his aversion to the Sanctions of the Gospel disposed him to treat all who had contributed to propagate or to support Revelation. But how the honest Pagans of antiquity had offended, who, many of them, believed no more of a future state than himself, is a little hard to conceive.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 504.

Yet PYTHAGORAS, he tells you, was a turbulent Fellow, and a fanatical subverter of States.

Nor did PLATO's delirious brains [3] fecure him from becoming, on occasion, a paultry Cheat, and a mercenary Flatterer. For almost all his Madmen are Knaves into the bargain But Plato had made himfelf obnoxious to his Lordship, by the blasphemous title he had given to the first Cause; in which his delirious brains could find nothing but a PIRST GOOD: fo that he was to be stigmatized as the Ring-leader of that wicked Sect who ascribe moral attributes to the Deity.

Even Socrates, whose glory it was, as Tully affures us, to take PHILOSOPHY out of the Clouds, and bring it down to dwell amongst Cities and Men, substituted (in his Lordship's opinion) fantaftic, for real knowledge [4] - and entertained and propagated THEOLOGICAL and METAPHYSICAL notions which are not, most certainly, parts of NATURAL THEOLO-GY [5]. We understand his Lordship very well. He means a particular Providence and a future State, the moral attributes of the Deity and the fubflantiality of the Soul. This apparently is the fantaflic knowledge which makes no part of natural Theology.

Nor could his own SENECA, tho' fo fervicable [6] to him in his Exile, escape the nick-name of THE STOICAL FOP: A character indeed, which, in the discourse referred to at the bottom, Seneca has enabled his Follower most admirably to sustain.

^[3] Vol. iv. p. 88. [4] Vol. iv. p. 112.

titled Reflections on Exile. condition and the

^[5] Vol. iv. p. 122. [6] See his Lordship's tract, en-

When these Pagan Heroes fare no better, who would be concerned for Church-men? or think much to hear Cyprian called a Liar and a Madman [7]; Jerom, a surly foul mouthed Bully; and EPIPHANIUS, an Idiot?

But now comes on a difficulty indeed.—PAUL and PLATO bear their crimes in their countenance: The Gospel of peace, he tells us, disclosed nothing but Murders; and the idea of a first Good occasioned all our complaints of evil. But what had Scipio done, or Regulus, to incur his displeasure? They were neither artificial Theologers, nor yet crazy Metaphysicians; but plain, sober, Statesmen. His Lordship's quarrel, we know, is with Divinity in all its forms; but he professes to admire the moral Virtues. And if there be any of higher dignity than the rest, and in which his Lordship would be more desirous to shine, they must needs be Chastity and good Faith,

" Cvi, Pador, &, Justitiæ foror,

" INCORRUPTA Fides, &c. &c.

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Yet he wrests all his reading to deprive those two brave Romans of their Glory; so nobly earned, and so generously paid, by the universal voice of all ages. I am not ignorant of that childish infirmity of our nature, the fondness of ingrossing to ourselves those shining qualities, with which we happen to be dazzled; but every one will acquit his Lordship of so impotent a project: Much less would I suppose him capable of thinking, that Scipio and Regulus may be still the great men they have been accounted, though stained all over with lust and persidy.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 407.

It is true, indeed, the new Historian of Great Britain, another of these first philosophy-men (for the esfence of the Sect confifting in paradox, it doth as well in History as Divinity) he, I fay, tells us, that it will admit of a doubt, whether feverity of manners alone, and abstinence from pleasure, can deserve the name of Virtue [8]. But then he is as fingular in his notions of Religion. He holds but two species of it in all Nature, Supersition and Fanaticism: And under one or other of them, he gives you to underfland [9], the whole of Christian profession is, and ever was, included. On the Church of England, indeed, he is so indulgent, to bestow all that Religion has to give : for when he fets it against Popery, it is Fanaticism: but as often as it faces about, and is opposed to the Puritans, it then becomes Superflition; and this as constantly as the occasions return.

You will say I grow partial to his Lordship, in appearing so anxious for his reputation, while Your two savorite characters lye expiring under his pen. Never sear it. They have not lived so long to die of a fright. When his Lordship blusters we know how to take him down. It is only leading him back to that Antiquity he has been abusing.

Half the work is done to my hands; and I shall have only the trouble of transcribing the defence of Scipio against his Lordship's suspicions, as I find it in an exposulatory Letter to him, on his recent treatment of a deceased friend.

^[8] The History of Great Britain, Vol. i. p. 200, 4to, printed at Edinb. 1754.

^[9] See his History throughout.

"The reputation of the first Scipio (fays his Lord-" ship) was not so clear and uncontroverted in PRI-" VATE, as in public life; nor was be allowed by all to " be a man of such severe virtue as he affected, and as " that age required. Navius was thought to mean him, " in some verses Gellius has preserved; and VALERIUS * ANTIAS made no scruple to affert, that far from re-" Storing the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauched and " kept her [10]. One would have hoped so mean a " flander might have flept forgotten in the dirty " corner of a Pedant's [11] Common-place. And " yet we fee-it quoted as a fact by an Instructor of "Kings. Who knows but at some happy time or " other, when a writer wants to prove that real " FRIENDSHIP becomes a great man as little as real " chaftity, [12] this advertisement [13] of yours may " be advanced to the same dignity of credit with the " calumny of Valerius Anties. If it should, I would " not undertake to dispute the fact on which such an "inference might be made; for, I remember, Tul-" ly, a great Statelman himself, long ago observed, " VIRE AMICITIE difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui " in Republica versantur. - But the words of Nævin were thefe, wire soo years at his will were

" Etiam qui res magnas manus fæpe gesfit gloriose,

" Cujus facta viva nunc vigent; qui apud gentes solus

" Praftat : eum suus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit.

[10] P. 204, of the Idea of a Patriot King.

[11] A. Gelfins. [12] See p. 201, of the Patriot King.

[13] Advertisement concerning Mr. Pope, prefixed to the Partition King.

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"These obscure verses were, in Gellius's opinion, the " fole foundation of Antias's calumny, against the " universal concurrence of Historians [14]. And what "Gellius thought of this historian's modesty and " truth, we may collect from what he fays of him in " another place. Where having quoted two tribuni-" tial Decrees, which, he tells us, he transcribed " from Records [ex annalium monumentis] he adds, " that Valerius Antias made no scruple to give them " the lye in public [15]. And Livy quoting this Antias, for the particulars of a victory, subjoins concerning the number flain [16], - but there is " little credit to be afforded this writer, who, of all Hif-" torians, is the most given to amplify. And he who " will enlarge on one occasion will diminish on an-" other; for it is the same impotence of temper which " carries him indifferently to either [17]."

RECULUS'S virtue falls next under his Lordship's censure: "I know not (fays he) whether Balbus" would have called in question the STORY OF RE"GULUS. Vid. Au. Gellium. It was probably fabulous, in many circumstances at least, and there
were those amongst the Romans who thought it to
be so [18]." Would not any one now imagine, by
his bringing Au. Gellius again upon the stage, that

[14] His ego versibus credo adductum Valerium Antiatem AD-VARSUM CETEROS OMNES scriptores de SCIPIONIS moribus sensisse.

[15] Valerius autem Antias, contra banc decretorum memoriam contraque auctoritates veterum annalium—dixit, &c. L. vii. c. 19.

[16] Scriptori parum fidei fit, quia in augendo non alius intemperantior est. Lib. xxxvi.

[17] A Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotism, the idea of a Patriot King, and the flate of Parties, &c. [18] Vol. v. p. 406.

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there was another Valerius Antias in reserve, to depose against REGULUS likewise? Just the contrary. The Grammarian, in the ivth chapter of his vith book, confirms the common flory, with an addition of the testimonies of the Historians Tubero and Tuditanus. The truth however is, that his Lordship had his Voucher, though he was shy of producing him. It was the respectable Mr. TOLAND; to whom his Lordship is much indebted for better things. Amongst the posthumous tracts of that virtuous writer, there is a Differtation, intitled, The fabulous death of Atilius Regulus: in which, from a fragment of Diodorus Siculus, preserved by Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, he endeayours to prove, against all the Roman writers, with Cicero at their head, that Regulus did not die in torments, but of mere chagrin. Toland only denied that his virtue was put to so severe a trial; but this was enough for his Lordship, to call in question the whole flory; and to add, that there were those among ft the ROM ANS subo thought it to be fabulous. Unluckily, the Roman writers are unanimous for the truth of the flory. How then shall we account for his Lordship's affertion? Did he take Diodorus Siculus for a Latin writer, because he had not seen him in Greek? Or did he understand A. Gellius as quoting Tubero and Tuditanus for doubters of the common flory?

As we see little reason therefore to dissent from the general opinion, and much less, to join his Lordship against it, let Scipio and Regulus still preserve their rank in our esteem and admiration. For as an excellent french writer, in a Letter to his Lordship, well observes, C'est être vertueux que de rendre à la beauté

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130 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE's beauté des mœurs l'hommage d'amour et de respect,

qui lui eft dû, nes sate ful f Shi world and o

His Lordship's ambition was uniform and simple: it was only, as we said, to be at the head of things. As he comes nearer home, therefore, he is more and more alarmed. He found his place already occupied by certain Counterseits and Pretenders, who had, some how or other, got into the throne of Science, and had actually received homage from the literary world. But these, as it was sitting, he unmasks and deposes.

"SELDEN, GROTIUS, PUFFENDORF, and CUM"BERLAND (fays his Lordship) seem to be great
"writers, by much the same right as he might be
"called a great traveller, who should go from London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope [19]." I
can hardly think they took so large a compass. But
let us trust to the Proverb: They and his Lordship
will prove it between them: He shews us a ready
road indeed, but it leads to Atheism; whereas, if
they take us a little about, they bring us the marest
way home to Religion.

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He professes "a thorough contempt for the whole "business of the learned lives of Scaliger, Bo"CHART, PETAVIUS, USHER and MARSHAM [20]."
This was natural. He owed them nothing. But those to whom he is most indebted have no better quarter.

MARCILIUS FICINUS, he calls the best Interpreter of Plato; but, at the same time assures us, he was perfectly delirious. But why, you ask, is Ficinus the best Interpreter of Plato, since J. Scaliger, who knew

[19] Vol. v. p. 68. [20] Vol. ii. p. 261--2. fome-

fomething of the matter, fays, that he stript his Master of his purple, and put him on his own beggarly rags? For a good reason; Ficinus taught his Lordship all he knew of Platonism. But why is he then perfectly delirious? For a better still: he holds opinions already condemned by his Lordship.

His very favorite Barrow, he tells us, "goes on a long while begging the question, and talking in a theological cant MORE WORTHY OF PAUL than of a man like him [1]—flimzy stuff, which a man is obliged to vend, when he puts on a black gown and band [2]."

Locke and Newton, he infinuates, were the Men: Nay, such is his humility, that he puts himfelf to school to Locke. Yet this does not secure his Master from being mighty liable to a PHILOSOPHICAL DELIRIUM [3]. And as for Newton, the APPLICATION of bis Philosophy is grown, or growing into some abuse [4]. Would you know how? By affording CLARKE and BAXTER the principles whereby to demonstrate, that the Soul is an immaterial substance. An abuse indeed!

But as for his Master,—and Bacon too, as much as be admires them, he is not blind to their errors; but can, without being dazzled, discern spots in these.
Suns.—

Before I go any further, I dare venture a wager that I know what those spots are. They are, or I am much mistaken, the stains of Faith and the impurities of Revelation. But let us hear him. "I can-

[1] Vol. iv. p. 278.

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[2] Vol. v. p. 361.

[3] Vol. iii. p. 442.

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[4] Vol. iii. p. 374.

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" discern a tincture, and sometimes more than a tinc-

" ture, in BACON, of those false notions, which we

" are APT TO IMBIBE as MEN, as INDIVIDUALS, as

" MEMBERS OF SOCIETY,, and as SCHOLARS. I can

" discern in LOCKE sometimes ill-abstracted and ill-

" determined ideas, from which a wrong application

" of words proceeds; and propositions to which I

" can, by no means, affent. I confess further, that I

"have been, and still am at a loss, to find any ap-

" pearance of consistency in an author, who pub-

" lished a COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES OF ST.

"PAUL, and a treatise on the REASONABLENESS OF

"CHRISTIANITY (which he endeavours to prove by

" fact and by argument) AFTER having stated clearly

" as he has done, the conditions and measures of his-

" torical probability; AND AFTER having written

" as strongly as he has done against the abuse of

" words [5]." Did not I tell you fo !

" This Sun's fick too;

" Shortly he'll be an EARTH;

as the Poet has it, in his description of the pestilence at Thebes; not more fatal to great Cities than this bloated Vapour of a first Philosophy, which mimics, and, as it reslects, desiles this Sun of Science, and turns Nature into Prodigy;

Et solem geminum et duplices fe oftendere Thebas &c.

But his Lordship's account of his other Luminary, Bacon, is still more extraordinary—He thinks be dif-

[5] Vol. iv, p. 166.

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ing a continuo

cerns in bim a tincture, and more than a tincture of those false notions, which we are apt to imbibe as Men, as Individuals, as Members of Society, and as Scholars.—That is, as Men, we are apt to think we have a Soul; as Individuals, we are in expectation of a future state; as Members of Society, we are inclined to reverence the established Relicion; and as Scholars, we are taught to reason, and not to harangue. If any of his Lordship's Followers can give a better account of this Oracular passage, I am very ready to resign the office of his Commentator.

In truth, his Lordship deals by Religion, and it's Advocates, as a certain french Author, I have read, does by Alchemy and the hermetic Philosophers; he brings almost every great name into the number; and after having entertained his reader much at their expence, concludes each various eulogy, alike, — "Now his folly was in hoping to "extract gold from baser metals:" just as the folly of all his Lordship's Alchemists is the hope of bettering buman nature by GRACE.

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You now, Sir, may understand, how well the disposition of his mind and temper was sitted to his System. It often happens, that men who arraign Religion, have been sirst arraigned by it; and their defiance of Truth is only a reprisal upon Conscience. Under these circumstances it is no wonder they should go to work much out of humour; tho' it be in an affair which requires perfect tranquillity, and freedom from all perturbations. But his Lordship has the miserable advantage of being the first who has written under one unintermitting sit of rage and resentment.

In this state, like a man in a sever whom no posture can ease, whom no situation can accommodate, he is angry at Philosophers for explaining what they cannot comprehend; he is angry at Divines for believing without explaining: Well then, they change hands; the *Philosopher* believes, and the *Divine* explains. No matter. He is angry still. In this temper then we leave him, and turn to the proper subject of my Letter.

You would know, you fay, with what abilities he supports his System.

The attacks upon Religion have been always carried on like War, by firatagem and force. I shall therefore first speak of his Arts, and then of his Powers of controversy.

It has been observed how closely, and how humbly too, he copies the FREE-THINKERS who went before him, even to the stalest of their paultry stratagems.

When FREE-THINKING first went upon it's Miffion, the Public were not disposed to understand raillery on a subject of such importance: so that it is possible there might be found, amongst the more early of these our Anti-Apostles, a Confessor or two to the glorious cause of Infidelity. This put their Successors on their guard; or, what was better, gave them a pretence to affect it. From henceforth you hardly faw an Infidel-book which was not introduced with a mysterious referve; with the obligations the Reader had to these servants of truth, for venturing so far in his service, while the Secular arm hung so fearfully over them; with the difadvantages their cause now lay under, while it could be but half explained and half supported; and with the wonders they would do by

by Powers they had in referve, when a little more-Christian Liberty should suffer them to be drawn out. This miserable Crambe made so constant a part of our diet, and had been dished out from time to time with so little variety, that it grew both offenfive and ridiculous; for what could more provoke our fpleen or our laughter than to feign an apprehension of the Magistrate's resentment, after they had written at their ease for almost a whole century together. with the most uncontrolled and unbridled licence?

In fuch a state of things, would you eafily believe his Lordship could pride himself in cooking up thiscold kitchen-stuff, and serving it again and again. amidft fo elegant an entertainment, "GASSENDI " (fays he) apprehended enemies much more formi-" dable than mere Philosophers, because armed with " ecclefiaftical and civil power. It is this fear which " has hindered those who have combated ERROR in " all ages; and who COMBAT IT STILL, from taking all the ADVANTAGES which a FULL EXPOSITION " OF THE TRUTH would give them. Their adver-" faries triumph as if the goodness of their cause had " given them the Victory, when nothing has pre-" vented their ENTIRE DEFEAT, or reduced their " contest to a drawn battle, except this, that they " have employed Arms of every kind, fair and foul, " without any referve; while the others have em-" ployed their offensive weapons with MUCH REserve, and have even BLUNTED THEIR EDGE " when they used them [7]."

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"The adverfaries [of Religion] (fays he again)

" feldom speak out, or push the instances and argu-

ments they bring, fo far as THEY MIGHT BE CAR-

" RIED. Instead of which these ORTHODOX BUL-

" Lies affect to triumph over men who employ but

" part of their strength, &c. [8]."

What it is, which his Lordship, who affects to tread in the steps of these cautious men, keeps thus hid and is so shy of producing, is not easy to guess. But

" Sous cet air capable où l'on ne comprend rien,

" S'il cache un honnête homme, il se cache tres-bien.

However, having (after his Masters) thus feigned a fear, he feigns all the obliquity and doubling, which fear produces. He professes to believe the Mission of Christ, tho' founded on the Dispensation of Moses, a Dispensation he ridicules and execrates: He professes to believe the doctrines of Christ, tho' he rejects his gift of life and immortality; He professes to believe him the Saviour of the World, tho' he laughs at the doctrine of Redemption which constitutes the effence of that character.

Well fare the New Historian of Great Britain; who having writ without controll against Miracles, and even the very Being of a God, gratefully acknowledges the blessing; and owns that We now enjoy to the Full that liberty of the Press which is so necessary in every Monarchy confined by legal limitations [9]. Nor is it, let me tell you the worst part of the observation, that the Monarch should be confined by legal limitations, yet the Writer for the Press should not.

[8] Vol. iii. p. 273.

[9] The Hiftory of Great Britain, Vol. i. p. 213.

It would be endless to enter into his Lordship's small Arts of controversy; yet it may not be amiss to touch upon one or two of them, such I mean as are of more general use and best disposed for service.

The first is, To bonour the name when you have taken away the thing: As thus, To express the highest devotion to God, when you have deprived him of his moral attributes:— the greatest zeal for Religion, while you are undermining a future state;—and the utmost reverence for Revelation, when you have stript it of Miracles and Prophecies.

2. A second is, To disponour Persons and Opinions the most respectable, by putting them into ill Company, or by joining them swith discredited follies. Thus, Divines and Atheists; Clarkians and Malebranchians, are well paired, and always shewn together: In like manner, The Propositions, that the world was made for man, and that man was made for happiness, are to be boldly represented as inseparable parts of the same System. From whence, these advantages follow, that if an Atheist be odious, a Malebranchian mad, and the proposition of the World's being made for man, absurd; the odium, the madness, and the absurdity fall equally on the Divines, on Dr. Clarke, and on the proposition, that man was made for happiness.

3. A third is, To bring the abuse of a thing in discredit of the thing itself. Thus the visions of the Rabbins are made to confute JUDAISM; Popery and School-learning, to decry the discipline and doctrine of CHRISTIANITY; and the dreams of Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Berkeley, to confute the waking thoughts of CUDWORTH, CLARKE, WOLLASTON, and BAXTER: For his Lordship is just such a Confuter of Metaphysics, as

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that Man would be of Ethics or Chemistry, who should content himself with exposing the absurdities of the Stoics, and the whimfies of the Alchemists, and yet fraudulently forget that there are such Authors, as CICERO and BOERHAAVE. - To overturn a FUTURE STATE, he employs all the superstitious fables of the Poets and the People, concerning it: To discredit REVELA-TION, he enumerates all the Impostors, and Pretenders to revelation in all ages: And to dishonour DIVINE WORSHIP, he is very particular in describing the Rites and Ceremonies of the antient Church of Egypt, and the modern Church of Rome. In a word, you are fure to find, on these occasions, every fort of topic, but what a fober and intelligent Reader would require; Confiderations drawn from the nature of the thing ufelf at a company a wall evaluate ben ben and the

You expect, however, that when the abuses of things have done him this fervice, so as to stand, where he has placed them, for the things themselver, He would for once, at least, spare the Auritors of the abuse, if it were only for the sike of carrying on the frand. But you expect more than you will find. His Lordship can, in the same breath, call the abuses of Revelation and the Gospel, by the names of Revelation and the Gospel, and rail at that Divine, or at that Church, which has introduced those abuses.

Controversy. But as a good Mimic is commonly a bad Actor, and a good Juggler a bad Mechanic; so an art-ful Caviller is as often a very poor Reasoner.

You will not be surprized therefore, if, in examining his Lordship's Philosophic Character, under the several heads of his INCENUITY, his TRUTH, his

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Consistency, his Learning, and his Reasoning, you find him not to make so good a figure, as in the professed arts of Controversy.

1. Of his INGENUITY, which comes first, I shall be very short: For his Arts of Controversy, of which you have had a taste, are one continued example of it.

1. Speaking of the Christians of the Apostolic age, he thus represents their character and manners. "Notwithstanding the fanctity of their profession, the "GREATEST CRIMES, even that of INCEST, were " practised amongst them [10]." Is it possible, (you ask) that his Lordship should give credit to the exploded calumnies of the Pagans and Apostates here alluded to? Think better of his sense: he alludes to no fuch matter. St. PAUL is his Authority : and on the Apostle's accusation he grounds his Charge, This surprises you the more. It may be so: for philosophers, as well as Poets, of a certain rank, aim at nothing but (as Bay expresses it) to elevate and surprise. Who would not conclude from this account that the first Christians began their profession in a total corruption of manners; and, like the Magi of old, intermarried with their Mothers and Daughters? It would never be imagined, that the simple. fact, as St. Paul states it, in his first and second Epiftles to the Corinthians, was but barely this, That certain man (whether before or after his conversion, we know not) had married his Father's wife; and, on the Apostle's reprehension, convinced and ashamed of his folly, had repented and made fatisfaction to the Church for the scandal he had occasioned. Agranday just

[10] Vol. iv. p. 513.

2. Again, this First Philosophy tells us, that when Jesus speaks of legions of Angels, it is the language of Paganism; but when Lord BobingBroke speaks of numberless created intelligences superior to man, it is the language of Nature: for, this doctrine of INTELLI-GENCIES, his Lordship affures us, is founded on what we know of actual existence. We are led to it by plain, direct, unforced ANALOGY. But the doctrine of ANGE-LIC LEGIONS, if you will believe him, flands on no other foundation, philosophically speaking, than of a MERE POSSIBLE existence of such spirits, as are admitted for divers THEOLOGICAL USES [11]. But why this different measure for himself and his friends? The last words may let us into the fecret. His Philosophical Intelligencies are a very harmless race; but the Gospel Legions are much given to theological mischief. Ministring Angels bring in, what he can by no means away with, a particular, and moral providence. God's physical Providence, and the civil Providence of the Magistrate, make the only Government he can relish. Now his Intelligencies, like Epicurus's Gods, are still, as they should be, at an idle end; but Angels are bufy and meddling; indeed, too head-strong to be trusted under his Lordship's Philosophic Administration.

You cannot, however, but be pleased to find, that the method of reasoning by Analogy, which you had cause to believe his Lordship had totally discarded, from the hard language he has so often bestowed upon it, is brought again into savour, and now does wonders. For, it not only opens the door to his Lordship's Intelligencies, by a plain, direct, and unforced ap-

[11] Vol. iv. 179.

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plication, but, as you will fee under the next head, it shuts it against Jesus Christ's.

3. "I only intend to shew (says his Lordship) that if since men have not admitted, in favour of Revelation, a System of Physics that is inconsistent with philosophic truth, there is no reason for admitting, in favour of the same revelation, a System of

"PNEUMATICS that is fo, too [12]."

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Now the Friends of Revelation say, this is a mere begging the question. The reasoning, when fairly represented, stands thus,—" Divines reject the Scripture System of Physics, which they hold to be salse, therefore, they should reject the Scripture-System of Pneumatics, which his Lordship holds to be salse."— Indeed, they conceive the argument to be no better than if one should say — because Politicians, in speaking of the first source of civil regimen, have called it the primum mobile, alluding to the old erroneous System of Astronomy; and because they have talked too of a balance of Power, alluding to the true principles of Mechanics; therefore, if we reject their System of Astronomy, we should reject their System of Mechanics likewise.

II. Thus much for this noble Philosopher's Ingenuity. Give me leave to lead you next and bring you to a place where you may have an advantageous view of his TRUTH, the very Soul of Philosophy.

1. "The Christian Theology (says he) has de-"rived a prophane licence from the Jewish, which "Divines have rendered so familiar and so habitual, "that Men BLASPHEME without knowing they blas-

[12] Vol. iv. p. 18t.

" pheme,

" pheme, and that their very devotion is IMPIOUS. "The licence I mean is that of reasoning and of " speaking of the divine, as of the human, nature, " operations, and proceedings; fometimes with, and " fometimes without the falvo of those distinguishing " epithets and forms of speech, which can, in very " few inftances, diffinguish enough. The Jewish " Scriptures ascribe to God, not only corporeal ap-" pearance, but corporeal action, and all the instru-"ments of it; eyes to fee, ears to ear, mouth and tongue to articulate, hands to handle, and feet to "walk. DIVINES TELL US INDEED that, we are " not to understand all this according to the LITERAL " fignification. The meaning is, they fay, that God " has a power to execute all those acts, to the effect-"ing of which, these parts, in us, are instrumental. "The literal fignification is, indeed, abominable, " and the FLIMSY ANALOGICAL VEIL, thrown over "it, is stolen from the wardrobe of Epicurus; for "he taught, that the Gods had not literally bodies, " but something like to bodies, quasi corpus: not " blood, but something like to blood, quasi sangui-" nem [13]."

"DIVINES fay, that God has no body nor any thing like to body, but is IMMATERIAL. EPICURUS faid, that his God had not a gross earthly body, but something like to that body, and was MATERIAL. Yet "Divines have stolen their simsy analogical weil from the wardrobe of Epicurus." Truly a very subtle thest; which extracts MATTER from sigurative expression! and well suited to his Lordship's leger-de-main, which

[13] Vol. v. p. 519.

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draws an analogical weil out of a metaphor. Indeed, to fit it the better to Epicurus's wardrobe, he makes it but a flimly one.

But, let us now observe, the various shifts he was reduced to, in order to support his principal calumny, that Divines flole from Epicurus the method of explaining the nature of the Godbead. He says, when the lewish Scriptures had given Gon a Body, the Divines found out that it was not to be understood literally. They had been strange Divines had they not found it out. when these Scriptures declare that God is a Spirit, or immaterial; in contradiffinction to body or MATTER. And the best of it is, that in other places, (as we have feen just before) his Lordship quarrels with the Scriptures on this very account, for their System of PNEUMATICS. Now what could these Divines conclude, but that where the Scriptures describe God's actions, in accommodation to the gross conceptions of men, they are to be understood figuratively. But this would not ferve his Lordship's purpose; which was, to convict the Divines of nonsense and prevarication. He, therefore, turns, what every body else calls METAPHOR, which is a figure of speech, into An a Logy, which is a mode of reasoning, - a flimsy analogical veil: and Epicurus's ANALOGY, (that the Gods had not earthly bodies but fomething like them. . that is to fay, material) he turns into a METAPHOR. Epicurus (fays he) taught that the Gods had not LITE. RALLY bodies. Epicurus's question was not about literal or figurative expression; but about similar and diffimilar things .-- But You have enough, You fay, of this great Restorer of TRUTH, and Reformer of Makill fer a criss ver 64. C. good in May Lad May ill or 450 life

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A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S 844 Reason. I will therefore be as fhort as possibly I. can, on this head! on that and a low so main

2. THE JEWS (his Lordship tells us) supposed CRUELTY TO BE ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY [14]. - These very JEWS themselves lay, That the Lord is gracious and full of compassion; flow to anger and of great mercy: That he is good to att; and his tender mercies are over ALL HIS WORKS [1:]: That bis mercy enduretb for EVER [6]: That the EARTH is fall of the goodness and mercy of the Lord [17]. That his mercy is from EVERDASTING TO EVERLASTING [18]. ... Now, which of them will You believe?

5 3. " Superflition (fays his Lordship) impersonated

" Chance under the name of FOR TUNE: and this chime-

" rical Divinity was supposed to direct arbitrarily all

"the events, whose causes were not apparent, or

which exceeded in good or ill, the expectations of men. The Heathens accounted, by it, for past

" events : consulted it about future : and referred

"themselves to it in doubtful cases. It is strange

" that fuch supers ritions, instead of being confined

" to the Heathen world, should have been as PRE-

" VALENT amongst God's chosen People, both Jews

" and Christians; and should be scarce exploded at

"this hour. It is franger fill, that a RECOURSE TO

"THE DECISION OF CHANCE should be expressly

" commanded in the Old Testament, and occasionally " countenanced in the New, even on to important an

" occasion as the election of an Apostle in the place "of Judas Iscariot [19]". The contract of the first

[14] Vol. v. p. 507. [15] Pf. cxlv. ver. 8, q.

[16] Chron. Jer. Efra, Pfalms, &c.

[17] Pf. xxxiii. ver. 5. cxix. ver. 64.

[18] Pf. c, ver. 5.--ciii. ver. 17. [19] Vol. iii, p. 477.

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The affertion, you see, is, 1st, that the Jews and Christians, as well as the Heathens, impersonated Chance under the name of Fortune: and 2dly, that their having recourse to Lots was having recourse to the decision of Fortune.

As to the first, it is so remote from all truth, That the custom of the Jewish People, in referring all events to God and to him only and immediately, has given a handle to Spinoza, Toland, and others, to bring in question the very existence of an extraordinary providence in the mosaic Dispensation; in which, to observe it, by the way, and with the abhorrence it ought to excite, they have had too many Followers amongst the Divines who have written against the Divine Legation.

As to the second, we must consider that Lors are of three distinct kinds.

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One fort is a civil balloting; of general use in States to prevent intrigues and partialities. Sortem posuissent, says Tacitus, ne ambitioni aut inimicitiis locus foret.

Another, is a superstitious appeal to the imaginary Deity, Chance or Fortune.

And there is yet another, which is a reference of the event to Heaven; and this, by God's own direction and appointment.

Of the fecond, and only reprehensible fort, Revelation, as we have just now shewn, is entirely innocent.

Of the first, his Lordship, as a Politician, will not disallow the use.

His quarrel, as a Philosopher, is with the third. And he has no way to support his charge, but by sophistically reducing it into the second; that is, representing it as having all the superstition of the second. Now in this he begs the question.— Are the Jewish and Christian Revelations true or false? False,

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fays

fays his Lordship, for several reasons; and, amongst the rest, for this, they authorize the Pagan supersition of Lors.—What made the Pagan supersition of Lots? Their being the inventions of men, while they pretended to be of divine appointment.—Very well: but the Jewish and Christian Lots were of divine appointment. Pretended to be so, if you please, says his Lordship; and this puts them into the condition of Pagan lots.—Softly, my Lord; Your argument must not take that for granted, which your argument

is employed to prove.

But his Lordship had his head full of that Master Sophism of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which concludes against the reason or justice of a DIVINE COMMISsion from the abuse of it; and because subsequent Impostors pretended to the like Authority. For, according to the Logic and Theology of these Gentlemen, Gon must not cast out DEVILS, because it afterwards gave a handle for Popish Priests to juggle with their Exercisms. He must not direct a thing to be decided by Lors, because a village conjurer would afterwards employ the fierie and flears. He must not make use of human instruments in punishing a People abandoned to unnatural crimes, because an Arabian Impostor would afterwards pretend to the like Commission. He must not institute a multifarous RITUAL, tho' it was to keep a People separate, and to secure them from the contagion of Idolatry, becanfe wicked Priests or Politicians would establish fuperflitious ceremonies to keep Communities enflaved to civil or religious Tyrants. These scrupulous Gentlemen, when their hand was in, had done well to tell us, that Gop should not have given men Riches, Knowledge, and Power, because there have been fuch

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Tuch as CHARTRES, SPINOZA, and MOLY Mo-

But to go on with his Lordship's veracity.

4. He afferts, that they [the Jews] made beafts AC-COUNTABLE LIKE MORAL AGENTS [19]. aware that to mitigate this abfurdity, as he expresses it. both the Jewish and Christian Commentators say, that the pain inflicted on beafts was to shew the heinoulnels of human crimes--- to blot out the memory of a great scandal--- to punish the owner for his negligence. But he despites all these solutions, as so many pitiful evafions. Would you believe now that in the fame breath, and merely to flew his reading, he should confute his own falle affertion? I know nothing more abfurd (lays he) than this, except a custom or law at ATHENS. The WEAPONS by which a murder had been committed were brought into Court; as if they, too, were liable to punishment; and the STATUE that had killed a man by it's fall, was, by a folemn sentence of that wife people, the Thafii, founded on a Law of DRACO, tast into the sea. Now what was his Lordship to prove? That Mofes was fo ignorant a Law-giver, and the Jews fo stupid a people, that they made beasts accountable like moral agents. And he illustrates it by a law of the most celebrated Legislator and of the politest People upon Earth, Draco and the Athenians; who, just in the same manner, made even weapons and statues, moral agents. The Athenians and Draco perhaps would have faid, that they enacted these laws to shew their abhorrence of murder, and to punish the careless erecter of a statue. Mere shifts and Evasions, fays his Lordship.

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But what I chiefly wonder at is, that when his Lordship was in so good a train, he had not told us, that the Stupidity of these Jews went still surther, even to imagine Walls and Garments [1] subject to human Diseases. Here he would have had a little truth on his side, and a much better subject for his contempt. This is only a word to the Wise, and for his Followers to improve upon. Let them try what they can make of it, and then they may hear further of this matter.

5. Again, "God (fays his Lordship) was FORCED to indulge the Jews in several SUPERSTITIOUS "prejudices [2], as learned Divines scruple not to affirm." Had learned Divines no more scruples in affirming, than his Lordship, I should hardly have

thought them worth a defence.

What they fcruple not to fay is this -- That IDOLA-TROUS WORSHIP was never fo entirely corrupt, but that some of it's Rites were still rational, or, at least, continued innocent; and might be used in the service of the true God without superstition: That the Ifraelites being fond of Egyptian ceremonies, God indulged them in the use of such as were harmless; and of no other. Por this, his Lordship calls them, bold Judges of the principles and views of God's proceedings [3]. But in what does their temerity confift? In teaching that God always chuses to take the ordinary means, before the extraordinary, when either may be made indifferendy to serve his purpose. And that, therefore, he faw fit to indulge the Jews in their fondness for old habits; and to turn their propenfities for the Egyptian Rites, upon fuch only as were innocent; rather than to

[/] Levit. chap. xiv. [2] Vol. iv. p. 30. [3] P. 32. give

give them new habits, and new propensities, by a miraculous impression on their minds, which should over-rule their wills and affections.

6. WE KNOW (lays his Lordship) THAT ADE THEIR [the Jews] SACRED WRITINGS WERE COMPILED AFTER THEIR CAPTIVITY [4]. Balzac speaks of a certain Critic who used to boast, that no body, besides God and himself, knew the meaning of such or such a verse in Persius. His Lordship's [we know] is just such another revelation. Only the Critic's meaning might be true; but the Philosopher's knowledge is certainly false. A falsehood so notorious, that I am in some doubt whether this stricture belong properly to his dogmatic or to his laconic style. For we know, may signify—We know that the spurious Esdras says so. And then he gets the two things he most wanted; a very useful Truth, and a very noble Authority.

"Lordship) IF IT MAY BE CALLED JUSTICE, most certainly requires that rewards and punishments found be measured out, in every particular case, in proportion to the merit and demerit of each individual. But instead of this, it is assumed, conformably to the doctrine of Plato, that the righteous are set on the right hand of the Judge, and the wicked, on the less; from whence, they are transported into Heaven, or plunged into Hell. They are tried individually, they seem to be rewarded or punished collectively, without any distinction of the particular cases, which have been so solemnly determined, and without any proportion observed be-

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[4] Vol. iv. p. 339.

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" innocence and guilt, in the application of these reestainment then a paroci [2] etnamilinuq bas ebaw "

If it may be called Juffice ... Marry, well thought of. For who knows but as this is the general day of reckoning, and that men fee, fuch a day will be wanted, rather than be without any, they might be foolish enough to take up with this? --- They feem to be rewarded or punished collectively. Should I seriously quote the Words of Jesus, --- The servant which knew bis Lord's will, neither did according to bis will, Shall be beaten with many stripes. But be, that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few fripes [6]; Should I feriously, I say, quote these words, to confute the noble Writer's observation, that men at the great Tribunal feem to be reswarded or punished collectively, he would, I suppose, have been amongst the first to laugh at my simplicity; at least, the intelligent Reader would not thank me for my diligence. this the words to the A of

III. I proceed now to his Lordship's Consistency; the next feature in his philosophic Countenance. You have feen with what bravery he contradicts all others; you shall now see with what greater bravery, he contradicts himfelf.

There be two things which characterise the reafoning part of his Lordship's writings, (if any part of fo declamatory a work can be called reasoning) and distinguish them from all other men's; His inceffant REPETITIONS, and his inceffant CONTRA-

[5] Vol. v. p. 495.

committaes

[6] Luke xii. 47, 48.

For when a Writer can furnish out no better an entertainment than a parcel of groundless flams, he will be much subject to repetition; and every repetition as likely to be graced with a variation; for his Tales having neither foundation in Fact, nor measure in Truth, what is produced for admiration, will be always new modeling for convenience, as best suits his present passions and purposes.

His REPETITIONS I leave for the refreshment of those who are disposed to read him through: This short specimen of his Contradictions I propose for

the amusement of more curfory readers.

But as professed Answerers never abuse our patience and understandings more than in this kind of discoveries; it may not be amiss, to say a word or two of a species of consutation, which such men are always ready to urge, on the very slightest grounds, for the convenience which attends it; the convenience of making an Author consute himself, when the Answerer is unable so to do.

Sometimes the imaginary inconfiltence arises out of the flow conception or cloudy apprehension, of the Answerer, when the Author is toobrief or too refined: sometimes from the less accurate expression of the Author, when the Answerer is too subtile or too captious. It sometimes arises from the Answerer's prejudices; and sometimes again from the Author's prevarication.

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Nay, which is stranger still, the very exactness of the distinctions, and correctness of the terms, (and the correcter and exacter they will be in proportion to the Author's knowledge of words and things) the

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YEZ A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

more shall the discourse abound with these fancied contradictions. For a heavy or a precipitate Answerer will never be able to distinguish things SIMI-LAR from things IDENTICAL.

Prejudice for a fet of Opinions may make an Anfiwerer mistake some things to be in Nature, what they are only in the combinations of the Schools; and finding them considered differently, that is, under other associations, by his Adversary, who may have no prejudices, or prejudices of another kind, he will be extreme ready to call these differences, by the more commodious name of contradictions.

Lastly, the Author, if he be a FREETHINKER, has a right by ancient custom [7] to two or three, or indeed, to two or three dozen of Characters, as may best suit his purpose, or errand: A practice, which, being begun amongst us Moderns, under a want of Liberty, was continued out of Licentiousness, and is still kept up for the sake of it's Conveniencies. Now if such a One be too lazy to assume a personated Character in form, then, (as Lord Shastsbury observes) a dull kind of IRONY which amuses all alike, becomes his favorite sigure of speech. But with such a Writer, an inattentive or plain-dealing Answerer may give himself much trouble, to collect his contradictions, and all, to be well laughed at for his pains.

I have honeftly marked out these various delusions, that You may have it in your power to detect me, should I be tempted to impose upon You, myself. Not that I claim much merit from this fair dealing; for his Lordship's contradictions are so gross and

substantial, so frequent and obvious, that I was under no temptation to make out my specimen by any thing doubtful or ambiguous, de ad rayage the remains

1. " I could not (fays his Lordship) have discover-"ed, as Newton did, that universal law of corpo-" real Nature, which he has demonstrated. But fur-"ther than that, he could go no more than I; nor " discover the ACTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE, BY WHICH THIS LAW WAS IMPOSED ON ALL BO-" DIES, AND IS MAINTAINED IN THEM [8]." Here he owns ATTRACTION not to be a REAL or effential, PROPERTY OF MATTER, but the action of the first cause upon it. Yet in another place he observes, that " ATTRACTION MAY BE, notwithflanding all the " SILLY abstract reasoning to the contrary, A REAL " PROPERTY OF MATTER [9]." The truth is that, for any thing his Lordship knew of this universal Law, Attraction might be Action, Passion, Magic, or the Man in the Moon. He only followed his Leaders. Mr. Collins displayed the same Philofophic spirit in speaking of gravity, the effect of Attraction: And CLARKE's animadversion on him will exactly fuit his Lordship. - " Not content to "have erred so very grossly in the first foundation of " all natural Philosophy; you could not forbear pro-" fessing further, that you have often admired that "GRAVITATION Should be esteemed a matter of such dif-" ficulty amongst Philosophers; and that you think it to " be fo evident and necessary an effect of matter in con-" fant motion perpetually striking one part against another, that you wonder every body should not see it. I

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[8] Vol. iv. p. 8. [9] Vol. iii. p. 547.

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1541 A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

" suppose the rest of the world will no less admire at " you, for imagining that, by fo flight an admiration ! " you could at once fet aside all the propositions in " that most excellent book [the Principia of New-"ton wherein it is made appear by frictly mathecal demonstrations, drawn from the Laws of mo-"tion, now agreed on by Mathematicians, and " established by experiments, and from the Phæno-"mena of the heavenly bodies; that the prefent " operations of nature, depending upon gravitation, "cannot possibly be mechanical effects of matter in " constant motion perpetually striking one part against an-" other. - Upon the whole, all that you have ad-" vanced about gravitation is fuch marvellous reason-" ing, to be made use of in the present age, after so " many great discoveries, founded upon experience, " and even mathematical demonstration; that tho' I have no cause at all to be displeased with you for " arguing in fuch a manner; yet, I believe, your " readers cannot but think you might very well have "forborn going out of your way, to give fo very "disadvantageous a representation of your own Phi-"lofophy [10]." - will be a side and side and the

2. In one place, his Lordship tells us, that the right of the Israelites to the Land of Canaan was founded on the PROPHECY of Noah: in another, that it was founded on the PROMISE to Abraham, Second thoughts are best. He seems to come a little nearer the truth here. For tho' a Promise may intitle to a possession, I do not see how a Prophesy can do more

[10] Clarke's third defence of the immateriality and natural immortality of the Soul, against Collins.

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than foretel one: Unless his Lordship has some ethical engine of a new invention, to extend the grounds of Obligation, unknown to Grotius, Selden, and Cumberland; yet they travelled for it; and, if we may believe his Lordship's account of their farmous Journey to Paris, spared for no room in laying foundations. But, in this affair of the Promise, his Lordship instructes an untruth; which is a great deal meaner than to tell one: For he represents the farmour as capricious, arbitrary, and without any reason assigned.

3. " The Jews (fays his Lordship) as often as "they made God descend from Heaven, and as much "as they made him refide on earth, were far from " cleathing bim with corporaity, and imputing corpo-" real vices to him [11]." Yet two or three pages forward, fo prevalent is his luft of abuse, that he expressly fays, they DID cloath bim with CORPOREITY. These are his words: "The Jewish Scriptures ascribe " to God not only corporeal appearance, but corpo-" real action, and all the instruments of it; eyes to " fee, ears to hear, mouth and tongue to articulate." "hands to handle, and feet to walk [12]." Your will fay, perhaps, that his Lordship meant, the Scriptures indeed ascribed all this to God; but in a figurative, not in a literal, fense. I would have faid fo too. but that his Lordship goes on rating the Divines for understanding this scripture-representation in a figurative fense. Which, too, he shews does not mend the matter; for this figurative fense, it feems, was stolen from Epicurus. Now we know that Epicurus

[11] Vol. v. p. 515. . . . [12] P. 519.

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certainly believed the Gods to be CORPOREAL, if he believed any, tho' made of somewhat a finer stuff than mere mortal bodies. "Divines (fays his Lord-" ship) tell us indeed, that we are not to understand " all this according to the literal fignification, &c. "But this flimfy theological veil thrown over the literal " fignification is stolen from the wardrobe of Epicu-"rus [12]." His Lordship's wardrobe seems to be as rich as Epicurus's, in verus: a little after, we have a very curious one, a thin and trite VEIL of analogy: and he is ready to lend them to Divines, as Lucullus did his Cloaks to the Players, by the dozen.

But whenever his Lordship speaks of CHRISTIAwitt, a kind of fatality attends him; and then his contradictions have neither stop nor measure.

4. Speaking of the last Supper, he fays, " The "person by whom it was instituted is represented " fometimes under images, that render it impossible "to frame any, of the EFFICACY, or even of the "INSTITUTION of this Sacrament. Christ is a wine, "he is a rock, nay he is a coat, according to St. " Paul," &c. [14]. And yet no further off than four pages, he fays, "There is no one ffigura-"tive expression) perhaps in the whole Gospel, less "liable to any equivocal fense than that which "Christ employed when he said, This is my body, and "This is my blood, in the very act of giving bread and " wine to his Disciples, who were at supper with him, "just before his death, for a remembrance of which, "this ceremony of a supper was then instituted by

^[14] Vol. iv. p. 592. *135-

him. The figure was easy, the application natural, and they could not understand the expression be literally [13]."

His Lordship, as you may well think, has often different purposes to serve by his contradictions. Here his purpose is one and the same; to discredit a Gospel-Institution : which is equally done by shewing it to be mysterious, obscure, and incomprehenfible, where it pretends to clearness and precision; and low, trite, and mean, where it pretends to something august, peculiar, and in the highest degree efficacious. All the fault in this case, except his Lordship's most profound ignorance of the nature of the Rite, [16], is his bringing these two curious observations fo near to one another.

5. " Christianity [says his Lordship] as the Sa-"viour published it, was full and sufficient to all the "purposes of it. It's simplicity and plainness shewed " that it was defigned to be the religion of mankind, and manifested likewise the divinity of it's origi-"nal [17]" This is very gracious. Yet the Scene changes with his Lordship's humour; and the simplicity and plainness now become dark, ambiguous and incomprebenfible. " That there are many ambiguous "expressions, many dark fayings, in the Gospel; "MANY DOCTRINES, which reason could never have " taught, nor is able to comprehend, now they are "taught, cannot be denied [18]." " stillen at easter Religion for a language"

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[17] Vol. iv. p. 450.

[18] Vol. iv. p. 318.

^[15] P. 596. The main to satom and a laded and aw [16] See what is faid of it, in the xth discourse, on the principles of Nat. and Rev. Religion, preached at Lincoln's Inn.

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But let him recover his temper, and Christianity brightens up with it, and we once again fee it reftor ed to his good graces. "The fystem of Religion " (fays he) which Christ published, and his Evange-" lifts recorded, is a compleat fystem to all the pur-" poses of true Religion, natural and revealed. It " contains all the duties of the former, it enforces "them by afferting the divine Mission of the Pu-" blifher, who proved his affertion at the fame time " by his miracles [19]." But it is only restored to be as fuddenly deposed. It's birth is so far from being divine, that he infinuates it to be spurious, and neither better nor worse than a kind of Bastard-Platonism. " It is altonishing to observe the strange conformity " between PLATONISM and GENUINE CHRISTIA-"NITY itself, such as it is taught in the original "Gospel. We need not fland to compare them "here: Particular instances of conformity will oc-" cur often enough. In general, the Platonic and "Christian Systems have a very near resemblance, "QUALIS DECET ESSE SORORUM [20]." He then goes on to shew, that the common Parent of both was not REASON but ENTHUSIASM.

Enthusiasm, you will say, is now fairly brought to bed of twins, PLATONISM and CHRISTIANITY. No such matter. Genuine Christianity was taught of God [1]. — "As it stands in the Gospel it contains a "compleat system of Religion: it is in truth the "system of natural Religion [2]." Well then, we shall hear no more of this sisterly resemblance to Platonism. Perhaps not. But you shall hear, and

[19] Vol. iv. p. 314. [1] Vol. iv. p. 348-9. [20] Vol. iv. p. 340.

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that foon too, of as good a thing. This Christianity is at last found to be derived frem Judaism; that very Juparsm, which, he had told us, was it felf raifed on THEFT and MURDER - " On the Religion of the " Jews, and on the Authority of their Scriptures, "Christianity was founded [2]." Again, "They " who prefer the example and doctrine of CHRIST to "those of PAUL, will find reason to think that the Mes-" fish intended rather to reform and to graft upon Ju-"daism, than to abolish it [3]." And again; He accuses PAUL for preaching a new Gospel, called by the Apostle, my Gospel: And this new, or peculiar Gospel, his Lordship tells us was the Mystery of God's purpose to TAKE IN THE GENTILES, So INCON-SISTENT with the declarations and practice of JEsus [4]. Yet for all this, had Christ's Gospel " been propagated with the same simplicity with " which it was originally taught by CHRIST, it " would (he tells us) have been to the unspeakable " benefit of MANKIND [5]."

Let us now fum up his Lordship's Instructions to his Disciples, concerning the Gospel of Jesus. "It is simple, clear, and of divine original:" But it is, at the same time, "dark, ambiguous, incompre-" hensible; and like it's Sister Platonism, the Issue of "Enthusiasm."—As Jesus published it, the Gospel is a compleat System of Natural Religion, and tends to the unspeakable benefit of mankind: But as Jesus published it, the Gospel was only a reform of that Imposture Judaism, on which it was founded, and was intended

^[2] Vol. iv. p. 317. [3] Vol. iv. p. 350.

^[4] Vol. iv. p. 323.

^[5] Vol. iv. p. 316.

by Jefus to be confined to the Jewish People; it being Paul, who, in direct contradiction to the declarations and the practises of Jesus, turned it into a compleat System of Natural Religion, and made it tend to the unspeakable benefit of mankind, by extending it to the Gentiles." And thus he goes on contradicting his own affertions, as fast as he advances them, from one end of his Essays to the other.

The same self-contradictions, which consute his calumnies against Christianity itself, still sollow him when he comes to speak of the PROPAGATORS of

Christianity.

6. " He [fays this noble Lord] who compares the Epifeles of James, of Peter, and John, fuch as we have them, with those of PAUL, and all " these with the doctrines of the GOSPEL, will be perhaps of my opinion; at least he will have no oround to fay of the THREE FIRST, that they er were authors of NEW Gospels, as he will have " grounds to fay of the last, and as the last does in effect fay of himfelf [6]." What was this new Goffel? It was, as we have feen just before, the Myftery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles. PETER, and JOHN, therefore, according to his Lordship, taught not this Mystery; so inconsistent, as he fays, with the declarations and practice of Jesus. Yet soon after he confesses, that JAMES, PETER and JOHN, did teach this Mystery, and forsook CHRIST'S for PAUL'S NEW GOSPEL. For, speaking of the Council of Jerusalem, he says, The Aposties had given no directions to infift that the GENTILES Sould or of Yours p. 303.

Should not, submit to circumcission, and to the yoaks of the Law [7]: Which necessarily implies a concession that they too were Authors of this new Gospel, the Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles. The taking in the Gentiles, we see, he supposes a thing agreed on by all the Apostles: and that, what was yet undone, was the settling the precise terms of their admission.

Our Unbelievers look fo monstrously asquint upon Religion, that prejudice with opposite rays is always disturbing and consounding it's own malignant aims. Yet, in general, it requires pains to fix the contradictions which spring out of these fugutive cross lights. Commend me therefore to his Lordship, who brings his contradictions to a point; and requires nothing of you but eye-sight to see them in their full glare.

His pro and con then, being fo near neighbours, we shall not be surprized to find them at last incorporated, as it were, into one another! as in the following instances.

7. "I much DOUBT [fays his Lordship] whether "the EVANGELISTS WOULD understand the Epistles "of St. Paul, tho' one of them was his "scribe [8]."—It was faid of somebody, that he believed against bope: a matter of much mirth to our sirst Philosophy-Men. But what is that, to his Lordship's greater strength of mind, who can doubt against certainty! Paul and Luke agreed to preach the Gospel together: and not only so, but that Luke's pen should be employed to convey their common sen-

^[7] Vol. iv. p. 324.

timents, and adventures, to Posterity. And yet he questions whether Luke understood Paul's Epi-STLES. Some body, I suppose, when he had pened this doubt, might tell him, that one of these Evangeliffs was Paul's Companion, his Amanuenfis and Historian. But the observation was too good to be thrown away ; he therefore adds, with infinite dexterity and address - tho' one of them was his Scribe.

8. Again, Speaking of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES. he observes. " We make God so much a copy of man, that we defign the worst, as well as the best " of our own features, if I may fo fay, in our reorefentations of him: and, as common as it is, " no unprejudiced thinking man can hear, without " aftonishment, our perfections and our imperfections imputed to the divine Being in the fame breath. " and by the same men; with this difference at most, "that the former are imputed directly, and the lat-" ter fometimes under the THIN AND TRITE VEIL " OF ANALOGY. In a Being thus constituted, they " may well imagine that the moral virtues are the " fame as they are in our ideas: and Theology may " eafily deduce, from his attributes, the characters. "Theology has given them [9]."

We cannot; fays his Lordship, without astonishment fee our perfections and our imperfections imputed to the divine Being. His aftonishment is all a flam. His very words prove that he well knew imperfections are not imputed. For when he thus boldly. affirms, they are, he was fo twitched in conscience, that he was forced to add, under the thin and trite weil of analogy: That is, not imputed. For when Scripture LOT Vol. in to Tat

[9] Vol. v. p. 89.

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speaks of the out-stretched arm of God, and his all-seeing eye, does it impute arms and eyes to God, in the sense it imputes justice and goodness to him? Yes, says he under the thin and trite weil of analogy: i. o. Not in the same sense. As if we should say, His Lordship AFFIRMS under the thin and trite weil of a DENIAL.

This, Sir, is a very scanty specimen of his Lord-ship's Contradictions. Yet no man appears to be more sensible of the disgrace which contradictions bring upon a Writer. For, speaking of the whole College of Apostles, he says, These inconsistent Writers talk often a different language on the same subject; and contradict in one place what they have said in another [10].

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IV. His Lordship's profound LEARNING comes next to be considered.

1. The first instance I shall give is setched from the very penetralia of the first Philosophy. "HUMAN

" knowledge is fo entirely and folely derived from

" actual BEING, that, without actual Being, we

" should not have EVEN ONE of those simple ideas,

" whereof all the complex and abstract notions that

" TURN OUR HEADS are composed [11]."

Here, his Lordship cried eventa, and should have facrificed a Bull for his discovery: which informs us of no less a truth than this, that if Men bad bad no Being they would bave bad no sensation: in other words, that qualities cannot exist without a substance: For if, by actual Being he did not take in the Thinker's own, the observation is false: a rational Being, tho' existing singly, will have yet the idea of his own existence.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 489. [11] Vol. iii. p. 411.

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But the observation is every way extraordinary. He supposes our simple ideas to be real; he supposes our complex and abhratt notions to be compounded of the fimple ideas; and yet he supposes that the composition has TURNED OUR HEADS. 'Till now, I understood it was fantaftic, and not real knowledge, which turned men's beads. But I forget; His Lordship found the whole World in a frenzy; and then indeed it is hardly worth while to enquire what fet them a going. 2. " The PAGANS [fays his Lordfhip] do not ap-" pear to have interpolated the antient Doctors of " Paganism; nor is there any pretence to say that " THEY have imposed any spurious books on the " world, under the name of those Dollors [12]."

ORPHEUS and MERCURIUS TRISMEGISTUS Were certainly Pagan Doctors, if ever there were any: And did his Lordship never hear, that the Books, Hymns, and Poems under their names, which are come down to us from times preceeding Christianity, were Pagan forgeries ? I will not infift upon the si-BYLLINE ORACLES, which CICERO affures us had been interpolated, (for the Pagans interpolated their very forgeries) because I do not know to what conditions his Lordship confines the Doctorate in the pagan World, or whether he admits the fair Sex to the honour of the Hood. However, let us not think him fo unlearned as not to have heard of these forgeries. He had both heard of them, and confidered them well: And as he is always for putting the faddle on the right horse (as where he loads Divines with atheism) he charges all these iniquities on the CHRIS-

[12] Vol. iv. p. 195.

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that all the Mysteries of their [the Christian's] Re"ligion, had been revealed by the writings of Pa"gan Philosophers many centuries before Christ, that
"fo many books were forged under the names of
"Mercurius Trismegistus, of Hystaspes, of the Sibyles,
"and perhaps of others." We are got a good way
towards Doctorating these old Women: They are
become Philosophers, we see.—But whether the Christians were the anly forgers of Sibylline Oracles must be
left to be decided between Tully and his Lordship.
The truth is, and who, that understands Antiquity,
ever doubted of it! that some paganized Christians
learnt this trade of forging Books, under antient
names, from those whose Superstition they had left,
but not that Spirit of imposture which supported it.

3. "The [greek] Historians, says his Lordship, "observing how fond their countrymen were of "those who writ Fables, turned History into Romance; and studied to make their relations mar"vellous and agreeable, with little regard to truth, "in which they were encouraged, AFTER ALEX"ANDER'S EXPEDITION INTO ASIA, by the DIF"FICULTY of disproving any thing they said of "countries so remote [13]." A vulgar man, and one of those his Lordship calls, Pedants, would have said, — BEFORE ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION: because the difficulty in a great measure ceased AFTER that Conqueror had opened, and his Successors had kept open, a communication with those remote countries.

^[13] Vol. iv. p. 137--8.

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He calls Aristotle's Logic, " the rules of a " Dialectic that feemed to prove, and DID PROVE indifferently either in favor of truth or error [14]." Exaggeration is his Lordship's favorite figure of fpeech: but here it feems pushed a little too far; for, not content with faying that Ariftotle's rules of fyllogizing (for that is what he means by the rules of a dialectic) feemed to prove, he will needs add, and DID PROVE. Which shews such a knowledge of Syllogism, as needed not the following words to set it off. " It must not (says he) be imagined, that " he who reasons, or seems, rather, to reason closely and confequentially, has therefore truth always on his fide [15]." I defire to know who ever thought he had, who did not mistake, as his Lordthip here feems to do, the art of ranging arguments, for the Art of finding them ? " No body, his Master " Locke would tell him, can hinder, but that Syllo-" GISM, which was intended for the service of truth, " will fometimes be made use of, against it. But it is " NEVERTHELESS ON TRUTH'S SIDE, AND AL-WAYS TURNS UPON THE ADVERSARIES OF " IT [16]."

5. Speaking of Angels, his Lordship thinks sit to hazard this Observation: "There is another cause "of this PNEUMATICAL MADNESS, [the belief of such Beings] the fondness of making man pass for one of those Beings that participated of the divine "Nature. This had long possessed the heathen There

[14] Vol. iv. p. 158. [15] P. 159. [16] Second Letter to the Bp. of Worcester, p. 31-2. 8vo. Ed. 1697.

"ifts; and it possessed the Christians with more advantage [17]."

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This feems a demonstration that his Lordship either never read, or at least never understood, an antient Apologist. The truth is, there was not one extravagance in all Paganism, which afforded so much advantage to the primitive Christians, as this fond opinion of the antient Philosophers, that the human Soul was a part or portion of the divine nature; nor was there any, which they were more folicitous, and for a very important reason, [18] to expose: They laboured, indeed, with so much warmth, and sometimes with so little discretion, that it hath given a handle for some learned moderns to pretend, that all the antient Fathers believed the natural mortality of the Soul [19]. Well, but if the Christians were not possessed with this fondness, his Lordship will shew you, at least, they might have been possessed with it, and to more advantage too. But this part of his Lordship's philosophic Character, his Argumentation, I am not yet come to. However, as we are now upon the borders of it, you may not think it amiss to have it ushered in with this curious reason, which is to shew, that the impious notion of the human Soul's participating of the divine nature, possessed, or at least might bave possessed, the Christians with more advantage, than it did the heathen Theifts. Now, what do you think it is? You will hardly guess. It is, because Christians are wont to ASSUME that man is compounded of body and SOUL [20].

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^[17] Vol. iv. p. 478.

^[18] See Div. Leg. Vol. i. part ii, p. 206, laft Edit.

^[19] See Dodwell on this Subject.

^[20] Vol. iv. p. 478.

Well, it must needs be allowed, that till we assume, man has a Soul, we can never be possessed with an opinion that his Soul participates of the divine Nature. So much then is admitted, that since Christians hold, man is composed of soul and body, they may be possessed with advantage. But how it should be with more advantage, than the Heathens, I cannot comprehend. Did not the Heathens as well as Christians hold that man was composed of soul and body? We need not, I think, any other proof than this notion of participation, imputed to them: For they could not, sure, be so absurd to hold that nothing might participate of something. However, of this I will not be over-positive, since his Lordship tells us, they all laboured under an incurable PNEUMATICAL MADNESS.

V. Such an escape of his Lordship's Logic, must needs awaken us to expect great things from this last capital accomplishment of the *Philosopher*, his ART OF REASONING: to which, we are now arrived.

Spirit involves more difficulty or obscurity in it than the notion of body. Nay, he says he will make Locke Prove this against himself, that we have more and clearer primary ideas belonging to body than we have of those belonging to immaterial spirit. And thus he argues, "Primary ideas are the ideas of such qua"lities as exist always in the substance to which they belong, whether they are perceived or no. They are therefore essential to it, and productive, by their

operations, of those secondary qualities which may be said only to exist in our perceptions of them.

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ti cion no others, the primary qualities, and, in our "ideas the essence of Matter, of which we can frame " no conception exclusively of them. THESE NOTIONS "I HAVE TAKEN FROM MR. LOCKE, and they lead " me to ask what the primary ideas are of spirit or " immaterial substance? The Primary idea, or the " essence of it, is THOUGHT; as body is the extended, " this is the thinking substance, SAYS DES CARTES. "THOUGHT then, ACTUAL THOUGHT, is the effence " of the foul or spirit, and, by consequence, so inse-" parable from it, that we cannot conceive the Soul " or Spirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of, "thought. But this I know to be untrue: and I may " well own, fince Locke has owned the same, that I " have one of those dull Souls that does not perceive itself " always to contemplate ideas [1]."

You will naturally suspect him of soul play, when you find him employing the language of one Philosopher, to consute the sentiment of another. He is consuting Locke's affertion concerning the equal evidence of the primary qualities of Bady and Spirit; and he takes Des Cartes's definition of the primary qualities of Spirit, to make good his point. In plain truth, he puts the change upon us: he uses thought, or actual thinking, for the faculty of thinking. It is this last, which is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it: It is this last, which being a power, is sitly predicated of an Agent; as extension, which is a property, is sitly predicated of a Patient. It is this last, which Locke understood to be the primary idea of a spirit or immaterial substance, when he said that the no-

[1] Vol. iii. p. 510---11.

tion of Spirit involves no more difficulty nor objeurity in it than that of body: And it is this last, of which it may be troly faid, that we cannot conceive the foul or fpirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of it.

His Lordship owns, that it is above bumanity to comprehend that wirtue, whatever it be, pobereby one Beine acts upon another, and becomes a cause. Mhatever knowledge (fays he) we acquire of apparent causes, we can acquire none of real cafuality: by which. 1 mean, that force, that power, that virtue, whatever it be, by which one Being ACTS on another, " and becomes a cause. We may call this by different names, according to the different effects of it: but to know it in its first principles, to know the " nature of it, would be to know as God himfelf knows. " and therefore this will be always unknown to us in se causes that seem to be most under our inspection, as well " as in those that are the most remote from it [2]."

Would you believe, new, that it was but just before, in this very Effay, that for want of this knowledge, (which yet to affect even in causes that seem to be most under our inspection, would be to affect knowing as God himfelf knows) he denies the Sour to be a fubfrance diffinet from body. " They (fays he) who "hold the hypothesis of two distinct substances MUST EXPLAIN in fome tolerable manner, which they " bave not yet done, the union and MUTUAL ACTION "ON ONE ANOTHER, of unextended and extended Be-"ings, or elfe deny the absolute existence of any "thing extrinsical to the mind [3]." That is, those who hold the hypothesis of two distinct Substances

[2] Vol. iii. p. 551. [3] Vol. iii. p. 521, 2,

must either do that which he holds no Being but the Omniscient can do ; or they must sun mad ; or (which I think is fomething worse) they must give themselves up to his Lardship's guidance.

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He employs the fame arms to combat Inspira. TION: and with the fame advantage. The Notion of Infliration is idle and visionary, because " He has is no more conception of this supposed ACTION of the distine, "on the human mind, than he has of the inspiration by "which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and Son, according to the decision of the council "of Honence." That is, he rejects Inspiration because he does not comprehend that virtue by aubich one Bring alls upon another, and becomes a Cause; attho he owns none but God can comprehend it.

But his argument against the existence of the Soul and the mality of Insperation, is doubly faulty. For as it is the height of extravagance to reject a revealed truth, because the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of the coule, of which our farulties are INCAPABLE; fo is it in a finallidegree of unreasonableness and folly to reject fuch winth, because the proposition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of which our faculties are CAPABLE. - 15 Hours

ing! Wis Lordibip endeavours to thew, that a fitter State was not the Santion of the Law or Religion of Name . And thus he fets about it. . Sanctions " must be contained in the Law to which they be-" long; they muttbe a past of it. In their promul-" gation, they must precede, as the Law does, neces-" farily, all afts of bledience, or disobedience to it

they must be as public - These conditions are

effential, there can be no fanction without them.

" And therefore the rewards of a future State, which

" have not these conditions, are no fanctions of the

" natural Law. Reason and experience, that taught

"men this Law, shewed them the fanctions of it.

"But neither of them pointed out these. Have we any grounds to believe, that they were known to

" the antediluvian World? Do they fland at the head

" or tail of the SEVEN PRECEPTS GIVEN TO THE

" Sons of Noah? Were they fo much as mentioned

" by Moses [4] ?"

" elicatia !.

Can you forbear laughing? Had he found a future flate in the feven precepts of Noah, or in the books of Moses, be affured he would have employed this lucky circumstance to prove, that a future state was not the Sanction of the Law of Nature, but of a pofitive Law, or of a pretended Revelation, only. For in the beginning of this very fection, he has attempted to prove it was the fanction of politive Law, from its being found in the Gosper. "God (fays he) " has given a Law, the Law of Nature and Reason, to all his human Creatures: the SANCTIONS of it are " a NATURAL TENDENCY of virtue to the happines, " and vice to the mifery, of mankind - They are " imperfect - To supply the imperfection f Revela-"tion pretends that there must be necessarily some " FURTHER SANCTIONS of this Law, and these are " the rewards and punishments referved to a FUTURE "STATE. Here is ample room for reflexions [5]." - In truth there is: but as they would make fo in they seek proceeds, as the Law does, never

Vol. v. p. (512---13. 200 [5] Vol. v. p. (513--12).

little for the credit of his Lordship's learning, his followers will not be offended with me for not purfuing them make one in

4. He tells us, that the worship of the one true God was not the first Religious Worship. - The BIBLE fays it was: No matter for that. The BIBLE is a farrago of inconsistencies [6]. " Methusalem saw both " Adam and Noah, to both of whom God revealed " himself in his Unity. Shem, the Son of Noah, "lived even to the days of Abraham. Need I stay " to fhew now impossible it is for any man in his " SENSES to believe that a tradition derived from God " himself, through so few generations, was lost amongst "the greatest part of mankind; or that Polytheism "and Idolatry were established on the ruins of it in "the days of Serug, before those of Abraham, and " so soon after the Deluge? I should think it " IM POSSIBLE even for the Jews themselves to swal-"low fo many fables and fo many anacronisms. " Since the unity of God was not univerfally taught " in those early days, it was not so revealed, nor pre-" ferved in the manner affumed [7]." This account, therefore, he tells us, is INCONSISTENT with itself [8]. Now the utmost that Prejudice in its senses can make of it is an IMPROBALITY: and this improbability. his Lordship himself, but two pages afterwards, is so good to remove. He delivers it as a general Truth, that "the Vulgar BASILY embrace Polytheism and " Idolatry, even ARTER the true doctrine of the di-"vine unity has been taught and received; as we "may learn from the example of the Ifraelites: and

[8] Vol. iv. p. 19.

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" fuperflitions GROW APACE, AND SPREAD WIDE, "where Christianty has been established and is BAILY "TAUGHT, as we may learn from the example of the Roman Churches [9]."

Now, Sir, I argue thus, If amongs the Ifraelites, Idolatry and Superfittion to eafily, to frequently, and fo infrantaneously fucceeded, to the worthip of the true God, and needed such severe punishments to bring men back again to reason, in a place where many extraordinary helps were provided to keep them in their duty; and if, amongst Christians, Idolatry and Superfiction grow apace and spread wide where the true doctrine of the unity is daily taught, how can we wonder that, in the few generations from Adam to Seras . Polytheifin and Idolatty thould stubliff themfolies on the ruins of the Unity: as this happened in an Age, where we hear of no other provision for the Truth than the long lives of the Patriatches, and Metholalen's feeing both Adam and Noah ? If You derry this to have been the cafe of Frees and Christians, his Lordship tells you, You are out of your fenger: If you but this to have been the case of the Anteditavians, You are out of your Twiles thill. What is to be done? There is but one way : Which is, lubicribing to his Lordship's unerring os it has an improserry; and the Wildom.

But I have something more to say of this pretended in Consistency.— Can any man in his sufer believe that a Tradition, derived from God himself, should be lost in so few generations, and so soon after the Deluge?"—How few, and how soon, I befeeth your Lord-thip? I am not captious: I have a special reason for asking. The Chronology of this period is not uni-

[9] Vol. iv. p. 22.

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form or constant; there is a wide difference in the feveral bible accounts: so that I suspect soul play as well as inaccuracy, in your thus putting us off with the vague reckoning of, so few, and so son.

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To be plain, tho' the HERREW Copy make it no more than three hundred years from the Deluge to: Abraham; yet the SEPTUAGINT, and JOSEPHUS, reckon about a thousand; time more than sufficient to fink the greatest part of Mankind into Idolatry and Polytheifm. fo early as the days of Serug. And here lies the difficulty, the best Chronologers agree in preferring the Septuagint and Tolephus, to the Hebrew Copy. But I forget myself: His Lordship has " a thorough "contempt for the whole business of the Learned "lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USHER, "and MARSHAM [10]:" to subom (he fays) the whole tribe of scholars bow with reverence, and consequently he must have the same contempt for CHRONOLOGY; which, indeed, he has shewn on more occasions than one; but never to fo much advantage, as where he feems to have supposed that Livy and Tacirus flourished before VIRGIL [11].

But this by the way only. My business with his Lordship at present lies in another quarter. For, having, in his attempt to shew that the worship of the one true God was not the first religious worship, thrown the BIBLE out of the account, he goes on in this manner: "If the inconsistency of this account makes us reject it, we shall find less reason to be-

^[10] Vol. ii. p. 261, 2.

^[11] See Dr. NEWTON'S learned and judicious Differtations.

the UNITY OF GOD WAS THE PRIMITIVE FAITH of mankind. Revelations to the Farace might have established this Faith universally: but without Revelation it could not be that of any one people, till observation and meditation, till a full and vigorous exercise of Reason made it such "[12]." The reasoning is truly admirable. The supposed Fact, as we find it in ANTIQUITY, stands thus, The BIBLE tells us, that the worship of the true God was the first religious worship: GENERAL TRADITION fays the fame. Between these two Teffimonies there is a natural and strong connection; the Tradition appearing to rife out of the truth of the Written word; for, as his Lordship well observes, nothing but a Revelation could establish this Faith univerfally, not even among ft one people, till observation and meditation had made it familiar to them. Here you have the Fact proved in the strongest manner a Fact can be proved; by the concurrence of two Witnesses, coming from different quarters, and strangers to each other's evidence; which yet not only agree, but mutually support one another. What would you more? -Hold a little, says his Lordship. This boasted connection is not real but imaginary: facred History concerning a Revelation is not to be believed, because inconsistent: prophane Tradition is not to be believed, because without Revelation the unity of God could not be the first faith of any one people. Thus stands his Lordship's reasoning, or thus, at least, it

[12] Vol. iv. p. 20.

would

PHILOSOPHY SHRING STORY would stand, had he urged it to the best advantage. And to this, I reply, first, that his Lordship, in calling the Bible account inconfistent, is guilty of an abuse of words: that, all which his own premisses infer is only an improbability; and this improbability likewise, he himself fairly contradicts and consutes. Secondly, He begs the question, in taking it for granted that For the inconfistence of there was no Revelation. any History concerning it, is no proof that it was NOT; tho' an universal Tradition that the primitive faith was the doctrine of the unity, (which doctrine, in his Lordship's reckoning, could come in no other way than by Revelation) be a very good proof that IT WAS. But I go farther, and, in defence of the Bible-account, observe, That, if what he says be true, that observation and meditation, and a full and vigorous exercise of reason, are necessary for the gaining the knowledge of the UNITY in a natural way, and that these qualities are long a coming, then it is highly probable, that the want of this observation and meditation, when the unity was revealed to the first Man, might have been the occasion of the speedy loss of it. He expressly tells us; that this Truth has been subject to as sudden revolutions, in the times of Judaism and Popery, when men were in full possession of it, with all their observation, meditation, and vigorous exercise of reason, at the height; and twenty other advantages to boot.

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But his Lordship's general management of this que-stion, of the FIRST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, should not be overlooked, tho' it belong properly to another Head. He discusses the point at large, in two several Differtations: each of which is fo well qualified; and

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fo fitly accommodated to the other, that the fecond is a complete confutation of the first. How this came about, is not unworthy the Reader's notice. His Lordship does things in order. He had it first of all in his purpose to discredit the Mosaic account of the Creation: And Moses representing the worship of the true God as the original Religion, he fat himfelf to prove that Moses was both a fool and a liar. Soon after, he had another Prophet to bring into contempt, the Prophet Isaiah, who informs us, that the lews were the only nation under heaven, which had the worship of the one God. A truth which Ever BIVS has taken upon his word [13]. His Lordflip will thew, they deferve no credit. And then he ranfacks all the dark corners, not of Antiquity, but of those Moderns who have rendered Antiquity still darker : in which he succeeds so well, as to persuade himself that the World, many ages before the foundation of the Jewish Republic, had the knowledge of the one God; pay, that there was no time fo early in which the one God was unknown. In a word, he overturns, as we faid, and very completely too, every thing he had written on the same subject, in the other Differtation, against Moses. But as all this is directly levelled at the Author of the Divine Legation, I leave that Writer to do his own argument justice as he shall find himself able.

5. In the mean time, I proceed to give you one of his Lordship's palmary arguments against RE-VELATION.

[13] See Div. Leg. Vol. i. Part i. p. 163:

of Can he be less than MAD who boafts a REVELA-"TION Superadded to REASON, to Supply the de-"fects of it, and who superadds REASON TO RE-"VELATION to supply the defects of this too, at the "fame time? THIS IS MADNESS, OR THERE IS NO " SUCH THING INCIDENT TO OUR NATURE [14]."

Now as every man, who believes REVELATION, was in these circumstances, his Lordship (and reason good) concluded the MADNESS to be univerfal; and none but himself in his senses; and standing thus alone he has thought proper to give us frequent notice of this extraordinary case [5], Infanire me aiunt, ultro cum ips infaniant. But if he will needs reduce us to this fad alternative, I shall make no scruple to vindicate our common nature, be it never fo much at his Lordship's expence. For, as to the body of mankind, who " hold that Revelation was superadded: " to Reason, to supply the defects of Reason; and " that Reason was at the same time superadded to "Revelation to supply the defects of Revelation." I am fo far from seeing in them any of those unfavourable fymptoms, his Lordship speaks of, that I think, whoever had done otherwise, had deserved, (at leaft, on the principles of his Lordship's rigid justice) to be fent to Bedlam. Indeed some, for so doing, have been actually fent thither. For what, for the most part, are the religious inhabitants of that place, but such, who; having superadded Revelation to supply the defects of Reason, WOULD NOT SUPERADD REASON to supply the defects of Revelation; but were for making the Laws of the Gospel the sole rule

[14] Vol. iv. p. 172.

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[5] Vol. iv. p. 316--353--377

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of all civil as well as of all religious measures : in other words, such as were grown FANATICAL. Dendw

Let us confider how the case truly stands. The Religionist, his Lordship fays, boasts, that Revelation was superadded to Reason, to supply the defects of Rea-Very well. Reason then is the foundation, and Revelation, the Superstructure. Revelation meddles not with the work of Reason, but supplies us with new Truths, where Reason stops short. And why was this done? - For the fake of an ADEQUATE RULE OF LIFE. Is Reason alone this rule ?- Then the superstructure of Revelation was not wanted. Is Revelation alone the rule ?- Then Reason was built upon to no purpose. The ADEQUATE RULE therefore is composed of BOTH. But if so, When Revelation has been added to Reason to supply the wants of Reason, must not Reason be added to Revelation to supply the wants of Revelation? Must not two things, thus related, be mutually applied to the aid of one another's insufficiencies? Reason is the Base; Revelation is the Upper-building. It is owned, the Upper-building is necessary to perfect the Base: Must it not be owned, that the Base is as necessary to bear the Upper-building?

But, (what is more) it is the Gospel itself, and not artificial Theology, as his Lordship pretends, which gives us this direction. For the Gospel being to serve (as is confessed) for a superaddition to the first building of Natural Religion, it delivers no complete system of moral Law, (for which it is so often reproached by his Lordship) because the general parts of that system are to be found in Natural Religion. To supply this defect, if it be one, St. Paul has pointed out

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an expedient, the fludy of natural Religion; from whence, together with the Gofpel, fuch a complete. fystem may be collected, "Finally, Brethren, what-"foever things are true, whatfoever things are ho-" nest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things, " are pure, whatfoever things are lovely, whatfoever "things are of good report ; If there be any virtue, "if there be any praise, think on these things [16]." This then is the Scheme of TRUE CHRISTIANITY. It superadds Revelation to Reason to supply the defects of it; and superadds Reason to Revelation to supply the defeds of this too at the same time. And can any thing be more rational than fuch a scheme?

Indeed, was REVELATION only a REPUBLICA-TION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE, his Lordthip's charge, tho' extravagantly urged, would appear to have some foundation. For then Revelation must be supposed to be the Religion of Nature, restored and perfected: and then to recur back to Natural Religion to rectify Revelation, after Revelation had been introduced to rectify Natural Religion, would have, the none of the marks of madness, which confifts in arguing confequentially from falle principles, yet great fymptoms of folly, which confifts in arguing like his Lordship, from the true. But he owns Chriftianity to be founded on the Principle of REDEMP-TION. Indeed he is as variable in this, as in most other points, and as often represents it to be a republication of the Religion of Nature: When he chuses to employ the gentler method of extirpation, the explaining it away, it is then a republication; when, 6. Agether of his Leeder Sautharida languag (

100 bernier : [16] Phil. iv, & of other ai miterarait

FEZ A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

the rougher and directer method of exposing it to contempt, it is then founded in the doctrine of Redomption. Therefore, as We have all along made the best of his Contradictions, e'en let Him do the same; for it seems not sit, he should be deprived of any advantages of his own procuring.

Let us fet his Lordship's argument in another light; and turn from his Philosophic to his Legislative Character; and suppose him to reason thus, (for change but the terms, and the reasoning will hold just as well in civil as in theologic matters.) "Can he be "less than mad who boasts a system of civil Laws su" peradded to the natural, to supply the defects of it; "and who superadds the natural to the civil, to sup-"ply the defects of this too, at the same time?" Now look, what sigure the Politician would make, who should thus instruct his Pupils, even such does our noble Theologian make in dictating to all Mankind.

Amongst the numerous absurdities in this famous argument, I don't know if it be worth while to take notice of one in the expression; for as it seems not to be committed with design, it hardly deserves the name of a sophism; and that is, the repetition of the word superadded to Reason, yet Reason can never be said to be superadded to Revelation, how closely soever it may be joined with it; because the two systems can never become top and bottom in their turns, after it has been owned that One is the foundation, and the Other, the superstructure.

6. Another of his Lordship's general objections to Revelation, is as follows:

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183.

"It is not, in any degree, so agreeable to the no"tions of infinite wisdom that God should deal out
"his Revelations by PARCELS, instead of making a:
"system of moral Law, when he created moral"agents, that might answer his whole purpose, in
"all circumstances of time, place, and persons;
"just as he made a physical system of Laws for
"the other part, the inanimate part of his Crea"tion [17]."

Now with his Lordship's good leave, I am bold to think, the contrary the more probable; and that too, on those very principles of Analogy, which his Lordship employs, to prove it less so. He argues against the likelihood of God's giving the moral Law, IN PARCELS, because the Physical Law was given AT once. This plainly proceeds on a supposition that: the nature of the two lystems is the same; and that there is the like constancy and regularity in the Moral as in the Physical; or the like irregularity in the Physical as in the Moral; For unless there be the same tendency to order, or to diforder, in two general fuftems. the means of governing them can hardly be the fame. But in thefe two fyftems, obedience to their refrective Laws is far unlike : Paffive MATTER, (the fubject of the physical) obeys, with small irregularities, the Laws impressed upon it by it's Creator; but an active MIND, (the subject of the moral) is perpetually deviating from that rule of right which the Governor of the world, prescribed for its observance. The method therefore of governing in the two Systems must needs, according to all our ideas of wisdom, be

[17] Vol. v. p. 544.

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very different. And this difference, which our fenfes tell us bas been observed, is that which natural reason teaches us to conclude, should be observed; namely, to a physical system (whose subject would constantly and invariably obey) a Law given at once; and to a moral system (whose subject inclined it to frequent deviations) a Law given in parcels; which might, from time to time, reform the disorders as they arose.

But the folly, in thus embarrasing ourselves about the sit ordinance of God's dispensations, has its source in a MADNESS, that his Lordship perhaps least sufpected, and which yet he was most concerned to guard against; the madness of supposing, that eternal wisdom needed the aid of our contrivance to make things as they should be.

7. I shall conclude my specimen with some of his Lordship's more particular objections to the BIBLE.

Speaking of the civil punishment of Idolatry, under the Jewish Theocracy, he says, "God himself "was the Legislator. The Cirizens, therefore, "of that commonwealth, who apostatized, were proceeded against as traytors and rebels, guilty of no less than high-treason. Let it be so. The objections of injustice and cruelty to those Laws will remain in their full force, and be of more weight to prove them numan, than all these hypotheses to prove them numan, than all these hypotheses to prove them divine. God was King, and idolatry was no less than high treason; no objection therefore can lye against the Punishment of it. None certainly, but every objection to the manner and

[17] Vol. v. p. 544.

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Here his Lordship to make amends, as it were. for his frequent denial of the truth, without understanding the question, has for once ventured to agree to it, upon the same terms. It had been said, "that as God was King of the Jews, idolatry was "high treason." To this, his Lordship condescends. But to shew us how well he understood the principle on which it stands, he affirms that God's being their LEGISLATOR made Idolatry high treason. As if the bare giving Laws to a people conferred the Mag1s= TRACY on the Giver : or as if there could be bigh treason against any but the MAGISTRATE. But you shall fee more of his talent for Philosophic Polirics, if it fall in my way (as perhaps it will) to speak of his abilities in his own trade. It is his reafoning on the subject, not his general knowledge of the case (things rarely to be found together in his Lordship's Fsays) that I now propose to examine.

You observe then, he owns Idolatry, in Judea, to be high Treason; and the Punishment of it (which is every where capital) to be just. But the manner and degree of that punishment he pronounces, both unjust and eruel. Was this like a philosophic Legislator! — When the question is of the justice or injustice of a public Law, every man of common sense, and endowed with the instinctive knowledge of right and ewrong, may pass a true judgment on it; because it stands on the unalterable nature of things; in buman Laws, on the relation between Magistrate and Subject; in divine Laws, on the relation between God

1 1 29 19 1 1 [18] Vol. v. p. 193: dad v to accises

and man; and in a System of Laws, like the Mosaic; both on one and the other, in conjunction. Now his Lordship, in passing judgment on the case upon these principles pronounces the Law against Idolatry to be right and equitable. What can be more honourable for this part of the Jewish System? It is Lord Bolingbroke who decrees in favour of it; and is here aided, which he rarely is, by the plainest and clearest principles of common sense. Hold, says his Lordship; take this along with you, Tho' no objection can his against the Publishment, yet every objection lies against the Manner and Degree of it.

Let us fee then whether this stands upon the same

To judge truly of the manner and degree of a pumishment, I apprehend, more is required than to judge of the punishment itself. It requires an intimate acquaintance with the People to whom this Law against idolatry was given; a knowledge of their manners, tempers, dispositions, prejudices, and situation; in a word, of a thousand other circumstances, which none but the Lawgiver himfelf could perfectly underfland, certainly, not this Politician of Yesterday. So that, it appears, the justice or injustice of the manner and degree of a punishment is not determinable on those simple and obvious Principles which thew the justice or injustice of the punisoment itself, but on other confiderations which determine of right and eurong from many fhifting circumstances; from the degree of temptation in the Object; from the degree of prejudice in the Subject; of propenfity to the Crime; of malignity to the System; and from other various connexions, of which only Those who are perfect in the ban know.

knowledge of antient Manners in general, and of the Jewish People's in particular, can form any reafonable ideas.

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This is enough to flew the folly of cavilling at the manner and degree of the punishment of Idolatry, after the punishment itself is allowed to be just and right. But this is not all; the very allowance of the punishment implies a presumption in favour of the manner and degree. The Punishment of Idolatry, a punishment which could take place in no system of Government but the Mofaic, is, when examined on plain and clear principles, found to be just admit now, the manner and degree of it to be doubtful for want of knowledge fufficient to thew us the necessity, and confequently, the juffice of them. Is it not fair to infer, that the Lawgiver, who so wifely and equitably observed the rule of justice in the punishment itfelf, observed it likewise in the manner and degree of the punishment Paris on bads odivi seems doursepared

This, as to the general meaning, of the manner and degree of a Punishment. But, if I be not mistaken, this manner and degree here insisted on, have a peculiar reference to his Lordship's own System of divinity and politics. I suppose, his principal objection to the manner might arise from the punishment's being insisted by the civil justice of the state, and not by the immediate hand of God. Buthe should have considered, that the LAW, all along distinguishes between the crimes capable of legal conviction, and such as were inscrutable to all but Omniscience. The latter God reserves for his own Inquisition [19]: But the crime in question was an overtact of idolatrous worship, and therefore

[19] See Div. Leg.

came:

came reasonably and equitably before the Civil Tribunal. His eavil at the degree comes next to be considered. It's being simply capital was not, I believe, that for which his Lordship imputed injustice and cruelty to it. The being attended with Confiscation, as in the case of Naboth, was what seems principally to have incurred his displeasure. But in a case, where his Lordship was personally prejudiced, he should have mistrusted his own judgment; he should have examined the force of those arguments, by which a great Lawyer had lately evinced, that forseiture for bigh treason is persectly just and equitable.

8. The noble Lord, harangning on the conditions of Historical Authenticity, delivers this, for one of the chief, "That the facts, the principal Facts at least, "be confirmed by COLLATERAL TESTIMONY. By collateral testimony (says he) I mean the testimony of those who had no common interest of Country, of Religion; or of Profession, to disguise or falsify the truth [19]."

This condition of bistorical Authenticity will be easily agreed to; as well as his definition of collateral testimony: And the quotations of Josephus and Eusebrus, from Egyptians, Phanicians, Chaldeans and Greeks will, without doubt, be urged by the defenders of Religion, as such collateral testimony, where the witnesses had no common interest of Country, of Religion, or of Profession to disguise or falsify the truth.—Pardon me, says his Lordship, "Josephus indeed attempts to support his history [the Bible] by col"lateral testimonias, those of Egyptians, Phanicians,

[19] Vol. iii. p. 281.

"Chaldeans, and even Greeks. But these testimonies, were they never so full to his purpose, would "CEASE TO BE COLLATERAL testimonies, by COM"ING THRO' HIM, who had a common interest of "Country and Religion to disguise and to falsify the "truth [20]."

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This feems a little hard, that, when our advantages of defence are, in his Lordship's opinion, so rare, the sew we have, should be lost the very moment they are gained. Josephus has no sooner seized this important mark of bistorical authenticity, but it sips thro' his singers as he is urging it: and, what is still more extraordinary, BECAUSE he urges it. The Back of life and the Seat of life, it seems, have this property in common—

" Like following LIFE thro' Creatures you diffect, "You lose it in the moment you detect.

For, as Tully well observes, all human things are given to change. "Corpora nostra non novimus.

"Itaque Medici ipfi, quorum intererat ea nosse, apa-"reerunt ut viderentur: nec eo tamen ajunt Empi-"Rici notiora esse illa, quia possit sieri ut patesacta

" et detecta, MUTENTUR."

But to canvas this wonderful, reasoning a little closer; Let us make a supposition, or rather, let us lay down a fast, that Apion, like his Lordship, had insisted on this very condition of bistorical authenticity; and that Josephus, who defended the Bible against his cavils, took him at his word, and agreed to put the issue of the debate on that circumstance; and

[20] Vol. iii. p. 281.

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thereupon produced the tellimony of Egyptiam, Phamicians, Chaldeans, and even Greeks, to support the facred Story. Thus far, his Lordship will allow, matters went glibly on, and the argument had its proper efficacy. Jose PHOS quoted from the Works of Pagan writers, transmitted to him thro' the hands of Pagan readers; and being engaged with a clear-fighted Adversary, without doubt, quoted fairly. The hiftorical authenticity of the Bur Etherefore was established on the terms his Adversary required. How then comes it to pais, that an argument which was once conclosive, has now lost its force? Whatowas truth in that Age must be allowed to be truth in this; or not only the Authenticity, but the very being of History will become precarious. Do these pagan testimodies, in running thro' the chanel of Josephus, become polluted, as foon as the original Books cease to exist? No, fays his Lordship; but they may be suspected. On what account, I pray? Could he prove that Josephus burnt them; or was aiding in their deflruction : or had a fore-knowledge of their loss, his Lordship might then indeed have some reason to fuspett. But to talk of suspicion, merely because lo-SEPHUS was interested that the quotations should be to his purpole, is fo vague a cavil, as shews the objector will never be at a loss for an evation. Were the Originals fill in being, he would then fuffect that there passages had been forsted in by some Jewish or Christian Impostor; at least, by some body or other, who had a common interest of Country, of Religion, or of Profession, to disguise or fallify the truth. In fliort, he would suspect all the World sooner than his own power to impose upon us. To

To thew you, this is faid neither at random nor in malice, confider his Lordship's conduct where this collateral testimony is circumstanced in the manner he himfelf requires. The defenders of Religion fay that the PENTATEUER, which represents Moses as the Leader and Legislator of the Israelites, is supported by that evidence which his Lordship calls collateral. What fays his good Lordship to this? " Be it so, that " the Ifraelites had a Leader and Legislator called " Moles is proved by the confent of Foreign, whom " I call collateral Evidences. But furely it will not " follow, that this man CONVERSED WITH THE " SUPREME BEING FACE TO PACE, which thefe " collateral Witnesses do not affirm [1]." Thus you fee, these collateral evidences will always be rejected, whether they tell their story viva woce, or whether their depositions be taken down by such who avail themselves of their Testimony - But, they do not fay that this man conversed with the supreme Being face to face. Would his Lordflip have believed them, if they did? Why, no, fays he, my faith goes no further than to civil facts; and I must needs reckon fuch Tales amongst the Miracles of the Greek and Roman Historians. Very well, my Lord. And does not this flew, that if the collateral evidence speak but to Moles's Legislation and civil rule, they fpeak to every thing they are called for, in support of Scripture against fuch Writers as your Lordship. To illuftrate the case; It is doubted, for inftance, whether Livy gives us a true account of fuch or fuch a Campaign between Hannibal and the Roman Generals.

[1] Vol. iii, p. 282,

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Polybius, Plutarch and Appian being Greeks are produced as collateral evidences, but they speak not a word of those Prodigies which the Roman Historian

relates at large.

9. Bur his hate to Moses is immortal : Notwithflanding all his Lordship's pretended contempt of him, as a Legislator, it looks as if, in his heart, he thought him a very formidable Rival. Archbishop TILLOTSON had attempted to defend the Authenticity of his writings, on this Postulatum, that the Unbeliever would only give the same credit to them which he gives to every civil History. His Lordship owns the demand to be reasonable; and is willing to try his Brother Legislator, on these terms. In order to this, he observes, " That one condition of the Authenti-" city of any human History, and fuch alone (fays " he) we are to consider in this place, is, that it " contains nothing repugnant to the experience of man-" kind. Things repugnant to this experience are to " be found in many that pass however for authentic; d' in that of Livy, for instance: but then these in-" credible anecdotes stand by themselves, as it were, " and the history may go on without them. But " this is not the case of the Pentateuch, nor of the " other Books of the Old Testament. Incredible anec-" dotes are not mentioned feldom and occasionally " in them : THE WHOLE HISTORY IS FOUNDED " on such, it confifts of little else, and IF IT " WERE NOT A HISTORY OF THEM, IT WOULD

"BE A HISTORY OF NOTHING [2]."
The Unbeliever's objection to the Authencity of the Bible as a civil bistory, is, that it is full of Miracles:

and, supposing the Defender of Revelation ready to reply, "So likewise is the History of Livy; and yet "that does not destroy its credit;" his Lordship obviates the reply extremely well. "There is an effective in the incredible anecdotes of Moses and of Livy. The Roman Historian's Miracles are detached pieces; they make no part of the subject, and are extraneous to it: But the Miracles of the Jewish Writer are intimately related to all the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part; the subole history is founded on them. Take away Livy's miracles, and the train of civil events goes on just as well without them: Take away Moses's, and his history becomes a heap of confusion, or more pro-

I am proud of any opportunity to acknowledge the obligations which Learning or Religion have to his Lordship; I only wish the occasions had been more frequent: As it is, I am unwilling to let the first that occurred to me pass by without my thanks, lest possibly the occasion should never return.

In a word, his Lordship's observation on the difference between the MIRACLES in Moses and in Livy, is solid and masterly. And this difference, let me observe, is a certain mark, tho' not of that civil authenticity which the good Archbishop's argument requires, Yet of that divine original which the Scrip-Tures arrogate to themselves.

It is the specious, but trite, objection of Infidelity against the Miracles recorded in the Bible, that those remote ages were full of prodigies and portents. "Why then, says the Freethinker, should we believe K

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the incredible anecdotes of Moses, rather than those of LIVY?" For a very good reason, replies his Lordship, we find them in a history effentially different from that of Livy. Take away his miracles, together with all those of the other pagan Historians, and the Story stands just as it did. But take away the BIBLE-MIRACLES, and you reduce the civil part of the relation to a state of inexplicable confusion.

Again, one of the least hacknied, and indeed least futile, observations I have ever heard urged against the Bible, (and it has been urged to me) is the WANT OF A NECESSARY CONNEXTON between the civil and the miraculous parts of that History. Here again his Lordship comes in, in support of Revelation, and fays, that this necessary connexion is evident to all, for that nothing can be made of the civil part if you take away the miraculous. Which fure

is a connexion of some strength.

Thus has his Lordship, before he was aware, in attempting to destroy the civil authenticity of the Bible. fupported its divine original. And this good, tho' undefigned, ought however to be acknowledged. But you may think, perhaps, that a matter of this importance, is not here fufficiently developed. Without doubt, it is not. This is a long flory; and as I pretend to have supplied this DESIDERATUM, The want of a connexion between the miraculous and ciwil part of the facred History, I shall refer you to the proper place, where it is to be found.

In the mean time, give me leave to go on with his Lordship; and proceed to the proposition itself, That the Miracles recorded in the BIBLE, deffroy its credit as a civil biflory. Now this I apprehend to be a pure piece

of chicane. Let us fee how the matter flands between

BELIEVERS Tay, the Bible-History is the history of a Difpensation really divine : Unnellevers fay, it is the history of one only pretended; and endeavour to support their affertion, by shewing it to have the civil marks of falsehood and imposture. Here the Archbishop steps forward and offers to try the authenticity of the Bible on the Standard of a CIVIL HISTORY. Agreed, replies his Lordship; And what fay you now to MIRACLES? Say? Why, that Miracks are out of the question; and come not into confideration till the DIVINE authority be contended for. When we agreed to confider the Bible as a civil biftory only, it was not for truth's, but for argument's Take. If we held the Writers of it to be mere civil Historians, the miracles, recorded in it, might be fairly urged against us; and urged with advantage, if indeed there be that difference between them and Livy's, which is pretended. But we hold the Writers were indeed inspired; and You, my Lord, have shewn us, by that difference, to justify the miraculous part, whenever their infpiration becomes a question between us. In the mean time, flick to your point; and never fancy you can make our Divines the dupes of so pitiful a Sophism. You have drawn us, (while we debate a particular question with you) to exclude for argument's fake one of our principles [3]; and then urge against that question, a FACT [4], which stands, and is to be defended on the excluded principle; and fo, cannot be maintained while the principle remains ex-

^[3] The divine authority of the Bible. [4] Miracles.

cluded: Which is just as if, when you had perfuaded us to tye our hands, on promife that the question should be only about the use of our feet, You should object to us our inability of laying fast hold upon you. Your own words, my Lord, where you push this imaginary advantage, best detect the fraud and imposture of your proceeding. " The Old Tef-" tament (you say) is founded in incredibility. Al-" most every event contained in it, is incredible in "its causes and consequences; and I must except or " reject the whole, as I said just now. No one, Ex-CEPT HERE AND THERE A DIVINE, Will pre-" fume to fay, that the histories of the old Testament " are conformable to the experience of Mankind, and the " natural course of things." - Except here and there a Divine, do you fay? Nor they neither, I assure your Lordship. What they say is this, That every thing of a mere civil nature in the Old Testament has all the marks of civil authenticity. This is all they faid, and all they meant to fay. And, on what good grounds they faid it, give me leave to shew your Lordship a little more at large.

The Bible tells us, the world was created in time; and that time at no immense distance, as several fabulous relations of pagan Antiquity had pretended.

—And does not the late invention of Arts prove that the Bible says nothing but what appears very probable?

It fays, the Earth was overflowed by a deluge of waters.—And do not the contents of its surface demonstrate that it has suffered this Catastrophe?

The Bible says, again, that the Founders of Cities were the inventors of arts; and that the first civil Go-

vernments composed of small Monarchies arose from the Domestic. And do not experience and the natural course of things support so credible an anecdote?

The Pentateuch informs us, that the Israelites, after a long abode in Egypt, went out as a great People, and in a hostile manner, to seek new habitations.—And of this, have we not both external and internal evidence? The external in the Egyptian, Phænician, Chaldee, and Greek Writers, quoted by Josephus and Eusebius: the internal in the whole Jewish Ritual.

Scripture relates the defection of the ten tribes to Idolatry; their transportation to a foreign land; and the re-peopling that part of Judea with a new Colony of Idolaters —And of the truth of all this, we fay, the Samaritan Pentateuch, yet existing, is a strong and amazing Testimony.

These, my Lord, are a very sew of the numerous instances which might be produced to shew the civil Authenticity of the Bible. And on these and such as these, the Clergy's challenge stood, when they unundertook to prove that Authenticity, on the common principles of historic credit. Further, or other than this, they neither said nor meant to say. They understood, as well as your Lordship, the difference between Moses's incredible anecdotes and those of Livy; and that the Jewish History, unlike to all other, is wholly founded on miracles. But they distinguished better than your Lordship, of Moses' civil History: which consists of two parts; the peculiar Dispensation to that People; and the occasional story of the rest of Mankind.

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It is the peculiar Dispensation only to which his Lordship's observation can be applied, viz. that the civil cannot be separated from the miraculous part : Nor did the clergy attempt to do it. It was the occafional flory of the human race, we must needs suppose, to which the Archbishop's challenge referred: And I have shewn just above, that we are able to make his challenge good.

Thus would I have reasoned with his Lordship; and thus, in fact was he reasoned with, (as I may have occasion to tell you in my next Letter) but he was deaf to all advice, tho' it was given in private, and to fave his memory from the difgrace of these portentous Essays. What remained was to expose them as they deserved to the laughter and con-

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tempt of Mankind. has vombath is mailt or muleb And now, Sir, I think I have pretty well discharged my general promise to You. When one looks back upon this poor collection of meagre, disjointed reasoning, tacked together by his System, and swelled up to the semblance of a body by the tumor of his Rhetoric, one sees revived in these Estays, the old flory of Prometheus; his Lordship insulting the fancity of the Public, just as that most antient of Freethinkers did the ALTAR OF JUPITER; on which, as the Poets tell us, he offered up to the King of Gods and Men, A HEAP OF DRY BONES COVERneither as a could love sellent ... TAR HTIW DE

their own quarrell but a Worse of very aminguous

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fame, the Author of me Denne galian of M. by and. -T I'M Albance between the accordance Of which Harris of the trade of many mile at 11 ; Lo. dhip's objectively supplied the

OU will wonder to hear again from me on fo trifling a subject as this FIRST PHILOSOPHY. And had not Lord Bolingbroke reduced us to this alternative, either to give up the BIBLE or his LORD-SHIP to contempt, I should willingly have left him in

possession of his Admirers.

My last Letter examined his Lordship's value in every point of view, in which a Philosopher would defire to shine. I shall now push my inquiry a little further, and venture into his own Province, I shall crave your patience while I try his talents in his po-LITICAL capacity, as an Analyser of States, a Balancer of Power, and a Distributer of Civil and Religious Sanctions.

But now we must recede a little from the method hitherto observed, which was to defend against his Lordship's calumnies, not this or that body of Divines, but the general Principles of natural and revealed Religion. Here I shall have occasion to patronife a fingle Clergyman; and not such a one neither as I could have wished; a Cupworth, a CLARKE, a CUMBERLAND, or a TILLOTSON; (eftablished Names! which the Public are ready to make their own quarrel) but a Writer of very ambiguous fame, the Author of the Divine Legation of Moses, and,... of The Alliance between Church and State: Of whom,

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I pretend to know little but from the talk of his Adverfaries; his Friends possessing him, as they do a good Conscience, in filence and complacency; and from his Adversaries I learn-" But hold, you ery. let us drop both his Friends and his Enemies, and hear what the learned abroad fay of him; for his works are well known, and have been frequently translated and criticised both in Germany and France; We may expect to hear truth from Strangers who are without felfish partialities or personal prejudices."-Indeed, the Author would owe you his thanks for referring him to that decision: Foreign Critics of the greatest name have spoken so differently of him from the Scriblers at home, that, was I to tell you what they have told the world, you would suspect their encomiums for the civilities of his most partial Friends. So to his Adversaries, I say again, I commit him: And, from them I learn that he abounds in Paradoxes, that he delights in Refinements, and would fain pass upon the World a heap of crude index-reading, for well-digested learning : that, on his first appearance, he was shrewdly suspected of infide-Tity; but that (no body knows how) he has worked men into an opinion, of his being a fort of friend to Religion; indeed, in his own way: I suppose he fees it for his Interest to slick to the established Church: for I know no other reason why there should have been different opinions concerning him. In a word, as I judge of him from the representation of his Enemies, I can allow him little other claim to literary merit, than that very doubtful one, The Dunces, of all denominations, being in Confederacy against bim.

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Indeed, fince his Lordship's discovery of a Confederacy between Divines and Atbeifts, the word confederacy is likely to become as ridiculous as the word Ode. which our Laureate foretells, no body for the future will hear spoken of without laughing. However, it shall pass ; for were there no more in this confederacy. than in his Lordship's; and that every individual Blockhead only followed the bent of his own natural bias, it would but make the wonder fill more and and

Such then is the Writer I am forced to take up with: In truth I could not find another, fo proper for my purpose; which was, as I said, to display Lord Bolingbroke's political talents. For the' his Lordhip be very profuse in his ill Language to All, who have undertaken the defence of Religion and Church Government ; yet the Author of The Divine Legation of Mofes is the only one whom he does more than rail at and abuse on these accounts. For while he keeps at a respectful distance from the Arguments of others, he comes, boldly, up to this Writer's, and fits down before them in form. He Disputes with him, the Knowledge of the Unity—the fense and reason of a feled people of a tutelary Deity of compliance with buman prejudices, and, in a word, every leading principle of the Author's Book. This feems not greatly for his Lordship's honour after he had defied all the mighty Chieftains of Literature, to decline the combat, and think himself quit by accepting the Gauntlet from this puny Writer,

His Lordship begins his attack on that capital circumflance in the Jewish Oeconomy, THE OMISSION OF A FUTURE STATE : He pretends to account for it independently of the EXTRAORDINARY OR EQUAL

PROVIDENCE, which Moles affored his people was to be administred under a Theocracy; and which the Author of the Divine Legation attempts to prove, from this very circumstance of the Omission, was actually Now, the question between landers are bereffinimbe

But to make this intelligible to the common Reader, it will be necessary to give a fummary View of that famous Argument purfued at large thro two volumes of the Divine Legation, and yet conceived by many of the Learned, to be left imperfect marry, by fome, if you were to judge from the know. ledge they feem to have of it, hardly to be begun.

RELIGION has been always held necessary to the support of civil Society; and (under the common dispensation of Providence) a PUTURE STATE, as necessary to Religion; because, nothing but a fue ture flate can remove the objections to God's moral Government, under fuch a Providence; whose phase nomena are apt to diffurb the ferious Professors of Religion, as it is of the essence of religious profesfion, to believe that God is a rewarder of those who diligently feek him. I and med a present a lid to noisbuilt

Moses, who inflituted a Religion and a Republic, and incorporated them together, flands fingle amongst ancient and modern Lawgivers, in teaching a Reliligion WITHOUT the fanction, or even the mention, of a Future State of Rewards and Punishments. The fame Moses, by uniting the Religion and the Republic of the Jews into one fystem, made God by confequence their supreme civil Magistrate, whereby the form of Government became truly and properly Theore Tical all and the second of the second

The natural consequence of a Theocratic rule is an extraordinary or EQUAL PROVIDENCE. And such indeed, the Jewish Lawgiver has every where represented it to be.

Now, the question between Infidels and Believers is, whether this extraordinary Providence was REAL or only PRETENDED?

Here the Author of the Divine Legation interpoles; and undertakes to prove, from the circumstance of the omission of a future state, that it was REAL. His. Argument stands thus:

If Religion be necessary to Civil Government, and if Religion cannot subsist, under the common dispensation of Providence, without a suture state of rewards and punishments, so consummate a Lawgiver would never have omitted to inculcate the belief of such a State, unless he had been well assured that an entra-dinary Providence was indeed to be administred over his People: or were it possible he had been so infatuated, the impotency of a Religion wanting a suture state, must very soon have concluded in the destruction of his Republic; But his Republic nevertheless continued sourishing and Sovereign, for many ages.

This is the plain and simple ARGUMENT of the Divine Legation; which the first and the second Volumes of that Work are employed to explain and illustrate. And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it. This praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others have understood so little of the Argument, as to imagine that the two first Volumes had left it unfinished; and that the Third was

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to compleat the Syllogifm; tho' the Author had told us, more than once, that the purpose of the last Volume was only to INFORCE the various parts of the foregoing ARGUMENT, by many new confiderations a label of reward mellers and excess (

To evade, as we fay, this Argument, his Lordthip casts about for a reason, independent of the Ex-TRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, to account for Mofes's omission of a future flate. And his first folution is this. " MOSES DID NOT BELTEVE THE IM-MORTALITY OF THE SOUL, nor the rewards " and punishments of another life, tho' it is possible " he might have learnt these Doctrines from the "Egyptians, WHO TAUGHT THEM VERY EARLY, " perhaps as they taught that of the Unity of God. "When I say, that Moses did not believe the immorta-" lity of the foul, nor future rewards and punish-" ments, my reason is this, that he taught neither, " when be had to do swith a people swhom a Theo-" cracy could not refrain; and on whom, therefore, ", terrors of Punishment, future as well as present, " eternal as well as temporary, could never be too " much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated [1]."

This reasoning is altogether worthy of his Lordship. Here we have a Doctrine, plausible in itself, and therefore of easy admittance; Most alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind; Of highest account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Israelites, who were fond of Egyptian manners; Of strongest efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indispensable use; Yet, all this notwithstanding, Moses

did not believe it, and, on that account, would not reach in. But then, had Moses's integrity been fo fevere, How came he to write a History which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at least, a fiction of his own? Did he believe that? How came he to leave the Ifraelites, as my Lord affures us he did, in possession of many of the superstitious opinions of Egypt? he believe them too? No, but they ferved his purpole, which was, The better governing an unrally People. Well, but his Lordship tells us, the doctrine of a future state served this purpose best of all; for having to do with a People whom a Theocracy could not restrain, terrors of punishment, FUTURE as well as prefent, ETERNAL as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too firongly inculcated. No matter for that. Moses, as other men may, on a fudden grows ferupulous; and fo, together with the maxims of common politics, throws afide the principles of common fense; and when he had employed all the other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which best ferved his purpose; was most innocent in itself; and was most important in its general, as well as particular, ufe.

In his Lordship's next Volume, this Omission comes again upon the stage; and then we have another reason assigned for Moses's conduct in this matter.

"Moses would not teach the Doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of a suture state, on actions of the many superstitions which this Doctrine had begot in Egypt, as we must believe, or believe that he knew nothing of it, or assign some which this sical reason for his omission [2]."

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We have seen before, that Mosks omitted a suture state, because he did not believe it. This reason is now out of date; and one or other of the three sollowing is to be assigned; either because it begot supersitions; or because be knownothing of it; or because HE COULD DO WITHOUT IT, as the Jews were under an extraordinary providence; that being what he means, by the whimsical reason assigned, [by the Author of the Divine Legation] for its omission.

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting however that he will fland to it, and having shewn, his two first reasons not worth a rush, leave the last established even on his own concessions.

1. Moses, says he, emitted a future state on account of the many superstitions, which this doctrine had begat in Egypt. But if the emission stands upon this principle, Moses must have omitted an infinite number of Rites and Doctrines, which, Lord Bolingbroke says, he borrowed from the Egyptians; part of which, in his Lordship's opinion, were those very superstitions, which this Doctrine had begat; such as the notion of statelary Deities; and part, such as arose out of those; in which number were distinction between things clean and unclean; an bereditary Priesthood; sacerdotal habits; and Rites of sacrifice.

2. However, he has another reason for the omisfion: Mosse might know nothing of it. To which if I only opposed his Lordship's own words in another place, (where, giving us the reasons why Mosses did know something of a future state, he observes, there are certain rites, which seem to alkade or have a remote relation to this very dollrine [3], it might be deemed

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fulficient. But I go further, and observe, that, from the very Laws of Moses themselves, we have an instantal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongst the Laws against Gentile Divinations, there is one concerning that species of them, called by the Greeks Necromaner, or invocation of the dead; which necessarily implies, in the Lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uses it, the knowledge of a surre state.

fons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own inventions, and to take up with some whimsical reason for the omission; that is, to allow that, as the Jews were under an extraordinary Providence, Moses in quality of Lawgiver had no occasion for the doctrine of a future flate.

However, his Lordship diffatissied, as well he might, with the folutions hitherto proposed, returns again to the charge; And in his Corona operis, the book of Fracments, more openly opposes the doctrine of the Divine Legation; and enlarges and expaniates upon the reason, before given, for the unission; namely, the many superstitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt.

"his Lordship) a doctrine so useful to all Religion, and therefore incorporated into all the Systems of Paganism, lest wholly out of that of the Jaws. Many probable reasons might be brought to shew, that it was an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode, and this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, fo soon, at least, afterwards, by all those who were instructed like Moszs, in the wisdom of that people.

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"He transported much of his Wisdom into the " scheme of Religion and Government, which he " gave the Ifraclites; and, amongst other things, "certain Rites, which may feem to allude, or have If a remote relation to, this very doctrine. Tho' this " doctrine therefore, had not been that of ABRAHAM, "Isaac, and Jacos, He might have adopted it with 5 as little scruple, as he did many customs and insti-"tutions merely Egyptian. He had to do with a re-" bellions, but a superstitious, people. In the first "Character, they made it necessary that he should " neglect nothing which might add weight to his ordinances, and contribute to keep them in awe. In "the fecond, their disposition was extremely proper to receive fuch a doctrine, and to be influenced by 16 it. Shall we fay that an hypothesis of future rewards " and punishments, was useless among a People suba lived " under a Theocracy, and that the future Judge of other "People, was their immediate Judge and King, "who refided in the midft of them, and who dealed " out rewards and punishments on every occasion? "Why then were fo many precautions taken? Why " was a folemn Covenant made with God, as with a temporal Prince? Why were fo many promises and " threatnings of rewards and punishments, temporal " indeed, but future and contingent, as we find in the " book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically held out " by Moses ? Would there have been any more im-" propriety in holding out those of one kind than "those of another, because the supreme Being, who " disposed and ordered both, was in a particular man-" ner prefeat amongst them? Would an addition to "the catalogue of rewards and punishments more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater, " have

have had no effect ? I think neither of these things

What shall we say then? How came it to pass, "this addition was not made?" I will mention what " occurs to me, and shall not be over follicitous about "the weight that my reflexions may deferve. If the " doctrines of the immortality of the foul and of a "future state had been revealed to Moses, that he " might teach them to the Ifraelites, he would have " taught them most certainly. But he did not teach "them. They were therefore not revealed to him. "Why they were not fo revealed fome PERT DIVINB " or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare " not presume to guels. But this, I may presume to " advance, that fince these Doctrines were not re-" vealed by God to his fervant Moses, it is highly " probable that this Legislator made a scruple of "teaching them to the Ifraelites, how well foever "instructed he might be in them himself, and how-" foever useful to Government he might think them. "The superstitious and idolatrous rites of the Egyp-" tians, like those of other nations, were founded on " the Polytheism, and the Mythology that prevailed, " and were fuffered to prevail, amongst the Vulgar, and that made the fum of their Religion. It feem-"ed to be a point of policy to direct all these absurd opinions and practices to the fervice of Government, inflead of attempting to root them out. But " then the great difference between rude and ignorant " nations and fuch as were civilized and learned, "like the Egyptians, feems to have been this, that "the former had no other fystem of Religion than "these abfurd opinions and practices, whereas the with that "

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" latter had an inward as well as an outward Doc-"trine. There is reason to believe that natural Theology and natural Religion had been taught " and practifed in the ancient Theban Dynasty; and " it is probable that they continued to be an inward "doctrine in the rest of Egypt, while Polytheism, "Idolatry, and all the MYSTERIES, all the impieties, " and all the follies of Magic, were the outward "doctrine. Mosas might be let into a knowledge " of both; and under the patronage of the Princess, "whose Foundling he was, he might be initiated " into those Mysteries, where the fecret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded. But we " cannot imagine that the Children of Ifrael, in ge-" neral, enjoyed the same privilege, nor that the " Mafters were fo lavish, to their Slaves, of a favour " fo diffinguished, and often fo hard to obtain. No. "The Children of Israel knew nothing more than " the outfide of the Religion of Egypt, and if the " doctrine, we speak of, was known to them, it was "known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabalous circumstances in which it was drossed " up and prefented to vulgar belief. It would have " been hard therefore to teach, or to renew this Doc-" trine in the minds of the Ifraelites, without giving "them an occasion the more, to recall the polythe-" iftical fables, and practife the idolatrous Rites they " had learnt during their Captivity. Rites and Ce-" remonies are often so equivocal, that they may be " applied to very different doctrines. But when they " are so closely connected with one Doctrine that "they are not applicable to another, to teach the " Doctrine is, in some fort, to teach the Rites and Ce-" remonies.

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"remonies, and to authorize the fables on which " they are founded. Mosas therefore being at liberty " to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments " in a future state, or not to teach it, might very well " choose the latter; tho' he indulged the liraelites, "on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by "the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several " observances and customs which did not lead direct-"ly, tho' even they did so perhaps in consequence, "to the Polytheim and Idolatry of Egypt [4]."

What a Babel of bad reasoning has his Lordship here accumulated out of the rubbish of false and inconfident Principles! And all, to infult the Temple of God and the Fortress of Mount Sion. Sometimes, he represents Moses as a divine Messenger, and distinguishes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, a future flate not being revealed to Moses was the reason be did not teach it. Sometimes again, he considers him as a mere human Lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of Religion and Politics from the Egyptians, in whose fecret Learning he had been intimately instructed; and then, the reason of the omission is, lest the Doctrine of A future flate should have drawn the Ifraclites into thefe Egyption Superstitions, from which, it was Mosa's purpose to estrange them. All these inconsistencies in East and Reasoning, his Lordship delivers in the same breath, and without the least intimation of any change in his Principles or Opinions.

ya But let us follow him flep by flep, without troubling our heads about his real fentiments; which this

remonies.

they are not applicable to another, to teach the -00 bns 201[4] Wol v. p. 238-9-40-41.

View of his talents regards with indifference. It is enough, that we confute all he says, whether under his own, or any assumed Character.

He begins with confessing, that one CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE, a doctrine so useful to ALL Religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the Systems of Paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews.

It feems then, this omission is no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for by Moses's difbelief of the doctrine; his ignorance of it; or the imaginary mischiefs it might possibly produce. So that we may be allowed to think it deserved all the pains, the Author of the Divine Legation of Moses has bestowed upon it: whose subimfical reasoning, if it ended in a demonstration of Revealed Religion, sufficiently attoned for it's going a little out of the way.

His Lordship proceeds to shew, in direct opposition to what he said before, that Moses could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a suture state, because the Egyptians taught it: His knowledge of it, (my Lord tells us) surther appears from an internal circumstance, some of his rites seeming to allude, or to have a remote relation to, this very doctrine. This I observe, to his Lordship's credit. The remark is just and accurate. But we are in no want of his remote relation; I have shewn just above, that the jewish Laws against Necremancy necessarily imply Moses's knowledge of the Doctrine.

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He then goes on to explain the advantages which, humanly speaking, the Israelites must have received from this Doctrine, in the temper and circumstances with which they left Egypt. Moses, says he, bad to do with a rebellious and a superstitious People. This likewise

likewise I observe to his credit: It has the same marks of fagacity and truth; and brings us to the very verge of the Solution, proposed by the Author of the Divine Legation; which is, that the Ifraelites were indeed under an extraordinary Providence, which fupplied all the disadvantages of the Omission. Under a common and unequal Providence, RELIGION cannot fubfift without the doctrine of a future state : for Religion implying a just retribution of reward and punishment, which under such a Providence is not difpenfed, a future state must needs subvene, to prevent the whole Edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the fact, which his Lordship so amply acknowledges, viz. that the doctrine of a future flate was most useful to ALL Religions, and therefore incorporated into ALL the Religions of Paganism. But where an extraordinary Providence is administered, good and evil are exactly distributed; and therefore, in this circumstance, a future state is not necessary for the support of Religion. It is not to be found in the Mosaic Oeconomy; yet this Oeconomy subfifted for many ages: Religion therefore did not need it; or. in other words, it was supported by an extraordinary Providence.

This is the argument of the Divine Legation. Let us now confider his Lordship's present attempts to evade it.

Shall we say, that an Hypothesis of suture rewards and punishments was useless amongst a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, and that the suture Judge of other People was their immediate Judge and King, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments

214 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S missments on every occasion? Why then were so

MANY PRECAUTIONS taken? &c.

First, let me observe, that the Precautions here objected to are intended for an infimuation against the truth of Moses's Promise of an extraordinary Providence. A kind of sophism which his Lordship advances and only holds in common with the rest who have written against the Divine Legation: and which I shall here, after much forbearance on the

Author's part, expose as it deserves.

Moses affirms again and again, that his People were under an extraordinary Providence. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a felf evident truth, it needs to be proved. Till then, the Unbeliever is at liberty to urge any circumftance in the jewish Law or History, which may feem to bring the reality of that Providence into question: The same liberty too, has the Believer; if, at least, he canperfuade himself to make use of it; as many, so professing themselves, have done both in their Writings and Discourfings against the Divine Legation. Things were in this train, when the Author of that book undertook the defence of Moses: And to obviate all objections to the Legislator's credit, arising from any doubtful or unfavourable circumftance in the Law or History of the Jews concerning this extraordinary Providence, he advanced the in-TERNAL ARGUMENT of the omission. An argument which necessarily inferred that an extraordinary Providence was in fact administred in the jewish Republic. What change did this make in the state of the case? A very great one. Unbelievers were now indeed at liberty, and Believers too, if so perversely inclined, to oppose, and, as they could, to confute

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the Argument of the Divine Legation: But by no rules of good Logic could they come over again with those scripture difficulties to Moses's credit, which the argument of the Divine Legation had entirely obviated, and which it still continued to exclude so long as it remained unanswered. For while a demonstrated truth stands good, no difficulties arising from it, however inexplicable, can have any weight against that superior evidence. Not to admit this fundamental maxim of common sense, would be to unsettle many a physical and mathematical demonstration, as well as this moral one.

I say therefore, as things now stand, To oppose difficulties against the administration of an extraordinary Providence, after that providence has been proved, and before the proof has been consuted, is the most palpable and barefaced imposition on our understanding. In which however, his Lordship is but one of a hundred: and indeed, the least indecent and inconsistent of the hundred; as his declared purpose is to destroy the credit and authority of the Jewish Lawgiver.

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I shall not however decline to examine the weight of these objections, tho' they be so foolishly and sophistically obtruded.

If there was this EXTRAORDINARY Providence administred, says his Lordship, Why so many Precautions taken? Why was a folemn coverant made with God as with a temporal Prince? Why were so many promises and threatnings of rewards and punishments, temporal indeed, but suture and contingent, as we find, in the Book of Deuteronomy, most pathetically beld out by Moses? This difficulty is not hard to be resolved. We find throughout, what we Believers are wont to call the History of

Providence,

But, (fays his Lordship) would the bypothesis of a future state have been useless, &c ? Would there (as his Lordship goes on) have been any more impropriety in holding out those [fanctions] of one kind than those of another, because the supreme Being, who disposed and ordered both, was in a particular manner present among st them? Would an addition of rewards and punishments, (more remote, but eternal, and in all respects far greater) to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of these things can be said. His Lordship totally mistakes the drift of the Author's Argument. The Divine Lega-

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tion infers no more from the fact of the omillion than this. That the Jewish Occonomy, administred by an extraordinary providence, could do without the fervice of the omitted Doctrine; not, that that Doctrine, even under fuch a Dispensation, was of no use, much less. that it was IMPROPER. But then one of his Followers, or, what is as good, one of the Adversaries of the Divine Legation, will be ready to fay, " If a future flate was not improper, much more if it was of wie. under an extraordinary dispensation. How came Moses not to give it? For great and wife ends of Providence vaftly countervailing the use of that Doctrine, if you will believe the Author of the Divine . Legation: Who, if he did not impose upon us, when he promised a third volume, (as his Lordship constantly believed he did) will there explain those ends at large.

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Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to Him, concerning the REASONS of the omiffion; And previously assures us, he is not over follicitous about their weight. This, I suppose, is to make his Counters pass current: For then, as Hobbes expresses it, they become the money of fools, when we cease to be follicitous about their worth; when we try them by their colour, not their weight; their Rhetoric, and not their Logic. But this must be said with exception to the first, which is altogether logical, and very entertaining.

If (fays his Lordship) the doctrine of the immortality of the foul and a future state had been revealed to Moses, that he might teach them to the Israelites, he would have taught them most certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed. It is in mood and figure, you see; and, I warrant you, designed to supply what was wanting in the

Divine Legation : Tho' as the Author of that book certainly believed, the doctrines were not revealed, itis ten to one but he thought Mofes was not at liberty to teach them; unless you can suppose that his Lordship, who believed nothing of Revelation, might believe Moses to be restrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the Author of the Divine Legation, who held Moses's pretensions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his Commission. Thus far, then, these two Writers may be faid to agree: But this good understanding lasts not long. His Lordship's modesty and the other's periness soon make the breach as wide as ever. - Why they were not fo revealed (fays his Lordthip) some PERT DIVINE or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not pretend to guess. The forwardness of the one and the backwardness of the other, are equally well fuited to their respective principles. Should his Lordship have guessed, it might have brought him to what he most dreaded, the divine original of the Jewish Religion: Had his Adversary forborn to guess, he had betrayed his cause, and left those data enemployed, which enabled him, I do not fay to guess, but to discover, and to demonstrate the Divine Legation of Moses.

However, This, his Lordship will presume to advance, that since these doctrines were not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable, that the Legislator made a scruple of teaching them to the Israelites, how sever well instructed he might be in them himself, and how sever useful to Government he might think them.

Here, you see, he personates a Believer, who holds Moses to be an inspired Lawgiver: But observe how poorly he sustains his part! Either Moses did indeed receive receive the Law from God, or he did not. If he did not, Why are we mocked with the diffinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If Moses did receive the Law from God. Why are we still worse mocked with the difinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing was revealed; as well, the direction for omitting a future state, as the direction to inculcate the Unity of the Godhead? Why was all this mockery, you fay? For a very good purpose: it was to draw us from the TRVE object of our inquiry, which is, What Gop intended by the omission; to that FANTAS-TIC object, which only respects, what Moses intended by it. For the intention of God supposes the mission and infpiration of a Prophet; but the intention of Moses, when confidered in contradiffinction to God's. terminates in the human views of an ordinary Lawgiver; which leads us back again to Infidelity.

But he foon strips Moses of his Mission, and invests him again with his civil Character: And here he considers, What it was, which, under this character, might induce Moses to omit a future state; and he finds it to be, lest this doctrine should have hurt the doctrine of the Unity, which it was his purpose to inculcate amongst his People, in opposition to the Egyptian Polytheism.

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Moses (says his Lordship) it is bigbly probable, made a scruple of teaching these Doctrines to the Israelites, bow-sower well instructed be might be in them, bimself, and howsoever useful to Government he might think them. The People of Egypt, like all other nations, were Polytheists, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward Doctrine: Natural Theo-

logy and natural Religion swere the inward Doctrines while Polytheifm, Idolatry, and ALL THE MYSTERIES, all the impieties and follies of magic, were the OUTWARD Doctrine. Moses was initiated into those Mysteries where the secret dostrine alone was taught, and the outward expladed - For an accurate Divider commend me to his Lordship. In distinguishing between the inward and outward doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts all the Mysteries amongst the outward; tho' if they had an inward, it must necessarily be part of those Mysteries. But he makes amends presently, (tho' his amends to truth is as it should be, always at the expence of a contradiction) and fays, that Mofes learnt the inward doctrine in the Mysteries. Let this pass. He proceeds - Moses had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not fo the Israelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outside of the Religion of Egypt. And if a future flate was known to them, it was known only in the super fitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in subich it was dressed up and presented to the vulgar belief. It would be bard therefore to teach or to renew this destrine in the minds of the Ifraelites, without giving them an accasion the more to recal the Polytheistical fables, and practife the idolatrous rites they had learnt during their Captivity.

The Children of Israel, it seems, know no more of a future state, than by the superstitious rites and sabulous circumstances with which it was dressed up and presented to the public belief. What then? Moses, he owns, know more. And what hindered Moses from communicating of his knowledge to the People, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new Law and a new Religion? His Lordship lets us understand that this People knew as little of the Unity;

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for he tells us, it was amongst the inward Doctrines of the Egyptians; yet this did not hinder Moses from infracting his people in the doctrine of the Unity. What then should hinder his teaching them the inward doctrine of a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances? He had divested Religious worship of the absurdities of Demi-Gods and Heroes; What should hinder him from divesting a future state of Charon's boat and the Elyfian fields? But the notion of a future state would have recalled those fabulous circumstances which had been long connected with it. And was not Religious worthip, under the idea of a tutelor Deity, and a temperal King, much more apt to recal the polytheifm of Egypt? Yet Moles ventured upon this inconvenience, for the fake of great advantages: Why should he not venture on the other, for the take of greater? for the doctrine of a future flate, is, as his Lordship confesses, even neceffary both to civil and religious Society." But what does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and fuperflitions concerning the foul (fuperflitions, which, the learnt indeed in the Captivity, were common to all the nations of Polytheism) when in other places he affores us, that Mofes indulged the lirachites in the most characteristic superstitions of Egypto) has the

However, let us fee how he supports this wise observation. Rites and Ceremonies (says his Lordship)
are often so equivocal, that they may be applied to very
different doctrines. But when they are so closely connected
with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to
teach the doctrine, is, the some sour, to teach the rites
and ceremonies. — In some sort, is well put in, to soften

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deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to shew that a superstitious Rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain Doctrine, will obtrude itself whenever that Doctrine is taught: and his reasoning is only calculated to prove, that where the Rite is practifed, the Doctrine will foon follow, This may indeed be true. But then it does not hold in the reverse, that the Rite follows the Doctrine : because a Principal may stand without its Dependent; but a Dependent can never subfift without its Principal.

Under cover of these grotesque shapes, into which his Lordship has travestied the sewish Lawgiver, he concludes, that Moses being AT LIBER-TY to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, he might very well chuse the latter - Yet it was but at the very beginning of this paragraph that he tells us, Moles was NOT AT LIBERTY to teach or not to teach. His words are thefe, Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to bis fervant Mofes, it is bigbly probable that this Legislator MADE A SCRUPLE of teaching it. But his Lordship well knows that Statesmen soon get the better of their feruples; and then, by another fetch of political cafailtry, find themselves more at liberty than ever. 182

I had observed above that our noble Discourser who makes Moses fo fcrupulous that he would on no terms afford a handle for one fingle superstition of Egypt to get footing among his people; has, on other occasions, charged him with introducing them by wholefale. He was fenfible, his Inconfiftency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it. - Tho' be [Moses] indulged the Ifrachites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the diwine

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diine wine permission, as it is presumed, in several observations and customs, which did not LEAD directly, tho' even they did so perhaps IN CONSEQUENCE, to the Polytheism and Idolatry of Egypt. And could the teaching the doctrine of a future state possibly do more than LEAD IN CON-SEQUENCE, (as his Lordship elegantly expresses it) to the Polytheifm and Idolatry of Egypt, by drawing after it those superstitious Rites and fabulous circumstances which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of such a State? If, for the bardness of their bearts, they were indulged in feveral observances and customs, which only led in consequence to Polytheism and Idolatry, Why, for the same hardness of heart, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a future state, which did not lead, but by a very remote consequence, to Polytheism and Idolatry? Especially since this bardness of beart would less bear the denial of a DOCTRINE so alluring to the human mind, than the denial of a RITE, to which habit only and old custom had given an occasional propensity. Again, those Rites, indulged to the People, for the hardness of their hearts, had, in themselves, little use or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewish Dispensation; but rather retarded them: Whereas a future state, by his Lordship's own-confession, is most useful to all Religions, and therefore incorporated into all the Systems of Paganism; and was particularly useful to the Israelites, who were, he fays, both a rebellious and a superstitiouspeople: dispositions, which not only made it necessary to omit nothing that might inforce obedience, butlikewise facilitated the reception and supported the influence of the doctrine in question.

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You have here the whole of his Lordship's boasted folution of this important Circumstance of the omisston. And you fee how vainly he ftrives to elude As force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of so irrefishble a Power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth; but fo maimed and broken, fo impotent and fretful, that all his remaining Arength is in his venom. And this, he now sheds in abundance over the whole Mosaic Oeconomy. It is pronounced to be a gros imposfure; and this very circumstance of the omission is given.

as an undoubted proof of the acculation,

- " Can we be surprised then (says his Lordship) " that the fews ascribed to the all-perfect Being, on "various occasions, such a conduct and such Laws as are inconfifent with his most obvious per-" fections? Can we believe fuch a conduct and fuch " Laws to have been his, on the word of the proudest and most lying Nation in the world? Many other " confiderations might have their place here. But "I shall confine myself to one; which I do not re-"member to have feen nor beard urged on one side, nor "ANTICIPATED on the other. To shew then, the "more evidently, how ABSURD, as well as IMPIOUS " it is to ascribe these Mosaical Laws to God, let it "be confidered, that NEITHER the people of Ifrael, "nor their Legislator perhaps, KNEW ANY THING " OF ANOTHER LIFE, wherein the crimes committed "in this life are to be punished. Altho! he might " have learned this Doctrine, which was not fo much " a fecret doctrine as it may be prefumed that the "Unity of the supreme God was, amongst the Egyptians. Whether he had learned both or either, or " neither

reither of them in those schools, cannot be deter-" mined: BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH ASSURANCE; If Moses knew, that comes, and therefore Idolatry, one of the greatest, were to be r punished in another life, he deceived the people in " the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with "God. If he did not know it, I fay it with horror, "the confequence, according to the bypathefic I oppose, must be, that God deceived both him and them. "In either case, a covenant or bargain was made, wherein, the conditions of obedience and difobe-" dience were not fully, nor by confequence, fairly " flated. The biraclites had better things to hope, and worfe to fear, than those which were expressed " in it! and their whole history feems to shew how " much need they had of these additional motives to refleain them from Polytheifm and Idolatry, and d to answer the assumed Purposes of divine Provi-" dence [2]."

This argument, advanced with fo much affurance, his Lordship says, he does not remember to have feen, or heard urged on one side, nor anticipated on the other. A gentle reproof, as we are to understand it, of the Author of the Divine Legation: for none but He, I think, could anticipate an objection to an Argument which none but He had employed. Give me leave then to supply his defects: I am the first good natured Animadverter on him that has done fo; the rest have contented themselves with their bolt endeavours to expose them. And as his Lordship is so generous to invite an answer to it, he shall not be disappointed. ... -qv38 and sign

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[2] Vol. v. p. 194-5.

Let it be confidered (fays his Lordfhip) that perhaps Mofes KNEW NOTHING of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be punified .- Confidered by whom? Not by his Lordship, or his kind Readers: for his reasoning has brought them to consider the contrary. " Many probable reasons (says he) " might be brought to shew, that this was an Egyp-" tian doctrine before the exode; and this particularly, " that it was propagated from Egypt, fo foon at least afterwards, by all those who were instructed TIKE Moses, in the wisdom of that People! He " transported much of this wisdom into the scheme of " Religion and Government which he gave the Ifrael-" ites; and, among other things, certain Rites, which " SEEM TO ALLUDE, OR HAVE A REMOTE RELA-" TION TO, THIS DOCTRINE [3]." This possibly might have recurred to his Lordship, while he was boasting of this new and unanticipated argument, and therefore, in the tricking it up amongst his Fragments, to his perhaps, he adds, by a very happy corrective, altho' M. fes might bave learnt this Doctrine, which was not so MUCH a SECRET doctrine, as it may be presumed that the Unity of the Supreme God was amongst the Egyptians. But he had done better to have left his contradictions uncorrected, and have trusted to the rare fagacity of his Readers to find them out. He had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; so in the case before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here speaking of a future state, diverted of its fabulous circumftances; Perhaps, THE BANGSHAP CONTRACT OF THE SHIP

[3] Vol. v. p. 328-9.

fays he, Moses knew northing of another Life. Which, was not so much a secret doctrine as that of the Unity. Now, Sir, turn back a moment, to the long quotation from his 230th page, and there you will find, that a future state, divested of its fabulous circumstances, was as much a secret Dodrine, as that of the Unity. - " There is reason to believe, " that natural Theology and natural Religion were "INWARD doctrines amongst the Egyptians. Mo-" ses might be let into a knowledge of BOTH by being initiated into those Myfferies where the fecret " doctrine alone was taught. But we cannot imagine, "that the Children of Israel in general enjoyed the " same privilege. No, they knew nothing more than the " outfide of the Egyptian Religion : and if the Doctrine " we freak of [A FUTURE STATE] was known to them, " it was known only in the superstitions Rites, and with " all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was " dreffed up and presented to vulgar belief."-Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a future flate, divested of its fabulous circumstances, was as much a secret Doctrine as the doctrine of the Unity?

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But his Lordship's contradictions are the least of my concern. It is his Argument I have now to do with. And this, he says, he advances WITH ASSURANCE. It is fit he should. Modesty would be very ill bestowed on such opinions:

He thinks he can reduce those who hold no suture state in the Jewish Oeconomy, to the necessity of owning, that Moses, or that God bimself, asted unfairly by the Israelites. How so, You ask? Because One or Other of them concealed that state. And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of

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the actual Sanctions of moral conduct, future punishment. But who told him, that this, which was no fanction of the Jewish Law, was a Sanction to the moral conduct of the Jewish People? Who, unless the artificial Theologer? the man he most despites and decries.

And, even in artificial Theology, there is nothing but the CALVINISTICAL tenet of Original Sin, which gives the least countenance to so moustrous an opinions every thing in the Gosper, every thing in NATURAL THEOLOGY, exclaims against it.

Jesus, indeed, to prove that the departed Ifrae, lives still existed, quotes the title God was pleased to give himself, of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jan cob; and this, together with their existence, proves likewife the bappiness of their condition: for the relation they are faid to fland in with God, flews them to be of his Kingdom. Rut we must remember, that the question with his Lordship is, not of reward, but punishment. Again, Jusus speaks, (indeed in a parable) of the deceafed rich man, as in a place of torment. But we must remember that the scene was laid at a time when the Doctrine of a future flate was become national. To know his fentiments on the question of subjection to an unknown Sanction, we should do well to confider the following words, " The fer-" vant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not " himself, neither did according to his will, shall be " beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of fripes, shall be " beaten with few stripes [4]." Now the will of a

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Mafte or Sovereign, declared in his Laws, always includes in it, the Sanctions of those Laws. The Auther of the Epiffle to the Hebrews expresly distingaifhes the fanction of the Jewish law from that of the Gospel; and makes the difference to consist in this, that the one was of temporal punishments, and the other of future. He that despised Moses's Law died without mercy under two or three witnesses: Of how much forer punishment, suppose ye, shall be be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God [10]? Which appeal is without common fense or honesty, on supposition that the apostle held the Jews to be subject to future punishments, before that Sanction was promulged unto them. From the Gospel therefore it cannot be inferred, that the Ifraelites, while only following the Law of Moses in which the fanction of a future flate is not delivered, were liable or subject to the punishments of that state.

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Let us see next, Whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or natural Religion (as his Lordship is pleased, for some reason or other, to distinguish the terms) hath taught us, that a people, living under an extraordinary providence or the immediate government of God, to whom he had given a Law and revealed a Religion, both supported by temporal sanctions only, could be deemed subject to those future punishments, unknown to them, which natural Religion before, and Revealed Religion since, have discovered to be due to bad men living under a common Providence.

NATURAL RELIGION standeth, (as has been already shewn) on this Principle, "that the Governor

[10] C. x. y 28--9.

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" of the Universe REWARDS and PUNISHES moral "Agents." The length or shortness of human existence come not primarily into the idea of Religion: not even into that compleat idea of Religion delivered by St. Paul, in his general definition of it. The Religionist, says he, must believe that God is, and that he is a REWARDER of those who seek him.

While God exactly distributed his rewards and punishments bere, the light of Nature directed men to look no further for the Sanctions of his Laws. But when it came to be feen, that He was not always a rewarder and a punisher bere, men necessarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be so, bereafter: and consequently, that this life was but a small portion of human duration. They had not yet speculated on the permanent nature of the Soul; And when they did so, that consideration, which, under an ordinary providence came strongly in aid of the moral argument for another life, had no tendency. under the extraordinary, to open to them the profpects of futurity: because, tho' they saw the Soul unaffeded by those causes which brought the body to defiruction, yet they held it to be equally dependent on the Creator's Will; who, amongst the various means of its diffolution, of which they had no idea, had, for aught they knew, provided one or more than one for that purpole.

In this manner was a FUTURE STATE brought, by natural light, into Religion: and from thenceforth, became a necessary part of it. But, in the Jewish THEOCRACY, God was an exact rewarder and punisher, bere. Natural light therefore shewed that under such an administration, the subjects of it did

not become liable to future Ponishments till that fanction was known amongst them.

Thus both natural and revealed Religion shew, that his Lordship calumniated them, when he affirmed, that, according to the hypothesis he opposed, Moses Deceived the people in the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with God: Or that, if Moses did not know the doctrine of a future state, then God deceived both him and them.

Should it be asked, how God will deal with wicked men thus dying under the Mosaic Dispensation? give me leave to answer, in the words of Dr. CLARKE. on a like oceasion. He had demonstrated a felf. moving Subflance to be immaterial, and fo, not perishable like Bodies ... But, as this included the Souls of irrational animals, it was asked " How these were to be disposed of, when they had left their respective habitations?" To which he very properly replies, " Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wife God " may, without any great difficulty, be supposed to " have more ways of disposing of his Creatures [I add, with perfect justice and equity, and with equal measure, to all] "than we are, at present, let into " the fecret of [11]." - But if the Author of the Divine Legation has not promifed more than he can perform (as his long delay gives us too much caufe to suspect) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his last Volume.

[11] Octavo Tracts against Dodwell and Collins, p. 103.

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Nothing now remains of this objection but the fanction of future rewards. And I would by no means deprive the faithful Ifraelites of thefe. His Lordflip therefore has this to make his bell of and in his opinion, even an unclaimed reward is foul dealing; for he joins it with puriforment, as if his confequence, against God's justice and goodness, might be equally deduced from either of them - A covenant, fays he was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and diffubedience were not FULLY, nor, by confequence, FRINCY flated. The Ifractites bad BETTER THINGS TO HORD and worse to fear than those which were expressed in its Tho' it be hard on a generous Benefactor to be denied the right of giving more than he had promifed; it is fill harder on the poor Debtor, that he is not at liberty to receive more. True it is, that, in this cafe, the conditions are not FULLY flated; and therefore, according to his Lordship's Logie, BY CONSEQUENCE NOT FAIRLY. To firengthen this Confequence, his Lordship concludes in these words-And their whole History feems to show how much need they had of these additional motives [future Rewards and Punishments] to restrain them from Polytheism and Idolatry, and to anfewer the ASSUMED purpofes of Divine Providence.

Whoever puts all these things together— That Moses was himself of the race of Israel—was learned in all the wisdom of Egypt—and capable of freeing his People from their Yoke—that he brought them within sight of the promised Land; a sertile Country, which they were to conquer and inhabit—that he instituted a system of Laws, which has been the admiration of the wisest men of all ages—that he understood the doctrine of a future state:

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and by his experience gained in Egypt, knew the efficacy of it in general; and by his perfect knowledge of the rebellious and superstitious temper of his own People, could not but see how useful it was to them in particular?—Whoever, I say, puts all these things together (and all these things are amongst his Lordship's concessions) and at the same time considers, that Moses, throughout his whole system of Law and Religion, is entirely silent concerning a future state of Rewards and Punishments, will, I believe, conclude, that there was something more in the ownstand than Lord Boundbroke could sathom, or, at least, was willing to discover.

But let us turn from Mosas's conduct, (which will be elfewhere confidered at large) to his Lordship's, which is our present business.

or. First, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the Omission, exclusive of Mosus's Driving Legation: but, as if distatished with them himself (which he well might be, for they destroy one another)

2. He next attempts, You see, to prove, that the Legation could not be divine, from this very circumstance of the amission.

3. But now he will go further, and demonstrate that an extraordinary providence in general, such a one as is represented by Moses, and which, the Author of the Divine Legation has proved, from the circumstance of the omission, was actually administered in the Jewish Republic, could not possibly be administered, without destroying free will; without making Virtue service; and without relaxing universal benevolence.

And laftly, to make all fure, he thuts up the account by thewing, that an extraordinary providence could answer no reasonable and or purpose. sometime

an In his first and last order of evalions, he feems to be alone; but in the fecond and third, he had the pleafure of feeing, many an orthodox Writer against the Divine Legation, (to use his Lordship's language) in confederacy with him and was family senses bone no

I have examined his Lordship's first and second order, The third and fourth remain to be confidered; it is the last refuge of his infidelity; and then, I think, I may return him back to the Author of the Divine Legation, to give us a fresh view of him; if to be he think it worth his while to defend the other principles of his book against him.

1. His first objection to the administration of an extraordinary providence, fuch as Moses promifed to his people on the part of God, is, that it would ne-STROY FREE-WILL. But here let me observe, that he affects to disquise the immediate Object of his attack; and, in arguing against an extraordinary Providence, chuses to consider it in the general, as the Point arises out of an imaginary dispute between Him and the Divines; who, he pretends, are diffatisfied with the present order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquiescence in God's government, the administration of an equal Providence, bere. But, this obliquity in disguising the true object of his attack not being of itself sufficient to embarras his adversaries, he further supports it by a prevarication : for it is not true, that Divines are diffatisfied with the present order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordship for imputing

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ring this scandal to them, being only this affertion, "That if the present state be the whole of Man's existence, then the Justice of God would have more exactly dispensed good and evil bere, but, as he has not done so, it follows, that there will be a state of rewards and punishments bereafter."

This premifed, I proceed to his first objection,—
"In good earnest (says his Lordship) is a system of
particular providences, in which the supreme Being, or his Angels, like his Ministers to reward,
and his Executioners to punish, are constantly employed in the affairs of mankind, much more reafonable?" [than the Godi of Epicurus or the miratiof Polemo] "Would the justice of God be
"more Manifest in such a state of things than in
the present? I see no room for Merit on the part
of Man, nor for justice on the part of God, in
such a state [12]."

His Lordship asks, whether the Justice of God would be more manifest in such a state of things, where good is constantly dispensed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, than in the present, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men? If his Lordship, by the present state of things, includes the rectification of them in a future state, I answer, that the justice of God would not be more manifest, but equally and fully manifest in either case. If his Lordship does not include this rectification in a suture state, then I answer his question by another; Would the Justice of the Civil Magistrate be more manifest, where he exactly dispenses rewards to good men, and punishment to evil, than

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where:

where he fuffers the Cunning and the Powerful to carve for themselves has tents draw segment of shippers

But he fees no room for merit on the part of Man, nor Juffice on the part of God. If he does not fee, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevarieating both with himself and his Reader; to the turning his view from the Scripture-representation of an equal Providence, to the iniquity of Calvinistical election, and to the partialities of Fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit; and to his giving these to the reader, in its stead. How dextrously does he slide Enthusiasm and Predestination into the Scripture-doctrine of an equal Providence !- If some men were DHTER-MINED TO GOODNESS by the ferret workings of the fpirit, &cc. Yes indeed, if you will be so kind to allow him, that under an equal providence, the will is over-ruled, he will be able to shew you, there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this fubilitating artificial theology (as he calls it) in the place of bibletheology, is his what leger-de-main. So again, -I can conceive fill less, that individual Creatures before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their actual existence, can be the objects of predilection or overfion, of love or hatred, to God. Who, of the Gospel. Divines, against whom he is here writing would have him conceive any thing of this at all? It is the artificial Theologer, the depraver, as he fays, of the Gospel who would draw him into so absurd a system, But what has this exploded Theology, that abounds only in human inventions, to do with the extraordinary Providence, represented in holy Writ! To fay, that this Providence takes away man's merit and God's justice, is confounding all our ideas of right Strefner and

and wrong. Is it not the highest merit of a rational. creature to comply with that motive which has molt real weight? And is not God's justice then most manifest when the order of things present fewest difficulties and obscurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordship was plainly of these sentiments, when, arguing against God's compliance with the Jewish bardness of beart, he thought it more becoming the Master of the Universe, to bend the perverse stiffness of their Wills: and, when, arguing against a future flare from the present good order of things, he pretends to fhew, against Divines and Atheists in conjunction, that there is little or no irregularity in the present dispensations of Providence; at least, not so much as the World commonly imagine. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a consciousness that the more exact the present administration of God's providence appeared, the more manifest it made his Justice? But now his Lordship's followers may be apt to pretend, that their Mafter has here, done no more, indeed scarce so much, at least not in so express terms, as a celebrated Prelate, in one of his diffourles at the Temple; who tells us, " That an " immediate and visible interposition of Providence "in Behalf of the righteous, and for the punish-"ment of the wicked, would INTERFERE WITH "THE FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS, AND NOT. " LEAVE ROOM FOR THEIR TRYAL [13]." they who object this to us, have not confidered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned Prelate well observes, A little experience may con-

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wince us, that the fame thing, at different times, is not the fame [14]. Now if different times may make fuch alterations in identity, what must different men do? The thing faid being by all candid interpretation to be regulated on the purpose of faying.

Lord Bolingbroke's fecond objection against an equal Providence is, that it would MAKE VIRTUE. SERVILE. " If the Good, besides the enjoyment " of all that happinels which is infeparable from "Virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil and if the wicked, besides all those evils which " are inseparable from Vice, and those which happen to all men in the ordinary course of events, were " exposed to others that the hand of God inflicted on " them in an extraordinary manner, such Good men. " would have VERY LITTLE MERIT; they would " have, while they continued to be good, no other " merit than that of children who are cajoled into " their duty; or than that of Galley-flaves who ply " at the oar, because they hear and see and fear the

If the perfection of a rational Creature confifts in acting according to reason: and if his merit rises in proportion as he advances in perfection; How can that state which best secures him from acting irrationally, leffen or take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of less worth for his moral incapacity of being unjust or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or less excellent

[14] Scripture windicated from the mifrepresentations of the Bp. of Bangor, p. 165.

[15] Vol. v. p. 428.

undituted that

according to the dignity or nature of the Agent. But the question here is not concerning the extellence, but the power of the motive to turn action into pall fion p which is the only way I can conceive of defroying merit in the subject. Now I hold, that this fancy, That motives exterior to the Being on which they work, may be able to turn an Agent to a Patient, is one of the greatest of Physical absurdities; and therefore commonly goes about disguised, in the garb of metaphysics. For while agency remains, metit subfifts: the degrees of which do not depend on the lefs or greater force the motives have on the affections. but on the more or less reason of the choice. In a word, there is no means of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, but by taking away agency, and making man passive, or, in other terms. a Machine, boog do en bedmines contribution is

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But, to expose in a more popular way the futility of this reasoning, it will be sufficient to observe that the objection holds equally against all religious Sanctions whatfoever. And so indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shaftsbury: who pretended that every motive regarding SELF, tended to fervilize Virtue. Without doubt, one fort, just as much as another; a future flate, just as well as an equal Providence. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would seem, that a future state without an equal providence (for they are alway to be confidered separately, as they belong to different fystems) would more strongly incline the Will, than an equal providence without a future flate: as the value of future above present good is immensely great. But the human mind being so constituted, that the distance of a good takes off proportionably from its influence, this brings the force of the two functions nearer to an equality; which at length proves but this, That the objection to the merit of Virtus holds against all religious functions what-soever. In the use of which objection Lord Shaftsbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it against them all, but more consistent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect disinterestedness in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongst those who hold, that self-love and social, the coincident, are two essential principles in the human frame.

That two confiltent motions act the Soul.

" And one regards ITSELF, and one the WHOLE.

But we might go further, and retort upon both these noble Adversaries of Religion, that the charge of making virtue servile affects all moral, as well as all religious sanctions; as well that, whose existence they allow, as those, which they would persuade us to be visionary; both these illustrious Patrons of insidelity acknowledging that moral fanction which arises from God's making the practice of virtue our INTEREST as well as duty [16]. Now interest and servility is, it seems, the same thing, with these generous Spirits.

His Lordship's third cavil to an equal Providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

But would there not be, as the same time,

" fome further defects in this scheme? I think there would. It seems to me, that these good men being

" thus diffinguished by particular providences, in

" their favour, from the rest of mankind, might be

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[16] Vol. v, p. 429.

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" BERAL BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental " Principle of the Law of Nature, and that Pus. " LIC SPIRIT, which is the life and foul of Society. "God has made the practice of morality our inter-" est, as well as our duty. But men who found " themselves constantly protected from the evils that " fell on others, might grow infenfibly to think " themselves unconcerned in the common sate : and " if they relaxed in their zeal for the Public good, " they would relax in their virtue; for public good " is the object of Virtue. They might do worfe, " spiritual pride might infect them. They might " become in their own imaginations the little Flock, " or the chosen Sheep. Others have been so by the " mere force of Enthufiasm, without any such in-" ducements as those which we assume, in the same case; and experience has shewn, that there are " no Wolves like thefe Sheep [17]."

The case assumed, to which his Lordship objects, and against which he pretends to argue, is that of an equal Providence swhich exactly distributes good to Virtue, and to Vice, evil. Now the present objection to such a state is, an' please you, that this favourable distinction of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt to destroy his general benevolence and public spirit. These, in his Lordship's account, and so in mine too, are the most sublime of all Virtues; and therefore, it is agreed, will be most highly rewarded: But the tendency of this savourable distinction, if you will believe him, may prove the loss of general benevolence and public spirit. As much as this shocks common sense, his Lordship

[17] Vol. v. p. 429.

has his reasons. God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. But men, who find themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow infensibly to think themselves unconcerned in the common fate. coleme, his Lordinip telle

God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST as well as duty. Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our interest, under an equal, as well as under an unequal Providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably fo, in the absence of those inequalities which hinder our seeing clearly, and feeling constantly, that the practice of morality is our INTEREST as well as duty. gine they have told

-But men, who found themselves constantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow infenfibly to think themselves unconcerned in the COMMON FATE. What are those evils, under an equal Providence, which fall on others, and from which the good man is protected? Are they not the punishments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perseverance in Virtue?. It is therefore impossible he should grow unconcerned to those evils which his Lordship calls the common fate, when he fees his interest and his duty so closely connected, that there is no way of avoiding those evils but by persevering in virtue. But the name of common fate, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reason against an equal Providence, yet flurs in upon us, in it's flead, a Providence which only protects good men; or rather one certain species of good men; and leaves all other to their COMMON FATE. But admit it possible for the good man to relax in his benevolence, and to grow in-Senfible

fansible to the common fate: there is, in the state here offuned, a speedy means of bringing him to himself; and that is, his being no longer protested from the eviluthat fall on others: for when men relax in their benewolence, his Lordship tells you, they relax in their virtue: and, give me leave to tell his Lordship, that when men relax in their virtue, Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to speak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

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However, spiritual pride (he fays) might infect the wirtuous, thus protested : And this he will prove a fortiori, from the case of Enthusiasts; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now; what if we should say, it is this very enthusiastic spirit itself, and not the visions of Protection it is apt to raise, which is the true cause of spiritual pride? ENTHU-STARM is that temper of mind, in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this diformedered state of things, Enthusiasm, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATIcism: and this, in it's extreme, begets the fancy of our being the peculiar favorites of Heaven. Now, every one fees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the cause, and not the effect of the diforder. For what but spinitual pride fpringing out of prefumptive holinefs, could bring the Fanatic to fancy himself exalted above the common condition of the Faithful? It is true, when he was got thus far, the folly which brought him thither, might carry him further; and then, all to come would be indeed the effect of his disorder. But suppose it was not the enthusiastic Spirit, but the vifions of protection it is apt to raife, which is the cause of spiritual pride; Is there no difference between a vi-M 2

vision and a reality? Fancy may occasion those diforders which fact may remove. This, I persuade myfelf, is the case here: The real communication of Grace purifies those passions, and exalts them into virtues, which the firong delution of fuch a flate only renders more gross and violent. - And here it may be worth while to take notice that his Lordship, in this objection to an extraordinary Providence, from the hurt it does to general benevolence, feems to have had the Yewiff People in his eye; who in the latter ages of their republic, were commonly charged, and perhaps truly, with want of benevolence to the relt of mankind: a fact, which tho' it makes nothing for his purpose, makes very much for mine, as it furnishes me with an example to support what is here faid of Fanaticism; an infirmity pretty general amongst the Jews of those Ages. They had outlived their extraordinary Providence; but not the memory, nor even the effects of it; Nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceased. This filled them with spiritual pride, as the elect of God; a disposition which, it is confessed, tends readily to destroy or to relax general benevolence. " But" what now are the natural confequences, which the actual administration of an equal Providence would have on the human mind? In this case, as in the other, a warm temper, whose object was Religion, would be obnoxious to the common weakness of our nature, and too apt to difgrace itself by spiritual pride: but as this is one of the vices which an equal Providence is always at hand to punish, the cure would be direct and speedy. The recovered Votary, we will now suppose to be received again into the numnumber of the Good; and to find himself in the little stock and chosen sheep, as they are nick-named by this noble Writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over; the sense of this high prerogative of humanity might revive, in a warm temper, the still unmortised seeds of spiritual pride. Admit this to be the case; what sollows? His pride revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled: for punishment is still closely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy discipline, the necessary consequence of an equal Providence, effectually does its work; it purishes the mind from low and selfish partialities, and adorns the Will with general benevolence, public spirit, and love of all its fellow creatures.

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What then could support his Lordship in so perverse a judgment concerning the state and condition of good men under an equal Providence ? That which supports all his other insults on Religion; his fophistical change of the question. He objects to an equal providence (which Religionists pretend has been administred during one period of the Dispensation of Grace) where good men are constantly rewarded, and wicked men as constantly punished; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a favoured elect, (which never existed but in over-heated brains) where reward and punishment are distributed, not on the proportions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of juffice.

But now, Sir, keep the question steddily in your eye, and his Lordship's reasoning in this paragraph will disclose such a complication of absurdities as will

A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S affonish you. You will see an equal Providence, which, in and thro the very act of rewarding bene-

volence, public spirit, and humility, becomes instrumental in producing, in those so rewarded, selfiste nels, neglect of the public, and spiritual pride.

His Lordship's last objection to an extraordinary Providence is, that it would not answer its END.

. " I will conclude this head (fays he) by observing, that we have example as well as reason for us,

when we reject the hypothesis of particular provi-

dences. God was the king of the Jewish People.

" His prefence relided amongst them, and his jus-

" tice was manifested daily in rewarding and punish-

ing by unequivocal, fignal, and miraculous in-

" terpolitions of his power. The effect of all was

this, the People rebelled at one time and repented

" at another. Particular providences, directed by

" God himfelf immediately, upon the fpot, if I may

fay fo, had particular temporal effects only, none

" general nor lasting : and the People were to little

fi fatisfied with this fyshem of Government that they

" deposed the supreme Being, and insisted to have

another King, and to be governed like their neigh-

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In support of this last objection, you see his Lordship was forced to throw off the mask, and fairly tell us what he aimed at; that is to fay, to differedit the extraordinary Providence mentioned by Mofes. An equal Providence, fays he, will not answer its end. What is it's end? Here, his prevarications bring the action to the second of th

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us, as usual, to our distinctions.—When this Providence is administered for the sake of Particulars, it's first end is to discipline us in virtue, and keep us in our duty: When administred for the sake of a Gemanunity, its first end is to support the Institution it had erected. Now his Lordship, proceeding from reason to example, gives us this of the Jewish Republic, to prove that an equal or extraordinary Providence does not answer one or other or both these ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that here, where he employs the example, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberless other places of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter. - How long this Theorracy may be faid to have continued (fays he) I am quite unconcerned to know, and should be forry to mispend my time in inquiring. The example then is only an argument ad hominem. But the misfortune is, that no laws of good reasoning will admit an argument ad has minen on this question, Of the EFFECTS of a REAL extraordinary promidence; because the nature of the effects of REAL providence can never be discovered by the effects of a PRETENDED one. To fay the truth, his Lordship is at present out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be real, his own representation of the case would, on his own principles, have proved it but pretended. For 'tis a principle with him, that where the means do not produce the end, fuch means (all pretences notwithstanding) are but human inventions. It is thus he argues against the Divinity of the Chriftian Religion; which he concludes to be an impofture for its not having effected that lasting reforma-

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THE TREE STORES OF THE SAME OF

tion

A VIEW OF LORD BOLINGBROKE'S tion of manners, which he supposes was its principal

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So far as to the CHOICE of his example ... He ma-

nages no better in the APPLICATION of its

We have diffinguished, concerning the ends of an extraordinary providence. Let us suppose now, that his Lordship takes the principal end of the lewish Theocracy to be the reformation of Particulars. He refers to their history, and pretends to shew they were not reformed. Now whatever other confequences may attend this supposed Fact, the most obvious and glaring is this, That his Lordship, in proceeding from reason to example, has given us such an example as overturns or superfedes all his reasoning. According to his reasoning, an extraordinary providence would tye virtue and good manners to fast down upon every Individual, that his very Will would be forced, and the merit of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, absolutely destroyed. You would now perhaps expect his example should confirm this pretended fact? Just otherwise. His example shews his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordship's bad reasoning. For, when we fee it so constantly opposed to truth, it is so far from being an additional difcredit to it, that it is as con-

flantly opposed to himself.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the JEWISH THEOGRACY, was to keep that People a separate nation, under their own Law and Religion, till the coming of the Messian; and to prepare things for his reception by preferving amongst them the doctrine of the UNITY. Now, to judge whether A BITT the

the Theocracy or extraordinary Providence companied it's end, we have only to confider, Whether this people, to the coming of Christ, did continue a diffinct Nation separated from all the other tribes of Mankind, and diffinguished from them by the worship of the one true God. And on inquiry, we shall find. they not only did continue thus diffinet and diffinguished, but have so continued ever fince. A fingularity which has had no example amongst any other People: And is sufficient to convince us, that there must have been some amazing power in that Theocraey, which could go on operating for fo many ages after the extraordinary administration of it had ceased. Let us conclude therefore, that the having nothing to urge against the due efficacy of this extraordinary providence, but that, the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects, is the most ample confession of his defeat. And so much, for his Lordship's exploits in ANTIENT POLITICS.

LET us now come a little nearer to him, and confider him in his capacity for the Modern.

Here his Lordship shines without a Rival.

" Whether to fettle peace, or to unfold

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"The drift of hollow States-befides to know

" Both spiritual power and civil, what each

"What fevers each" ___ [mea

as was faid by a Poet [18] of the last age of bis turbulent. Friend; who if he did not serve his country better.

[18] Milton.

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than this Politician of later date, had much more to answer for, as by all accounts, his talents were vafily But men had not been long in policilion of chollegis

His Lordship however, with the best he has, proceeds to overturn the PRINCIPLES of the ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. But the pains he had taken, and the opposition he had found from the ARGUMENT of the DIVINE LEGATION, had, by the time he came upon this fecond Adventure, fo ruffled his temper and discomposed his manners, that he now breaks out in all kinds of opprobrious language, not only against the System, but even against the perion of the Author gold a read adding willing

To understand the nature of his Lordship's provocation. if at least it arole from this treatile of the Alhance, it may not be improper to fay a word or two of the occasion of that Book, and of the Principles

on which it is composed. after it at the benefits bat.

After the many violent convultions our Country had fuffered fince the REFORMATION by the rage of religious Parties (in which, at one time, liberty of Conscience was oppressed; and at another, the establiffied Church overturned and defolated) it pleafed divine Providence to fettle our religious Rights on fuch fundamental principles of juffice and equity, and to fecure the civil peace on fuch maxims of wisdom and true policy, as most effectually guarded both against the return of their respective violations: and the means made use of were the giving, on proper terms of fecurity to the national Religion, a free toleration to all who diffented from the established Worship. This feemed to be going as far towards perfection in religious Communion as the long distracted state of

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the shriftian World would fuffer us to indulge our

But men had not been long in possession of this blesfing before they grew weary of it, and fet on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old diforders. For it is to be observed with forrow, that this reform of the English Constitution happened not to be the good work of the Church, begun in the conviction of Truth, and carried on upon the principles of Charity: but was rather cwing to the vigilance of the STATE; at one time, vainly perhaps anxious for the established Religion [19], at another, wifely provident for the support of civil Liberty [20]. So that when succeeding diffentions in Church and State had made this newly reformed Constitution the fubject of enquiry, the Parties who managed the debate being those who before had both persecuted and fuffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the discussion of the question, were not such perhaps as were best fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their partialities. One fide feemed to regard the To-LERATION as an evil in itself, and only a temporary expedient to prevent a worse; while their conduct shewed, they lay at watch for the first occasion to break in upon it. This was enough to mislead the Other to confider the TEST Law, which covered and fecured the established Religion, as no better than a new species of persecution: and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this shadow of a grievance; "To have

[19] Cb, II.

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[20] Will. III.

vine Worthip really free, they faid no religious profession should be attended with givil incapacities a Test had made that diffinction among ft "God's Worldipers; it was therefore to be fet ande." But every man faw (and perhaps the enemies of the Tell were not amongst the last who saw it) that to set afide this Law, which, under a general Toleration was the only fecurity of the established Church, was expofing the National worthip, to all the inroads of a ferrarian rabble. This mischievous project, tarising out of abused liberty, was at first entertained, as we may well suppose, by the tolerated Churches only Some of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of fear, on the discovery of that bigoted principle in their Adversaries, which considered Toleration as only a temporary expedient. And where was the wonder if thole who believed, they had no fecurity for what they had got, while such principles prevailed, should endeavour to put it out of the power of their adverfaries to do them harm? Others of a more politic turn cherished it from views of ambition, and in hopes of fharing the emoluments of the established Church. It was fome time before any Member of the Church of England joined with Diffenters in their clamours against a Test Law, or, more properly speaking, against their own Establishment. This monstrous coalition did not happen till a warm dispute on certain metaphyfical questions [1], (if confidered in one light, too fublime to become the fubject of human wit; if in another, too triffing to gain the attention of reafonable men,) had farted new scruples concerning Church-Subscription. And to get rid of this necesfary engagement to FEACE, and acquiescence in the established Religion, these wise and faithful Ministers. of the National Worship were amongst the foremost to discredit it, and the bulieft to trample down all its fences and fecurities. wanted bust wal mem

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BIGOTRY, you fee, was at the bottom of the first fet of principles ; and FANATICISM, at the top of the other. In their separate appeals to the experience of Mankind, there was this remarkable difference; All ages had felt the mischiefs of religious restraint and perfecution; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Christian times, of the evils attending the WANT of an established Religion. The Fanatics therefore, were perpetually urging their experience against perfecution, secure in not having the argnment retorted on them. But, in this imaginary triamph they deceived themselves; and the very want of examples was the greatest Advantage the Bigots had over them : Who if they had no instance of the evils attending the want of an Establishment, to retort upon their adversaries, it was because such want was never known: The necessity of a national Religion for the support of Society, being so indispenfable, that Men even in the wildest times, the sworn Bnemies of religious Establishments, and leagued together for their destruction, were no sooner become able to effect their purpose, than they found, in beginning to new model the state, which they had subdued by the superiority of their arms, that there was even a necessity of supporting an established Church. Of this, we have a remarkable example in the INDE-PENDENT Republic, and in the Proteflorfbip of OLI-VER; both of which under their feveral Usurpations, were.

A VIEW Of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S were forced to erect Passbyreau, the Religion they most hated, into a NATIONAL CHURCH, morio mistro

To proceed; The distempers of the State, still further contributed to inflame those of the Church: And, on the Accession of the present royal Line to the Throne, a long, a famous, and a regular dispute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the Two Societies, was begun and carried on by two parties of Church-men. But as the several disputants had reciprocally affigned too much, and allowed too little to the two Societies, and had erected their arguments on one common fallacy; the Maintainers of an Effablishment supported a Test-law on such reasoning as destroyed a Toleration; and the Desenders of religious Liberty, argued against the justice of that security on fuch principles as concluded equally against a national Church.

In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition. the Author of the Alliance between Church and State found the fentiments of men concerning religious Liberty and Establishments when he proposed his Theory to their confideration: a Theory calculated to vindicate our present happy Constitution on a PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjusting the precise bounds of either Society; by shewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their Union: and from thence, by natural and necessary consequence, inducing, on the one hand, an EsTA-BLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, secured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who diffented from the National Worship.

He first shewed the use of Religion to Society, from the experience and practice of all Ages: He inquired from

from whence the use arose, and sound it to be from certain original desects in the very essence and plan of Civil Society. He went on to the nature of Religion; and shewed how, and for what causes, it constituted a Society: And then, from the natures of the two Societies, he collected, that the object of the Civil, is only the Body and its interests; and the object of the Religious, only the Soul. Hence he concluded, that both Societies are Sovereign, and Independent; because they arise not out of one another; and because, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to clash; the sameness of original, or the sameness of administration, being the only causes which can bring one, of two distinct Societies, into natural subjection to the other.

To apply Religion therefore to the service of Civil Society, in the best manner it is capable of being applied, he shewed it was necessary that the two Societies should UNITE: For each being sovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the fervice of Religion in any folid or effectual manner. But no fuch union could arise but from free compact and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unless each Society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The Author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two Societies, explained what those motives and advantages were. Whence, it appeared that all Whence, it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the two Societies, thus united, with the Civil Magistrate at their head, were indeed those very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find established and enjoyed under our present happy Constitution in Church and State: The refult of this was that an made perfectly to agree by the medium of a Tear Law.

This Law therefore the Author in the last place, proceeded to vindicate, on the fame general principles of the Law of Nature and Nations.

You have here, Sir, a true tho' fhort analysis of the Alliance between Church and State; with the Princi-

ples on which the Theory is conducted.

Let us now confider the account his Lordship has been pleased to give of it. I shall take him paragraph by paragraph, in his native diforder, as he lies : And for the fame reason that I sollowed a different method in confuting his Arguments against the moral attributes, which I chose to methodize and digest. For when a diforderly writer is tolerably clear, you may make him ftill clearer, and shew his arguments to advantage, by bringing them into order. But when fuch a one is beyond remedy cloudy and confuled, as our noble Writer is here where he reasons against the book of the Alliance, this affistance would be fuspicious: for the Reader might come to fancy that as well the obscurity as the order were of the Aufwerer's making. Therefore the fafest, as well as fairest way in this case is to take the Writer as you find him. The obscurities in thought and expression will be then feen to be his own; and nothing can be objected to his Adversary, but a few repetitions, which, in this method of answering, can never be avoided.

His Lordship preludes his attack upon the Book

and the Author with this curious Narrative.

"I have heard of a Sermon preached by one "Doctor Serion, a Fellow of Trinity College, in "Cambridge, before King Charles the Second, at New-

" New-market, in the days of passive obedience and " non-refisience, and afterwards printed. His text was " taken from the +4th, 15th, and 16th verses of the " fourth Ch. of Exodus, or some of them; wherein " God directs Moses to take AARON the Levite, be-"cause he knew that AARON could speak well to " the People, and joins them together in Commission, " that they might assist one another mutually; that " AARON might be instead of a mouth to Moses, " and that Moses might be inflead of God to AARON. "What other applications the good Doctor made of " thefe texts, I know not. But I am informed by " Mr. Lewis, who has read the Sermon, that he " established on them a supposed Alliance between the "Church and the State: or rather between the Church. " and the King. By this Alliance the well-spoken " Levite was to inftil paffive obedience to the King, " in the minds of the People, and to infift on it, as " on a Law of God; The King, on the other hand, " was to be the nursing Father of the Church, to " support her Authority, to preserve, at least, if not " increase, her immunities, and to keep her in the " full possession of all the advantages she claimed, "The Church performed her part, and had a right, " by virtue of this alliance, if the King did not " perform his, to teach this doctrine no longer, and to " refume her independency on the State and on him. "This was the purport of the fermon, at least: and "WARBURTON took his hint, Possibly, from it, " and turned it to serve his purpose; that is, to lay " down the same principles and TO BANTER MAN-" KIND IF HE COULD, by NOT drawing directly, and " avowedly, from them the fame conclusion. Dr. SENIOR'S News.

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"SENTOR's authority is, no doubt, as good in this "cafe, as that of DE MARCA or even of BOSSUET. "The first, a time-serving Priest, interested, and a "great flatterer, if ever there was one, and who made no scruple to explain away whatsoever he " had found himself obliged to say in favour of the "State. The latter was as wife, if not as cunning, " as learned, and a much better man, tho' not fo " much in the favour of Mr. WARBURTON, who " gave them Characters in his assuming style, with-" out knowing any thing of them; and who has the " impertinence to pronounce of the greatest Scholar, the " greatest Divine, and the greatest Orator of his age, " that be was a good sensible man. He was all I have " faid of him: but he was an Ecclesiastic, and a " fubject of France [1]." and and see in such finished

As to this account of Dr. Senior, I fearce know what to make of it, or what credit it deferves : For he who will falfify a Book in every body's hands, will hardly be very forupulous of what he fays of a Sermon, which nobody has heard of, but his Friend Mr. LEWIS. At least if Doctor SENIOR was ever a man of this world. I should fancy he must be later than where his Lordship, who is no great Chronologer, has placed him. He tells us it was in the days of passive obedience and non-resistance, and that the doctrine of his fermon was calculated for the service of popery and arbitrary power. May we not suppose then, that he flourished under his Lordship's Auspices, when the Church was last in danger? If this were the case, his Lordship Box of the Armania to the talk of box dragates beyond

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uses Dr. Santon just as he used St. PAUL [2], first-sets him upon preaching passive Obedience, and then abuses him for his pains: passive state of the dell'

But let Dr. Senior live when and where he will, he thinks it possible that Warburton might have taken the bint of the Alliance from him. Yes, just as possible as that Locke took the hint of the original compact from FILMAR.

He affures us, however, that the Authority of Dr. SE-NIOR is as good as that of DE MARCA, or even of Bos-SUBT. The authority of Dr. SENIOR! For what?-To Support Mr. WARBURTON's doctrine of the Alliance. But where is it to be had: Suppose this difficulty to be got over ; and Dr. SENIOR as ready at hand as DE MARCA or Bossuer, and as willing to declare against the incroachments of the Church; yet the Author of the Alliance, perhaps, would not think it altogether fo fit for his purpose: For he tells us, that his purpose in so frequently quoting the acknowledgments of DR MARCA and Bossuer, in favour of the State, was to shame those Protestant Divines who had contended for the independency of the Church, after its became established; and even for its superiority, before.

But, of these two famous Frenchmen, The first (he says) was a time-serving Priest, interested, and a great statteren—the latter was as wise if not as cunning, as learned and a much better Man, tho not so much in the

^{[2] &}quot;By this Alliance of the Hierarchy and the Monarchy, Religion that should support good government alone, was employed to support good and bad government alike, AS IT HAS "BEEN BY ST. PAUL." Vol. iv. p. 516.

favour of Mr. Warburtan, who game them Characters, in bis assuming style, without knowing any thing of them, and who has the impertinence to pronounce, of the greatest Scholar, the greatest Divine, and the greatest Orator of his age, that HE WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN.

The Author of the Alliance, in the Advertisement to the last Edition of his Book, speaking of the French Translator, has these words—" He supported them [the conclusions] all along with quotations from the two samous works of De Marca and Bossuet; the one the wisest, and the other the MOST SENSIBLE DIVINE THAT NATION EVER PRODUCED [3]."

From these words, I seave you, Sir, to restect upon the truth and ingenuity of the noble Writer's representation, that Bossuer is not so much in Mr. Warburton's savour as De Marca; and that Mr. Warburton's savour as De Marca; and that Mr. Warburton's she impertinence to pronounce that Bossuer was a good sensible man. In the heavy distresses of Controversy, many a Writer has been found to missepresent. But to do this out of mere wantonness and gayety of heart, and then, on the credit of his own false quotations, to abuse and call names, is altogether in his Lordship's manner.

But you will fay, perhaps, that the IMPERTINENCE was not in the familiarity of the commendation, but in the choice of the topic. It may be so, and then we get another Rule of good writing from his Lordship, who has already supplied us with so many:

"That when the authority of an Author is urged in a point concerning Civil and Religious Rights, his

hould be insisted on, rather than his good sense."

All this is but a presude to the Combat. "The motion (says this great Politician) of a format all two independent, distinct powers, is a very ground- less and whimsical notion. But a fraudulent or filent compact between princes and priests became very real, as soon as an ecclesiastical order was chablished [4]." The latter part of this period is but too true; and the Theory of the Mhance, (misrepresented in the former part,) was proposed to remedy these mischiefs. It is this Theory only, which I shall undertake to vindicate against his Lordship's Objections.

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If, by format, he means (and what should he mean elfe?) one actually executed in form; and supposes that the Author of the Alliance between Church and State, afferted the actual execution of fuch a one, we may, with more justice perhaps, apply to his Lordship what he fays of the Author, concerning DE MARCA and Bossuer, That he gives a Character of the book called the Alliance, without knowing any thing of it. Give me leave to quote the Author's own words " From all this it appears, that our plan of Alliance " is no precarious arbitrary Hypothesis, but a The-" ory founded in reason, and the invariable nature of " things: For having, from the effence, collected " the necessity of allying, and the freedom of the com-" pact; we have from the fame necessity, fairly intro-" duced it; and from its freedom, confequentially

established every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if the reader should ask, where this * Charter or treaty of convention for the union of " the two Societies, on the terms here delivered, is to be met with ? we are able to answer him. We er fay, it may be found in the fame Archive with the " famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between Magistrate " and People; fo much infifted on, in vindication of " the common rights of Subjects. Now when a fight of this compact is required of the Defenders of Civil liberty, they hold it sufficient to say, that it is " enough for all the purpoles of fact and right, that " fuch original compact is the only legitimate foun-" dation of Civil Society: That if there were NO " SUCH THING FORMALLY executed, there was, " wirtually: That all differences between Magistrate " and People ought to be regulated on the supposi-"tion of fuch a Compact; and all Government re-" duced to the principles therein laid down; for " that the happiness of which Civil Society is pro-" ductive, can only be attained by it, when formed " on those principles. Now something like this we " fay of our Alliance between Church and State [5]. Let this ferve too, for an answer to his Lordship's infulting question in another place - " But where shall " we look for the conditions of that original contract " which was made between the religious and the civil " Society, I know not; unless we suppose them writ-

" ten on the back of Constantine's grant to Sylve" ster [6]." Does his Lordship know where to look

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^[5] Alliance, third Edition, p. 165-6-7.

for the original contract which was made between the prince and people, in any place of easier access? Or will he, when at a loss, send us to the back of Constantine's grant to Sylvester, for this contract likewise?

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But to proceed. If by formally, through a perverse use of words, his Lordship means only wirtually, like the original compact between King and People, This indeed, the Author of the Alliance does venture to say, and not only to say, but to prove likewise.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, in his Lordship's opinion, stands upon a whimsical principle:
sho did the argument of the Divine Legation of Moses,
from the Omission of a suture State [7]. Indeed
his Lordship seems to have been as much distressed by
whimsical Divines, when he turned Philosopher, as
the was by whimsical Politicians, while he continued a Statesman [8]. However, the subimsical principle in question, is this, That the Church of
Christ composes a Society sovereign, and inDependent of the Civil.

This principle, his Lordship rejects: and it must be confessed, not, as is his wont, altogether absurdly: For he who makes Religion itself a Fantom, can surely have little or no idea how it should become embodied.

"Neither NATURE nor REASON (fays his Lord"Ship) could ever lead men to imagine two Di"STINCT AND INDEPENDENT SOCIETIES IN THE
"SAME SOCIETY. This imagination was broached

" by ecclefiaffical ambition [9]."

[7] See p. 204.

[8] See his Letter to Sir W. Windham.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 412.

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A grave fentence! which to me feems equivalent to this, That neither nature nor reason could ever lead men to imagine that ONE was TWO. In this, I readily agree with him. But then the difficulty remains, how fuch a thing could ever come to be broached, (as his Lordship says it was) by any imagination not more disordered than it usually is by Ecclesiastical Ambition. School-Learning, indeed, might do much; for there, his Lordship has fixed his theological-Bedlam: But Church Ambition, he assures us, is of another mould; which, as it never failed, he fays, to aim at, so, it never failed to obtain, immoderate Wealth and exorbitant Power. What then are we to think? That his Lordship meant, that neither Nature nor Reason could ever lead men to imagine two distinct and independent Societies in the same COMMUNITY? for Community being the genus, feveral Societies, as the species, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, I am ready to suppose, merely for my own ease; because when his Lordship is well understood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph then are contained these two propositions:

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1. That the Church does not compose a Society.

2. That it does not compose a Society independent and soverign.

Let us examine his reasoning on these points as it lies in his works; for as disorderly as it lies, it is intended. I assure you, to overturn the whole Theory of the Alliance.

"A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY, (says his Lordship) BY
"WHICH IS MEANT, ON THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY,
"is, or is not, a creature of the State. If the first.

it follows, that this Order no more than others, " which the State has instituted for the maintenance " of good government, can assume any rights, or ex-" ercife any powers, except fuch as the State has " thought fit to attribute to it, and that the State may, and ought to keep a confant controll over ".it, not only to prevent usurpations and abuses, but to direct the public and private influence of the "Clergy, in a strict conformity to the letter and foi-" rit of the Constitution; the servants of which, in a much truer fense, they are, than what they affect fometimes to call themselves, the Ambassadors of " God to other men. If the last is faid, if it be afferted, that the Church is in any fort independent on the State, there arises from this pretension the greatest absurdity imaginable, that, I mean, of " Imperium in Imperio; an Empire of divine, in an "Empire of human institution [9]."

Thus far his Lordship, who is here reasoning against the principles laid down in the book of the Alliance. He introduces his Dilemma with telling the Reader, that the Author of that Book has defined a religious Society, to be the body of the Clergy.—A religious Society, by which (fays he) is MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, is, or is not, a Creature of the State [10].

You cannot, I believe, fee this affertion without fome furprize, when you observe, that the Author of

[9] Vol. iv. p. 413.

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[10] So again, This order of men which we CALL the Religious Society, - V. iv. p. 440. And again, The Religious Society, as we have accustomed ourselves to CALL the Clergy. V. iv. p. 561.

the Alliance has defined a religious Society to be A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS CREATURES ASSOCIATED [11]. - When you observe, that He makes it one of the principal cares of a religious Society, to provide an Order of men, to be fet apart for ministring in holy things, or in other words, a CLERGY. - " The " greatest care is to be had, that the acts of religious worship be preserved simple, decent, and significa-" tive. But this can be done only by providing persons " fet apart for this office; whose peculiar employment it shall be to prefide in, direct, and superintend " the Acts and Services of Religion, &c. [12]" -When you observe, he makes the end of religious So. ciety to be, Sulvation of fouls, and one of the means, the Order of the Clergy .- Laftly when you observe, he oppofes the Church and the Clergy to each other, " It is unjust in the CHURCH to aim at the Propagation of Religion by force, and impertinent to aim at riches, honours, and powers. But what mo-" tives the CLERGY OF A CHURCH might have, is nothing to the purpose of our inquiry. We have " only to consider what the Chunch had, which, " as a religious Society, confifts of the whole body of the Community, BOTH LAITY AND CLER-" GY [13]."

[13] Alliance, p. 55.

[13] Alliance, p. 112. The very popish Clergy, nay DE MARCA himself, that time-serving Priest and great Flatterer, was more honest (as his Lordship might have seen by the quotation at the bottom of this very page of the Alliance — Ecclesia corpus, ex fidelium omnium compage constituiturium) than he chuses to represent the body of the English Clergy.

In a word, the Author of the Alliance was at much pains to prove that a religious Society or Church does not mean the Clergy, but the whole body of the faithful: and this for two reasons, for the sake of truth in general, and of his own system in particular.

1. It shocks common Sense to call one Order or rank in Society, by the name of the Society: it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a Sub-

stance, by the name of the Substance.

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2. It subverted the Theory of the Alliance to make the Clergy constitute the Church: for then the Church could neither be a distinct Society, nor independent; both of which it must be to make it capable of an Alliance with the State. It could not be a diffinct Society; for an Order of men, as I observed just before, is the fame in politics, as a quality in physics; the one must inhere in a Society, the other in a Substance: and these being the fubstrata of the other, to talk of a distinct, much more, of the independent existence of an order, or of a quality, is the profoundest nonsense in Politics and Physics. But admitting that such a Church, which like Trinculo's kingdom, confifts only of Viceroys and Viceroys over them, were capable of allying with the State, the Author has shewn, in the place quoted above, that it's motives for allying would be fuch as the State could never comply with, either in justice or policy.

Extreme necessity (to do his Lordship all the right we can) forced him upon this bold and violent falsification of the doctrine of the Alliance. He saw no other way of discrediting the opinion of an independent religious Society, than by making it believed that such a Society would be an "Imperium in Imperio, an Empire

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of divine, in an Empire of human Inflitution;" a mischief, against which the State is always on its guard. And if a religious Society signified the Church, and the Church, only the CLERGY, the claim to Independency would imply such an Imperium. But the Author of the Alliance goes upon other principles; he holds that the Church signifies the whole body of the Faithful; that though this Society be independent, yet, from its independency, no such solecism in Politics can arise as an Imperium in Imperio. This argument, which the Author has drawn out at large, the noble person, in the following words, misrepresents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

An Imperium in Imperio (fays he) is in truth fo expresly contained in the very terms of the affertion, that none of THE TEDIOUS SOPHISTICAL REASONINGS, which have been employed for the purpose, can evade or disguise it. One of these "I will mention, because it has a CERTAIN AIR OF "PLAUSIBILITY, that imposes on many; and because, if it cannot stand a short and fair examination, as I think it cannot, the whole edifice of ecclefiaftical in-" dependency and grandeur, falls to the ground. It has " been faid then, that religious and civil focieties are " widely diftinguished by the diftinct ends of their " inflitutions, which imply necessarily distinct powers " and a mutual independency; that the end of the one, is the Salvation of Souls, and that of the other the " fecurity of temporal interests; that the state pu-" nishes overt acts, and can punish nothing else, be-" cause it can have cognizance of nothing that passes in the mind, and does not break out into criminal " actions; but that the Church employing her in-" fluence

" influence to temper the passions, to regulate the " inward dispositions, and to prevent sins, as well as " crimes, is that tribunal at which even intentions

" are to be tried, and fins, that do not ripen into

" crimes, nor immediately affect civil Society, are

" to be punished [14]:" sale man and an installation

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This, I will suppose, his Lordship intended as a fair representation of the Author's argument for the independency of the Church. But the Argument, as it flands in the Alliance, is drawn from the different powers belonging to the two Societies; as those powers are deduced from their different ends. But different powers implying different administrations, they create a mutual independency; and different administrations implying an incapacity of their clashing with one another, shew plainly that such an independency can never produce an Imperium in Imperio. This is the natural order of the argument, as it flands in the Alliance. Let us fee now, how his Lordship represents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, wiz. Salvation of Souls, and Security of temporal interests: But, proceeding to speak of the different powers, adapted to those different ends, viz. Coertion in the State, and Persuasion only in the Church (from whence arises a mutual independency) he mistakes the consequences of these powers, which are punishment of overt acts, and subdual of the passions, he mistakes them, I fay, for the powers themselves; from which consequences indeed no independency ensues; because fubdual of the passions may, in his Lordship's opinion at least, be obtained by coercive power, as well as " bad the Sword ere par late their naget feat they

odw .eno 1 [14] Vol. iv. p. 413-14.

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punishment.

coercive power, one must needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this mistake only to shew you, what a poor and impersect conception, his Lordship had of the Argument of the Alliance. Had he told us, tho' in sewer words, that the Author's reasoning against the pretence of an Imperium in Imperio arising out of a mutual independency, was this, That the State having coercive power, and the Church having none, the administration of the two Societies could never class; so as to induce the mischief of an Imperium in Imperio; Had he told us this, I say, we should have seen, that at least he understood his Adversary.

But let us confider how he goes about to answer what he so ill represents.

" Now in answer to all this (says his Lordship) " WE MAY DERY, with truth and reason on our " fide, that the avowed ends of religious, and the " real ends of civil Society are to diffinet as to re-" quire distinct powers, and a mutual independency. "The Salvation of Souls is not the immediate end " of civil Society, and I wish it was not rather the " pretence, than the end of ecclefiaftical policy; but " if to abstain from evil and to do good works be " means of falvation, the means of falvation are the " objects of civil government. It is the duty of " Princes and Magistrates to promote a strict ob-" fervation of the Law of Nature, of private and " public morality, and to make those who live in " fubjection to them, good men, in order to make " them good citizens. For this purpose, the balance " and the fword are put into their hands, that they " may measure out punishment to every one, who " injures

injures the Community, or does wrong to his neighbour; and a rigorous punishment of crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, for both are intrusted to the same men [15], is the surest way not only to reform the ontward behaviour, but to create an habitual inward disposition to the practice of Virtue [16]."

We may, fays his Lordship, deny that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil Society, are fo diffind. - Here he contradicts his mafter LOCKE. This indeed is a small matter. I shall shew he contradicts Truth, and the whole system of human affairs, both in the constitution of Laws and in the administration of Justice. - But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done. - We may, fays his Lordship, deny that the AVOWED ends of religious, and the REAL ends of civil Society, are so distinct, as to require distinct powers and a mutual dependency. The avorved ends, does he fay? Avowed by whom? Common sense requires he should mean, avowed by those who go upon the principles of the book of Alliance. But then he might have faid real; for the avowed and the real ends are the fame: He fould have faid real; for the fair use of the proposition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require this word. But by what he predicates of these avoived ends, viz. their not re-

[16] Vol. iv. p. 414.

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^[15] This is faid, I fuppose, in opposition to what is afferted in the Book of the Alliance, (to shew the impersection of the plan of civil power) that reward is not (as it is generally understood to be) one of the Sanctions of civil government, in the sense that Punishment is so. But as this is all his Lordship has to say against it, I shall here let the matter rest between them.

quiring diffinet powers, we fee, he means avowed by corrupt Churchmen. (The falvation of fouls (fays he, immediately after) is rather the pretence than the end of ecclefiaftical policy:) and these ends are Church Uniformity for the fake of spiritual dominion. Now these around ends, we readily confess, cannot be obtained without coercive power of the civil kind. Here then you have his Lordship, after all his declamation against spiritual tyranny, coming at last, in the true spirit of a free-thinking politician, to profess that religious persecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as justly and reasonably employed in matters of conscience, as in the overtacts of civil life: now tho' this be altogether upon principle, (for what should restrain a Statesman, who believes nothing of the truth of religion and fees all the mischiefs of diversity of opinions, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?) Yet you would not have expected it in this place, where his Lordship is defending religious Liberty, against the Priest-craft of the Alliance: Nor would you have found it, had not the distresses of controversy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The Alliance went on this principle, that the Church was a Society. independent of the Civil, as not having coercive power like the Civil. To overturn this argument, his Lordship was forced to deny the minor, and so unawares has brought in PFRSECUTION as one of the natural powers of the Church. But to compass this matter neatly, and without noise, he has recourse to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expression, the abuse of the thing for the thing itself .- The avowed ends of religious - the real ends of civil fociety. But

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it was fo evident a truth, that the falvation of fouls was the real end of religious Society, and the security of temporal interests, the real end of the Civil, that he must have lost his senses who could be brought to believe that coercive power was as proper to promote the first as the second; or that instruction and exhortation was as proper to promote the fecond as the first: one of which things, his affertion, that the Church and State have not distinct powers, necessarily implies: To disguise this absurdity therefore for, real, which fair argument required, he substitutes the ambiguous word. assowed, which his bad cause required: And under this cover, he denies, that the two focieties are fo distinct as to require distinct powers .- Well, this however we understand; and have thoroughly canvassed. But what mean the words that follow? --- AND A MUTUAL INDEPENDENCY. The author of the Alliance indeed had faid, that the ends of the two focieties were so distinct as to require distinct powers. was not so absurd to add-and a mutual independency; because, independency was not the mean of attaining an end, like diffinct powers, but a consequence of those powers: for if the powers, by which two focieties are administered, be different, those societies, (seeing their administrations can never clash,) must needs be independent on one another. This is given only as a fresh instance of the cloudy apprehension this great Statesman had of a plain argument, the argument of the Alliance, built on the first principles of Law and. Politics.

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Let me now proceed with his reasoning. He is to prove, what he had afferted, that the two Societies are not so distinct as to require distinct powers. He is wri-

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ting against the book or rather against the Author of the Alliance; who lays it down as an acknowledged truth, that the end of the Religious is falvation of Souls; the end of the Civil, fecurity of temporal interests. To this his Lordship replies, that salvation of souls is only the pretended end of the Religious; but it is the real, tho' not immediate end, of the Civil. And thus he has with great dexterity wiped out all diffinction between the two Societies. I have already detected both the fraud and the fallacy of the first part of his affertion. I come now to the other, that fakuation of fouls if the real, tho' not immediate, end of civil Government. Here the meanness of his sophistry is still more apparent. than in the former part. It stands thus, - " The immediate end of civil government is confessed, on all hands to be fecurity of temporal interests. - This is done by keeping men to abflain from evil, and exciting them to good works - Good works are the means of falvation - Therefore the means of falvation are the objects of civil government; or, in other words, the falvation of fouls is at least the real, tho' mediate end of civil Society."

The Author of the Alliance had obviated all this paultry Chicane in the following words: " Civil "Government, I suppose, will be allowed to have been invented for the attainment of fome certain " end or ends exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. "Which distinction arises from the different proper-" ties of the things pretending. But amongst all " those things which are apt to obtrude, or have in " fact obtruded, upon men as the ends of civil Go-" vernment, there is but one difference in their pro-" perties,

" perties, as BNDs: which is this, that one of thefe " is attainable by civil Society only, and all the rest are " eafily attained without it. The thing then with the " first mentioned property must needs be that genuine " end of civil Society. And this is no other than

" fecurity to the temporal liberty and property of man [17]." But his Lordship's sophism confists in the ambiguity of the word END; which either fignifies the confer quence or issue of a mean, simply; or, the consequence and iffue, with intention and fore-thought. In the first sense it may be true, that falvation is the mediate end of civil Society; but then it is nothing to the purpose. In the second sense it is to the purpose, but not true. The civil Magistrate, all men see, had not this consequence or iffue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his punishments to the various species of unlawful actions, he does not proportion them to the heinousness of the offence, as estimated on the principles of natural or of revealed Religion, but on their malignant influence on civil Society. A plain indication, that, when he measured out punishments to offences, he had only political and not religious considerations in his view. But you shall hear what the Author of the Alliance has faid on this subject, who had consuted his Lordship's sophism even before he had conceived it.

We have thewn (fays this writer) that it was " the care of the Bodies, not of the Souls of men, that the Magistrate undertook to give account of. Whatever therefore refers to the body, is in his jurifdic-" tion; whatever to the foul, is not. But, and if

" second directly concedicts his method and tale [17] Alliance, p. 32-3.

" there be that which refers equally to both (as " Morals plainly do) fuch thing must needs be partly " within, and partly without his province; that is, " it is to be partially considered by him; his care " thereto extending fo far only as it affects Civil Society. The other confideration of it, namely as it makes part of Religion, being in the Hands of those, who preside in another kind of Society. " Again, with regard to civil practice; if we cast " our eye on any Digest of Laws, we find that evil " actions have their annexed punishment denounced, " not as they are VICES, i. e. not in proportion to " their deviation from the eternal rule of right: nor " as they are SINS, i. e. not in proportion to their " deviation from the extraordinary revealed will of " God; which two things indeed coincide: but as " they are CRIMES, i. e. in proportion to their ma-" lignant influence on civil Society. But the view " in which the State regards the practice of Morality " is evidently feen, in its recognition of that famous " maxim, by which penal laws in all Communities " are fashioned and directed, THAT THE SEVERITY " OF THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN " PROPORTION TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME. " A maxim evidently unjust were actions regarded by " the State, as they are in themselves only; because " the Law of Nature enjoins only in proportion to the " ability of performance; and human abilities abate " in proportion to the contrary propenfities: evi-" dently impious, were actions regarded by the State " as they refer to the will of God, because this State-" measure directly contradicts his method and rule " of punishing. But suppose the Magistrate's office

to be what is here affigned, his aim must be the suppression of crimes, or of those actions which malignantly affect society; and then nothing can be more reasonable than this proceeding; for then his end must be the good of the whole, not of particulars, but as they come within that view. But the good of the whole being to be proceived only by the prevention of crimes, and those to which there is the greatest propensity being of the most difficult prevention, the full severity of his Laws must of necessity be turned against these [18]."

But, his Lordship goes on to inform us, Whatthose means are which Princes and Magistrates employ to procure this mediate end of civit Society, the Salvation of Souls; and they are, he says, coercive force. — For this purpose, the ballance and the sword are put into their hands, that they may measure out punishment to every one, who injures the community or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous punishment of crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the surest way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward disposition to the practice of virtue.

Who would have expected that it should come at last to this, so contrary to his Lordship's affertion in the case of an extraordinary providence, That a vigorous and exact distribution of rewards and punishments under the Magistrate's Providence (which indeed is the only one his Lordship thinks worth a rush) should be so far from taking away merit and making

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virtue fervile, that it is the fureft way of creating an inward disposition to the practice of wirtue! i. e. the furest way of making virtue free and meritorious. But there is fomething marvelously perverse in his Lordfhip's conduct. The exact distribution of rewards and punishments by Heaven makes virtue worthless and fervile, the the administration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way if any, of creating an inward disposition to the practice of virtue; that is, of making it free and meritorious. On the contrary, if you will continue to believe him, the exact distribution of rewards and punishments by the civil Magistrate, makes virtue free and meritorious, tho' the Magistrate's administration be unable to operate on the mind and intention, and influences only the outward act; which is (if any be) to make virtue worthless and servile.

But to come to the point, which these observations naturally lead to. The very means his Lordship affigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely coercive force for falvation of fouls, entirely subverts his principle, and shews that salvation of souls could be no end of civil Society, fince the means are in no wife calculated to promote the end; it not being action fimply, which intitles to the favour of God, but action, upon proper motives. Now with these, (which refult into what we call Conscience,) force, or coercion, is absolutely inconsistent: Force may make hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of Religion can make men lovers of Virtue.

Now if it be by fuch kind of reasoning as this that the whole edifice of ecclefiastical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground, (to use his Lordihip's big language) Church Power was never worth the rearing.

To proceed. His Lordship with much gravity, tells us next, that " A Clergy might co-operate with " the civil Magistrate very usefully, no doubt, by ex-"hortations, reproofs, and example. - This they might do as affiftants to the civil Magistrate, in concert " with him, and in subordination to him. To robat " purpose therefore do they claim and affect independency " on bim? Greater power never did, nor can enable "them to do greater good. Would they erect a tri-" bunal to punish intentions? The very pretence is im-" pertinent. Would they erect it to punish subere no " injury is offered, nor wrong done? The defign is un-" just and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are deter-" minate and fixed. The Magistrate cannot alter "them. The ideas of Sins are more confused and "vague; and we know by long and general expe-" rience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in "the writings of casuists. Would they credt such a " tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith? Such a " one is erected in fome countries, under the name of " the Inquifition, and is juftly detefted in all. To "what end and purpose then can spiritual " COURTS and COERCIVE POWERS ATTRIBUTED " TO THE CLERCY ferve, unless it be to make " them Judges and Parties in their own cause, when " matters of interest are concerned [18]?"

His Lordship, it must be remembered, is here reafoning with the Author of the Alliance, against his notions of the rights of a Clergy in an established

[18] Vol. iv. p. 415-16.

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Church. And the noble person's first misrepresentation, you fee, is, that amongst these rights, the claim of independency on the State during their effablishment, is one; and that the coercive power exercifed by them, under the Alliance, is exercised as inherent in their order. To what purpose (fays his Lordship) do they [the Clergy] GLAIM AND AFFECT independency on bim, the civil Magistrate? And again, To what end and purpose can spiritual Courts, and coercive powers, ATTRIBUTED to the Clergy, ferve? And, as if this was not plain enough, in the very next page, addressing himself to Pope, he says, Amongst all the fallacies which have been em-" ployed by Churchmen, one of the most absurd has " been advanced, the' not invented [18], by a paradox-" ical Acquaintance of yours; and it is to maintain " the INDEPENDENCY of the Church, and to Sup--" pose, AT THE SAME TIME, a fort of original " Contract between the Church and State, the terms of which, every whimfical Writer, EVEN THIS scribler, adjusts as he pleases [19]." Falshood and ill language commonly go together. But let themigo, and it justy deterior in ogiment

You shall now hear what the Author of the Alliance holds on these two points, and from his own mouth. First, as to the independency,—" Let us see next (says he) what the STATE gains by it [the Alliance.] "These [advantages] in a word may be comprized in its supremacy in matters ecclesias—"TICAL. The Church resigning up her in—
"DEPENDENCY, and making the Magistrate her su—
[18] It was invented, it seems, by his friend Dr. Senior.
[19] Vol. iv. p. 417.

" PREME HEAD, without whose approbation and al-

"lowance, she can administer, transact, or decree

" nothing of 1 !" ment your I have a land land

Secondly, as to coercive power. "The third and

" last PRIVILEGE THE CHURCH GAINS, by this

"Alliance, is the being INTRUSTED WITH A JU-" RISDICTION, INFORCED BY COACTIVE POW-

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His Lordship assures us, the Author of the Alliance holds, that the independency of the Church is retained in an establishment : the Author himself, says that it is given up. His Lordship affures us, the Author holds an inherent coercive power in the Church; the Author himself fays, that coercive power is a grant of the State, during the Alliance.

And here you may take notice, how greatly his Lordship has improved upon his Masters, the Authors of the Rights of the Christian Church, and of the Independent Whig. They had ventured indeed to charge both these doctrines on the body of the English Clergy: But as one can never be sure what an indiscreet or corrupt member of so large a body may have faid, the confutation of their calumny was not fo eafy. His Lordship is more bold, he charges these opinions on a particular member of the established Church, by name: but then he is more fair, he puts it in the power of the person injured to do. himself justice; for it so happens, that this person not only denies the independency of the Church under an establishment, and all claim to inherent coercive power whatfoever, but has laid down principles to discredit, and rules to prevent the return of, those usurpations. The Author of the Alliance has vindicated [3] the English Clergy from the prevarications of Tindal and Gordon; It had been hard, had he found no charitable hand to vindicate him from the same calumny, when revived by this noble Lord.

As therefore, no independency in alliance, is either claimed or affected; and no inherent coercive power is attributed to the Clergy, We will suppose his Lordship's simple question to be, " For what end is " that tribunal, called a Spiritual Court, erected?" And had he been so candid to let the Author of the Alliance, to whom he directs his question, speak for himself, he had not waited for an answer. For the Author tells us, in the most conspicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMA-TION OF MANNERS only [4]. But, as if the Author had entirely left us to ourselves to conjecture how he intended to employ this firitual tribural, his Lordship falls a gueffing: and there is no kind of abfurdity, he does not propose, as favoured by his Adversary, tho' they be such as his Adversary had already exploded. From a combrod and Massor

To what purpose, says his Lordship, do the Clergy claim and affect independency on the Magistrate? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good. Would they erect a tribunal to PUNISH INTENTIONS? The very pretence is impertinent.

Before I come to his Lordship's conjecture, give me leave, Sir, to say one word of the happiness of his

[3] Alliance, p. 81, & feq.

[4] Bid p. 134.

induction. This Tribunal, or this coercive power, which he makes to follow independency, is so far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the Church till it has given up it's independency. The Author of the Alliance assigns a plain reason." The State (says he) having, by this Alliance, bestowed upon the Clergy a Jurisdiction with coactive power, such privilege would create an IMPE. RIUM IN IMPERIO had not the civil Magistrate in return, the supremacy of the Church [5]."

And now, to his conjecture. Is it, fays he, to punish intentions? The Author of the Alliance favs. No, it is for reformation of manners only. But you under-Rand not half his Lordship's drift, unless you consider these questions as proposed to infinuate, that the Author of the Alliance held the Abfurdities contained in them, So here, for inflance, you are to understand, that Mr. W. held this Tribunal was to punish intentions. However, I will acquit his Lordship of malice: it feems to be an innocent blander. The Author of the Alliance did indeed talk of a Tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal; and by ill lack, the noble Person mistook this tribunal, for a finitual Court. The Author's words are thefe-" The ef-" fectual correction of fuch evils I as arise from the " intemperance of the sensual appetites] must be begun " by moderating and subduing the Passions them-" felves. But this, civil Laws are not understood to " prescribe, as punishing those passions only when " they proceed to act: and not rewarding the at-" tempts to subdue them. It must be a tribunal re-

^[5] Alliance, p. 149.

" garding irregular intentions as criminal which can do " this; and that is no other than the tribunal of Reli-" gion. When this is done, a coactive power of the " civil kind may have a good effect, but not till "then. And who fo proper to apply this coactive ower, in fuch cases, as that Society, which fitted " and prepared the subject, for its due reception and " application [6]." This tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal, the Author calls the tribunal of Religion, (Forum conscientia) and distinguishes it from that other tribunal, which is invested with coaclive power of the civil kind, called spiritual Courts: he makes the first a preparative to the other. Yet, strange to believe ! his Lordship mistook this tribunal of Religion, so described and distinguished, for a firitual Court: and upbraids the Author of the Alliance for supporting a tribunal with coercive powers, to PUNISH INTENTIONS. But we shall see more of his Lordship's acumen, as we go along.

His second charge against the principles of the Alliance is in these words — Would they erect this tribunal to punish, where NO INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE? The design is unjust and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The Magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of sins are more confused and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of Casuiss.

To punish where no injury is offered nor wrong done, is his Lordship's periphrasis for the punishment of wague tust, which the Author of the Alliance makes one

[6] Alliance, p. 99-100.

branch of the reformation of manners, and confequently an object of spiritual Courts. But his Lordship's own opinion of the quality of vague lust, intimated in this periphrafis, is but a fecond confideration. His principal purpose in giving it, was to discredit the tyranny of spiritual Courts, in punishing where no fault is committed. To forget his BIBLE is nothing: but to forget his HORACE is a difgrace indeed. Now this honest Pagan reckoned the prohibition of vague luft, as one of the chief objects of civil

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" CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO; dare jura maritis.

All this is so very extraordinary, that you will not readily believe his Lordship could design the punishment of vague luft, by the words - punishing where no injury is offered nor eurong done; nor would I neither, did he not so clearly explain himself, in his curious distinction between crimes and sins: which, because it was occasioned by, and alludes to, a passage in the Alliance, it may not be amiss previously to transcribe that passage: " If we cast our eye on any digest of Laws " we find that evil actions have their annexed pu-" nishment denounced, not as they are VICES, i.e. " in proportion to their deviation from the eternal " rule of right: nor as they are sins, i. e. not in " proportion to their deviation from the extraordi-" nary revealed will of God; which two things in-" deed coincide; but as they are CRIMES, i. e. in " proportion to their malignant influence on civil

" Society [7]." The Author of the Alliance faid this, to shew that the civil Magistrate does not concern himself with Religion, as such. His Lordship borrows the same distinction between crimes and fins, to shew, that it is arbitrary and unjust to punish fins, as Spiritual Courts undertake to do: for, fays he, the ideas of CRIMES are determinate and fixed: The ideas of SINS are more confused and vague. From this, it appears, that his Lordship mistook vices, fins, and crimes, for different actions; whereas they are the fame actions under different confiderations: either as they respect natural light, revealed Religion, or civil laws; and fo have different names imposed upon them. The ideas therefore of these three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally determinate and fixed, or all equally confused and vague. But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his Lordship to object to the confused and wague idea of Sins, fince this idea is formed upon the revealed will of God in the Gospel, which, in a hundred places of his Essays he tells us, coincides with the eternal rule of right; a rule, which he acknowledges to be the most determinate and fixed of all things.

But he fays, the Magistrate cannot alter the ideas of erimes, as the Casuist may, the idea of sins. That is, the Magistrate cannot give the Name of Crimes to innocent actions. What should hinder him? He had two advantages above the Casuist: First, coercive power: secondly, the vague and confused measure to which crimes refer; namely, to the influence of actions on Society. Matter of fact confirms this observation. Look round the World; enquire through antient and

modern Times, and you shall find, that the Magiftrate has been guilty of infinitely more abuse in ranging actions under the idea of Crimes, than the Cafuift. in ranging actions under the idea of Sins. This was not improper to be observed in answer to his Lordthip's EXPERIENCE, which uthers in his old fophism, ready at every turn to help him out, the abuse of the thing for the thing itself-We know, fays he, by long and general experience, bow the ideas of fins vary in the minds, or at least in the WRITINGS of casuifts. By which it would feem, the noble Author knows as little of Cafuifts, as of any other fort of learned men. whose characters he has treated so Lordly. For corrupt casuistry does not so much consist in varying the ideas of Sins, concerning which they are generally agreed, as in contriving to evade the punishment denounced against them.

His last conjecture about the use of an ecclesiastical Tribunal, on the principles of the Alliance, is, that it is erected for the punishment of Opinions. Would they ered, fays he, such a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith? Why no, fays the Author of the ALLIANCE, in as plain terms as he can speak; -NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION [8]: And he not only fays it, but proves it too [9] .- To what end and purpose then, says his Lordship, can spiritual courts and coercive powers serve, unless it be to make the Clergy judges and parties in their own cause, when matters of interest are concerned?—To what end? The Author of the Al. hance has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE

and spared in it, invitable a consuming some steps.

[9] Alliance, p. 136. [9] P. 137-8.

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REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But fuch an answer did not serve his Lordship's turn. He will make the Author fay as he would have him; or injoin him filence, and answer for him, himfelf. He infinuates therefore, in the last place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal interest of the Clergy is concerned, and where they become Judges in their own cause. Hear then what the Author of the Alliance fays upon this head likewise; " CIVIL MATTERS, which tempooral Courts may conveniently inspect, can never " belong to an ecclefiaffical Jurisdiction. It hath been shewn, that this Court was erected as a suc-" cedaneum to the Civil, to take cognizance of fuch " actions as the Civil could not reach, or could not " remedy: which shews, the State could never in-" tend to put those things under the ecclesiastical " Jurisdiction that fall most conveniently under it's " own. Besides, for ecclesiastical Courts to ingross matters that belong to the civil jurisdiction, as it can possibly have no good use, may very possibly be attended with this evil, of inviting and en-" couraging the Church to aim at more power than is confistent, either with her own good, or the " good of the State. The great Founder of our Re-" ligion faid, Who made me a Judge or Divider be-" tween you? And what he would not assume to him-" felf, he would hardly bestow upon his Church: " and that the State should ever intend to give her " what was the peculiar right of temporal Courts, is " as difficult to suppose. We must conclude then, that fuch practice, wherever it is found, was de-" rived not from the reasonable Laws of this Alli-46 ance, - FOTE T

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" ance, but from the authority of old papal usurpa"tions [19]." Thus far the Author of the Alliance;
where you may find a great deal more to the same
purpose.

But his Lordship goes on with his confutation. -" By admitting the independency of the Church on " the State, the State acknowledges an original in-" dependency in the Church, derived from a greater " authority than her own: and the supposed terms of Union may be construed to be rather concessions " of the religious Society to the civil, for the fake of " order and peace, than grants of the civil to the re-" ligious Society. Thus Religion and the Church " are fet on the fame foot; no human authority can " alter one, but must receive it in the terms in which " it has been revealed; and fo may a good Cafuift " prove on this hypothesis, that no human authority " can measure out any conditions of Establishment " to the other. Thus the State becomes no better " than a coordinate, but inferior power [20]." I once met with a Philosopher of deep thought, who professed the same reverence for artificial Nonsense, that the Turks pay to naturally Folly. His System on this point was very fingular. He supposed that, as in the material World there was an universal, tho' very subtile fire, diffused in secret thro' all bodies; which, by a late contrivance might be allured or drawn out from the most inanimate or lumpish Matter, even from the dirty shoes of the Chronologer of Leicester, the Man who makes Time of Eternity; So, in the intellectual, that there was a certain witty

[19] Alliance, p. 138-9-40. [20] V. iv. p. 417.

200 A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

Spirit, which lay dormant in the most inexplicable Nonsense; and only wanted the application of some Engine of analogous invention to rouse it, and set it free. "Till such a one be discovered, we can but guess at his Lordship's meaning.

By admitting the independency of the Church on the State, (Says he) the State acknowledges an original independency in the Church derived from a greater Authority than her own. If, by Church, he means the christian Church, in general, it is confessed that it's independency is derived from a greater authority than what the State claims for any of it's rights. The Church holding of God immediately and in an extraordinary manner; the State, only mediately, and in a common way. But what are the confequences his Lordship would deduce from thence ? The first is, that then the supposed terms of union may be construed to be nather concessions of the religious Society to the civil, for the fake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious Society. The supposed terms are terms of Alliance between two These terms cannot, in the independent Societies. nature of things, be any other than mutual concessions and mutual grants. What then does he mean, by their being construed to be rather concessions of the religious Society than grants of the civil? By the Supposition on which his Lordship condescends to reason, When the Church in Alliance gives up its original independency it is without doubt a concession; because it is giving up a right: And when the State in Alliance, confers a coercive power on the Church, this, is certainly a grant; because an original independent religious Society can have no inherent coercive power. However some meaning, it is likely, his Lordship had. And

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And it feems to be this, "That if the Church have an original independency, no fuch Alliance as is funposed would be made of for that the terms on the side of the Church, would not be conditional but voluntary concessions, the State having nothing to give, in return." This would be talking fense at least, the not truth. But, first to suppose the fact, that the terms of this Union are mutual grants and mutual concessions: and then to deny mutual grants, and mutual concessions. is giving such a form to his argument as will need a first Logic to turn into sense, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a first Philosophy to turn into truth. Thus much however You may fee s Some cloudy conception his Lordship plainly had, that a Society of divine original could never enter into Alliance with another, only of buman. When the Sons of God came down amongst the Daughters of Men. we are told they begot Giants. His Lordship betrays his apprehensions, that this coalition between the civil and religious Societies would produce an issue altogether as monstrous, a kind of STATE LE-VIATHAN. Indeed, he charges the Author of the Alliance with being no better than a Pander or Procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his apprehenfions were, his conception was altogether unworthy both of a Philosopher and a Statesman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath shewn from the nature of things, that Religion composes an independent society: The Gosper, by divine inflitution hath declared the Christian Religion to be an independent fociety. His LORDSHIP hath shewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent society of the civil kind: And the Law, by divine infti-0 2

inflitution, hath declared the Jewish Republic to be an independent civil society. Now I would ask his Lordship, if nothing hindered this civil Society of divine original, from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reasons, excepted by name, what should hinder this religious Society of divine original

from entering into Alliance with the State?

Another Confequence his Lordship draws from an original independency in the Church is, that RELI-GION and the CHURCH are fet on the fame foot. That is, as I understand him, for he might have expressed himself better, the DISCIPLINE of the Church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE : The inference from which is, that the State must receive the CHURCH on she terms in which it was revealed: From whence his Lordship draws another consequence, that no human Authority can measure out any conditions of establishment to the Church: and, from thence another, (for his Lordthip's falle conceptions are always attended with fuperfectations, that the State becomes an inferior Power, or Creature to the Church. All these brave confequences, we fee, arise out of this principle, " that, in a Church of Divine Original, the Discipline is as " unalterable as the Doctrine." And of the truth of this principle his Lordship is so confident, that he calls his Adversary a flupid Fellow for not owning it. " The STUPID FELLOW, who advanced this Paradox in English, did not see how ill the parts of it " hang together, nor that if ecclefiaffical Govern-" ment was, by divine appointment, independent " of civil, no fuch contract as he supposes could be " made. The religious fociety, notwithstanding their " known "known moderation, could not have parted from " that independency AND SUPERIORITY over the " civil power, which God had given them [4]."

It is true, this STUPID FELLOW, did not fee it. And I don't well know how he should; since, on the other hand, he saw it to be impossible that any such contract as be supposes could be made, unless the Church or religious Society were independent of the civil. For what contract is it, which this Author supposes to have been made between Church and State ? He tells us, in express words, it is a mutual compact by FREB CONVENTION [4]. Now the entering into a free convention is at the pleasure of the contracting parties. But Parties who have this liberty, must needs be independent on one another.

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Well, but he has his reason, such as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. The Religious Society (fays he) could not have parted from that independency, AND SUPERIORITY, over the civil Power, which God had given them. And now indeed, after much cloudy flourishing, we are come to the point; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, as well as the nature of things, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT? This is in truth a question worth debating. But as his Lordship rarely suffers an important proposition, which he is fet either upon denying or depraving, to pals thro' his hands without first perplexing it, in the expression with an absurdity or an equivocation, I shall be obliged, before we can pass forward, to free this from the Bolingbrokian embarrafs. The religious

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^[3] Vol. iv. p. 418. [4] Alliance, p. 87.

Society Mays he) could not have parted from that independency AND SUPERIORITY over the civil power wibich God bath given them Now as the Author of the Alliance contends only for the independency of the Church before Alliance; and as his Lordship's reasoning acknowledges that the question is only concerning independency before Alliance, he must needs suppose, by adding, AND SUPERIORITY over the civil, that this Superiority is a consequence of independency. And so, indeed, he speaks of it more plainly just before,-Thus, [i. e. from the independency of the Church] the State becomes no better than a coordinate, BUF INFE-RIOR, Power. Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, superiority is so far from following independency, that it cannot confift with it. For why is religious Society by nature independent, (as the Author of the Alliance shews it is) but for the reason that Author gives, that it is effentially different from the civil, by having different ends and means [5]." But there is no ground for fuperiority of one Person or Society over another, but where some natural relation or connexion exists between them: none exists in this case; therefore a pretence of superiority on the one fide, and of dependency on the other, is abfurd. However, as I am verily persuaded his Lordship did not know enough of these matters even to prevaricate neatly in the point in question, I consider it as an innocent blunder, erifing from the following words of the Alliance, shamefully, indeed, misunderstood. Was it Such "then is the nature of Christ's kingdom fl. 2. the

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"christian Church] it is essentially framed to com? pose a firm and lasting Society; it is made such by divine appointment, and in order to six for pub." lic services it is both by nature and institution decorated soveness, and independent of civil God vernment, that it may adapt itself by free Alliance to the various kinds of human Policies [6]." Now sovereign in itself and independent of civil government, this great Writer hath paraphrased to signify, independency and superiority over the civil,

"Thalem talento non emam Milefium:

"Nam, ad fapientiam Hujus, nimius nugator fuit."

But, to come to the question; which is WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENCENCY WHICH GOD, as well as the Nature of things, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT. His Lordship determines in the negative. For if, says he, ecclesiastical Government was by divine appointment independent of the civil, the Religious Society could not have parted with that independency which God had given them.

Man was, by divine appointment, made free and independent; therefore, according to this reasoning, he could not part with his independency, and become subject to civil Laws. Hold, says his Lordship, Man was made free, that he might be subject to no laws but those to which he had given his consent; and as he needed protection from Laws, he had a right to part with his independency if he could get protection upon no other terms. And is not this the very case of the religious Society in question, which is only an

[6] Ibid. p. 180.

artificial person, by nature and institution free, and standing in need of protection?

But his Lordship's affertion, you will find, bottoms at last upon this Principle, that DIVINE AU-THORITY REDUCES ALL IT'S LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES: An Error which Bigots and Fanatics indeed, are equally fond of indulging; and has been indulged by them to the infinite differvice both of civil and of religious Society : But that a Philofopher and a Statesman should know so little of the NA-TURE OF LAWS is perfectly aftonishing. The first elements of his profession might have taught him, That the Authority by which a thing is command-" ed makes no alteration in the essence of the thing." Natural and positive duties retain their respective natures in the Code of Religion. Natural duties are eternal; Positive duties are revocable. Of these latter, fome are lasting as the Dispensation to which they belong; others only temporary. Of the temporary, fome cease not till they are expressy revoked; others cease with the occasion that enjoined them. These last are again to be distinguished into Privileges and Duties; privileges may be receded from at pleafore; but duties must either be revoked, or the occafion must be plainly feen to cease. Now the INDE-PENDENCY in question, is one of those institutions in the divine Law, which ceafes with the occasion; and is besides, a privilege, which may be receded from, at pleasure. Again, In the divine Laws, some things are enjoined to be believed as Truths; others to be practifed as Utilities. Of utilities some are general; others particular: The first of these are permanent and constant; the second variable. Of the first, is the

the Church's composing a Society: of the second, is it's particular form. Thus, Jesus seemed to institute an equal Ministry; the Apostles, episcopal Government; and modern Churches have chosen one or the other, as best suited to the various civil Governments with which they had allied.

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As Christianity was, by divine institution, a Society at large, to authorize and to enable the feveral Churches to give particular forms to ecclefiaftical Government; so the independency was bestowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free Alliance with the State. When God himself allied the Jewish Church with the State, he did not leave that Religion a fociety at large; neither did he ordain it independent : he prescribed, in the minutest manner, the form of Church Government; and made it dependent on the State. But the Author of the Alliance tells his story better. " The " christian religion (says he) was not only left inde-" pendent of the State by not being united to it like " the lewish; (and being so left it must needs by the "Law of Nature be independent,) but its indepen-"dency, was likewise secured by divine appoint-" ment, in that famous declaration of it's founder, "My kingdom is not of this world; which bears this " plain and obvious fense, That the kingdom of Christ, to be extended over all Mankind, was not like the king-" dom of God, confined to the Jewish people, where Reli-" gion was incorporated with the State; and therefore, " of this world, as well in the exercise of it, as in the " rewards and punishments by which it was administered: but was independent of all civil communities; and " therefore, neither of this world, as to the exercise of it, nor as to the rewards and punishments by which it 0 5

" was administered - But whoever imagines that, from this independency by inflitution, the Church cannot " convene and onite with the State, concludes much too faft. We have observed, that this property in the Kingdom of Christ was given as a mark to dif-" tinguish it from the kingdom of God, that is, it was " given to flew that this Religion extended to all mankind; and was not, like the Mofaic, confined " to one only people. Confequently, that very rea-"fon which made it proper for the Mofaic Religion "to be united by divine appointment to the State, " made it fit, the Christian should be left free and " independent. But for what end, if not for this, To be at liberty to adapt itself to the many various "kinds of civil policies, by a fuitable union and al-" liance.—An Alliance then we must conclude the "christian Church was at liberty to make, notwith-"flanding this declared nature of Christ hingdom. " So far is indeed true, that it is debarred from entering into any fuch Alliance with the State as may "admit any LEGISLATOR in Christ's kingdom but "himfelf [that is, a power in the Magistrate to al-" ter DOCTRINES.] But no fuch power is granted " or usurped by the supremary of the State [7]." Twhich extends only to DISCIPLINE. HE THE COLOR

From all this it appears, that the unalterable part of the Law of Christ is the Doctrine: and the only alterable part, the Discipline: but it is the latter, with which Society, as such, is chiefly concerned, when it enters on Alliance with the Church. Therefore, when his Lordship says, Religion and the

[7] Alliance, p. 178--9, &c.

Church being set on the same foot, no human authority con alter one, but must receive it on the terms in subject it has been rewealed, if he means, there can be no alteration in discipline, I have shewn he is mistaken; if he means, there can be no alteration in destrine, he is certainly right; and I consider his Lordship's observation as a complaint, that, by the constitution of the Christian Church, the Magistrate cannot tyrannize over Conscience.

In the mean time we fee to what little purpose this great Philosopher and Statesman had read his Hoo-KER : of whom he confesses something might be learnt. Now, Hooker would have shewn him, that divine authority does not reduce all it's Laws to one and the same species.-" Positive Laws (says this "truly great Man) are either permanent or elfe-"changeable, according as the matter itself is con-"cerning which they were first made. Whether "Go pror MAN be the maker of them, ALTERA-"TION they fo far forth admit, as the MATTER doth "exact. Wherefore, to end with a general rule con-"cenning all the Laws which God hath tied men. Sounto: those Laws divine, that belong, whether " naturally or supernaturally, either to men as men, " or to men as they live in politique Society, or to "men as they are of that politique Society which is "the Church, without any further respect had unto "any fuch variable accident as the State of men, " and of Societies of men, and of the Church itself in this world, is subject unto; all Laws that so be-Hong unto men, they belong for ever, yea altho' " they be positive Laws, unless, being positive, " God himself which made them, alter them. The " rea-0 6 awab "

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"not always continue, but may perhaps be clean other-"wife a while after, and so may be required to be other-

" wife ordered than before; the Laws of God himself

" which are of this nature, NO MAN ENDOWED WITH

COMMON SENSE will ever deny to be of a different

conflitution from the former, in respect of the one's con-

" Rancy, and the mutability of the other [8]."

So much for this country Parson. And how poorly does his Lordship figure before him with his affertion, that divine law makes every thing, which relates to the Church, equally unalterable? Yet this noble Haranguer, thus ignorant of the very first elements of Law, can dictate with the authority of an Oracle, and be received with the reverence due to one, concerning civil liberty, Church usurpations, a Patriot King and the ballance of power. But Master Hooker will tell you, how easily all this may be done without knowing more than our neighbours.

-" Thus far therefore (fays he) we have endeadeavoured in part to open, of what nature and
force Laws are, according unto their feveral kinds:
the Law which God himfelf hath eternally fet

[8] Eccl. Pol. Lei. Sect. 15. 14 1 hand boo

"down to follow in his own works; the Law which " he hath made for his creatures to keep; the Law! " of natural and necessary Agents; the law which "Jangels in Heaven obey; the Law whereuntor by the light of reason, men find themselves bound, in " that they are men; the Law which they made by " composition for multitudes and politique Societies " of men to be guided by; the Law which belong-"eth unto each nation; the Law that concerneth "the fellowship of all; and lastly the Law which "God himself hath supernaturally revealed. It " might peradventure bave been more POPULAR AND " MORE PLAUSIBLE TO VULGAR BARS, if this " discourse had been spent in EXTOLLING THE FORCE " OF LAWS, in fewing the GREAT NECESSITY OF "THEM, when they are GOOD, and in AGGRAVAT-"ING THEIR OFFENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS "ARE INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. But forafmuch as with fuch kind of matter THE PASSIONS OF MEN " are rather flirred one way or other, than THEIR "KNOWLEDGE any way fet forward unto the trial of " that whereof there is doubt made, I have there-" fore turned afide from that BEATEN PATH, and "chosen, tho' a LESS BASY, yet a more profitable "way, in regard of the end we propose [9]."

Great Names, however, are still of good use to his Lordship: for the he cannot profit by their lights, he can shine at their expence: and, having well chicaned their expressions, can afterwards convert the truths contained in them to his own use. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind.

Hookek and Locke have been supposed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil Government. Alas and fine Thefeo! There is nothing fo well done, which his Lordship cannot mend. He reproves Both of them, with much folemnity, for representing mankind to themselves, like a number of savage individuals out of Society, in their natural State, inflead of confidering them as members of families from their birth. "This " (he fays) has made them reason in consist ENTLY, "and on a FALSE FOUNDATION. Inconfidently, " because they sometimes acknowledge paternal Go-"vernment to have preceded civil, and yet reason " about the inflitution of civil, as if men had then " first assembled in any kind of society, or had been " subject to any kind of rule; for to say that the Law " of nature was of itself fuch a rule, and that every " one of these independent inhabitants of the earth "did or might exercise Justice for himself, and others on those who violated the Law, was lan-" guage unworthy of Mr. Lock E, and unnecessary to his System. - Falsely, because it is easy to demon-" frate that mankind never was in such a State [10] " To fay the truth easy enough, and like demonstrating day-light. A man need only open his eyes to fee that a Mother does not abandon her infant as foon as the has dropt it, nor the Father renounce the care of it and her. Is it possible then that Hooken. Locke, and their Followers, should want to be told by his Lordship so obvious a truth, That, before civil Society, mankind did not flart up like mush-

from the fight of circumiances of new roads in the circumstrated [or] vilov. [or] appearances

Hooker

rooms, a number of favage individuals at once;

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but came as they could be got, and entered as they were born, into tribes and families. Why then you ask, did not Hooken and Locke to confider them! when they were deducing the origin of civil. Society? For very important reasons, and, one would think, very obvious ones.

equally shown on either supposition, the truths which soldered from it, were clearer seen; as they were less embarrassed, mby considering Mankind before will Society, as individuals.

But this was not all ... Had They confidered men before civil Society as ranked under tribes; the nights belonging to the Heads of families, thus brought into view, tho's neither relative to, nor connected with. those of a civil kind, might have too much countenanced that abfurd System, which derives political Rule from the Patriarchal; a fystem which, both for its abfurdities and mischiefs, it was the purpose of Locks and Hookan to expose and discredit. The former therefore did judiciously; to affert, as he might do it truly ; (for the exercise of justice no more belong. ed to Fathers of Families, as fuch, than the exercife of Regal prerogative) that, before the inflitution of Civil Society, every one of these independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exercise justice for himself and others, on those who wielared the Law. Yet this, his Lordhip calls language unworthy of his Master. Navi fo great a franger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the representation to be UNNECESSAame whereas we fee it was done to keep the unwary from the fight of circumflances of no use to affift their ,mamphifee of teaching and baptizing. The Apo-

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304 A VIEW of LORD BOLLNEBROKE's judgment, and easily abused by designing men, to millead them.

But to proceed with our Subject. His Lordship goes on against the Book of the Alliance in this Manner. This imaginary Contract, in thort, whether " well or ill made, never existed at any time, nor in any Country; though, to have been real, and really authorized, it should have been the fame at " all times and in all Countries where Christianity was propagated. Political Societies make and al-"ter and break their Alliances, as the varying reason "of flate fuggetts. Different orders of civil Goff vernment in the same Society change, and with " them the whole Constitution of such Governments. " as reason or passion, the interests or the dispositions of men determine them. But a Religion given by "God is in its nature invariable. And therefore if a 16 Religious Society with certain privileges, immuni-" ties, and prerogatives be necessary to preserve it so, " the order and conflitution of fuch a Society must be invariable too. The CHURCH must be established by " the fame divine Authority as the RELIGION, and be by confequence independent of the State. But " nothing of this kind has been. Christ's kingdom " was not of this World. He fent out his Apostles to " teach, and to baptize; and the utmost power he gave them, befides that of working Miracles to " convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust " of their feet, and to protest against the insidelity of st those who refused to receive them, and the Gospel " they published. The Apostles ordained others to " accompany and to succeed them in the same office, the office of teaching and baptizing. The Apo-" files " files could give no more power than they received;

" and no argument of right can be drawn from any

"thing that passed, or from any thing that these." Men did for the Maintenance of their Sect, while,

"Christianity was a Sect [11]."

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This imaginary Contract (he fays) never existed at any time or in any country. If he means, a Contract actually and formally executed, I have answered that already, and shewn, that the objection holds equally against the original contract between King and People; which I suppose his Lordship allows not to be so imaginary but that the prerogative of the one, and the rights of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the conditions of it. But You shall hear the Author of the Alliance on this matter.

" [12] When I say that all regular policied States " had an Eftablished Religion, I mean no more than "He would do, who, deducing Civil Society from its true Original, should, in order to persuade Men of the Benefits it produces, affirm that all Nations " had a Civil Policy. For as this Writer could not " be supposed to mean that every one constituted a " free State, on the Principles of public Liberty, " which yet was the only Society he purposed to prove " was founded on Truth, and productive of public " Good; because it is notorious, that the far greater " Part of Civil Policies are founded on different Prin-" ciples; or abused to different Ends: so neither " would I be understood to mean, when I say all " Nations concurred in making this Union, that they " all exactly discriminated the Natures, and fairly

[11] Vol. iv. p. 419-20. [12] Alliance, p. 114-117.

" adjusted

"adjusted the Rights of both Societies, on the Prin-" ciples here laid down; tho an Eftablishment resulting from this Discrimination and Adjustment be the "only one I would be supposed to recommend On "the contrary, I know this Union has been gene-" rally made on mistaken Principles; or, if not so, "hath degenerated in length of Time; by which " means the national Religion in the Pagan World " hath been most commonly a Slave to the State; " and in the Christian System, the State sometimes a "Slave to the Established Church. And as it was " fufficient for that Writer's Purpofe, that those So-" cieties, whether good or bad, proved the Sense all Men had of the Benefits resulting from Civil Policy " in general, though they were oft mikaken in the " Application; fo it is for Ours, that this universal "Concurrence in the two Societies to unite, shews "the Sonfo Mankind had of the Ufefulness of such an Union. And laftly, as that Writer's Principles " are not the less true on account of the general Deviation from them in forming Civil Societies; for may not the plain ones of Alliance here delivered; "I tho! fo few States have fuffered themselves to be " directed by them in Practice; nor any Man before "delivered them in Speculation; especially if, as in " that Case, so in this, we can derive such Mistale " and Degeneracy from their Causes. It would draw " me too far out of my Way to explain diffinctly the " Causes of the Mistake; and the intelligent Reader, "who carefully attends to the whole of this Dif-"course, will not be at a Loss to discover the most " confiderable of them; fome of which I have al-

" ready hinted at; and others, I may possibly, in the

beauth, "

" Sequel

" Sequel of this Discourie, take occasion to mention."

"As for the Degeneracy, we have observed, that the

"Quantas Now, the common life of such, Gratius

"acquaints us with, in these Words: Interim verum
"off accidere plerumque, ut qui superior est in fadere, st

" IS POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM

"IMPERIUM PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET : PRÆ-

But if, by, never existed, his Lordship means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either Society, which naturally follow such an Alliance, were never actually exercised and enjoyed by the two Societies, his affertion is false. They are at this present actually exercised and enjoyed by the two Societies, in Enguere the Land, under our happy Constitution of Church and State. And it was a principal purpose of the Book of the Alliance to shew they are so, in order to realize the Theory. Here again it may not be improper to give you the Author's words: "We see how unrea- fonable and even how impolitic our Adversaries are, when in their ill humour with Establishments, "they chuse to pick a quarrel with their own; where

"they chale to pick a quarrel with their own; where

"the national Religion is on a footing exactly agree-

" able to the nature of a free Convention between " Church and State, on the principles of the Laws of

"Nature and Nations. A felicity, they should have

"known, that scarce any other People on the face of

" the earth can boast of. In England alone the ori-

"exactly, that this account of the Alliance between

off [13] De jure Belli & Pacis, Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

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" and State of England, than a Theory, as indeed it was, formed folely on the contemplation of Na-

" ture, and the unvariable reason of things [44]"

To make this contract (Says his Lordship) real, and to be really authorized, it should have been the fame at all times and in all countries where Christianity was professed. In plain terms, Right waits to receive it's nature from Man's acceptance of it: or, in fill plainer, Right becomes Wrong when rejected. How would this political aphorism of his Lordship's found when applied to the ORIGINAL CONTRACT between Prince and People? - to make it real and to be really mithonized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries, where civil rule bad been introduced,

But political Societies (he fays) make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reason of state suggests. If he would be here meant to speak of such which make these alterations justly, the same may be said of the Alliance between Church and State. The Author has shewn that, in this respect, the Alliances of political Societies with one another, and the Alliance of the political with the religious, fland just upon the fame footing. " If there be (fays the Author) more " religious Societies than one at the time of Conven-

tion, the State allies itself with the largest of those religious Societies. It is fit the State should do so,

because the larger the religious Society is, where

" there is an equality in other points, the better en-

abled it will be to answer the ends of the Alliance.

" It is scarce possible it should be otherwise, because

[14] Alliance, p. 167-8.

a Church

" the two Societies being compoled of the fame in-" dividuals, the greatly prevailing Religion must have a majority of it's members in the affemblies " of State, who will naturally prefer their own Re-" ligion to any other. Hence we fee the reason why " the Episcopal is the established Church in England: " and the Presoverian the established Church in Scot-" land. Hence too we fee the reason of what was " before observed, concerning the duration of this " Alliance: that it is perpetual but not irrevocable: " i e It subfifts just fo long as the Church thereby " effablished maintains it's superiority of extent; " which when it loses to any considerable degree the Alliance becomes void. For the united Church "being then no longer able to perform it's part of " the Convention which is formed on reciprocal conditions, the State becomes difengaged; and a new "Alliance is of course contracted with the now pre-" vailing Church, for the reasons which made the "old. Thus formerly, the Alliance between the " Pagan Church and the Empire of Rome was diffolv-" ed and the Christian established in it's place: and " of late, the Alliance between the Popish Church and the Kingdom of England was broken; and an-"other made with the Pratefiant, in it's flead [15]." Different orders of civil government, in the same Society, change, (fays his Lordship) and with them the whole Constitution of fuch Governments, as reason or passion, the interests or dispositions of men determine them. - And is it not the same in Church Government? It is here Episcopacy; there Prefbytery; and in another place

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variably followeds became little end wine real diffe [15] Alliance, p. 197-98.

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But,

But a Religion given by God is in its nature invaria. the holts Doctrons it is Yes, and in its Disci-PLINE likewife, (fays his Lordfhip) and thus I prove it If a religious Society with certain privileges, emmunities, and prerogatives, be necessary to preserve it fo, the order and constitution of fuch a Society must be invariable too. The inference is just. But what principle of the Alliance (against which his Lordship is here arguing) supposes, that one certain fet of privileges, immunities, and prerogatives is neueflary to preferve a religious Society in that State and Condition? This Theory fays, Religion compoled a Society before it had any of those privileges, immunities, and prerogatives and will remain a Society when it has lost them. For it had none of them till it came into Alliance with the State, and will hold none of them longer than that Alliance continues. But, if by a strange liberty of expression, his Lordship means, by privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, only Church-Government in general, fo far forth as it is a Society; I own that this is necessary to preferve a religious Society in the State and Condition of a Society: But then, give me leave to fave it does not follow from thence, that the order and conflictation of fileb a Society must be invariable too: Because Church Government may be administred by an Episcopacy, a Presbytery, or an Independency. The Specific form of Church-Government amongst the Jews was prescribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, because Moses united the Religion to the State, under the collective name of Laws The specific form of Church Government amongst Christians was not prescribed, and therefore none seems intended to be invariably followed, because Jesus did not unite his Religion

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Religion to the State, but left it to particular Churches to follow fuch as were most agreeable to the forms of those civil Societies, in which they were to be established. For this purpose it was sufficient that he instituted his Religion, a Society, by directing the members of it to bear the Church, and by appointing Officers as it's organs to convey it's decisions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the Author of the Alliance, who speaking of the Jewish and Christian Churches, says, " This, Both had in com-"mon to be political Societies by divine appoint-"ment; but different in this, that Gon, for wife "ends, minutely prescribed the whole mode of " lewish policy: and Chaist, on the contrary, with "the same divine wisdom only constituted his Church " a policied Society at large, and left the mode of "it to human difcretion [16]." All its

Those ends, the Author thus explains, in another place. The Jewish Religion was, like the true is natural, which it ratified, effentially fitted to compose a Society; and like the Christian, of which it was the first rudiment, made such by divine appointment. But then unlike the Christian, in this, that it was not left independent of civil Government, to unlte with it at its pleasure, on terms agreed upon; but was for great and wife reasons at once united to it, by God himself. Which also he was pleased to do, not by way of Alkance as between two bodies that were to continue distinct, and might be separated, but by mutual conversion into one another, and perfect incorporation [17]."

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[16] Alliance, p. 164. [17] Alliance, p. 176.

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His Lordship then owns, that if the Church be effablished by the same divine authority as the religion, that is, if religion be formed into a Society) it is by consequence independent of the State. I am apt to suspect, he here grants more than he is aware of : For it follows from this concession, that if the Christian Religion even composes a Society by nature, tho' not by divine appointment, it must be independent of the State: because the independency does not arise from the Authority which formed it, but from the nature it posfesses: And the Author of the Alliance has shewn [18] that Religion composes a Society by natural right. His Lordship's endeavour therefore to avoid the consequence of independency, by affirming that the Church was not established by the same divine authority as the Religion, would be to no purpose even tho he could prove it. However let us hear how he supports his affertion.

His first argument is the declaration of Jesus himfelf, that his Kingdom was not of this World. The
question is, Whether Christ's Religion composes a
Society, and a Society independent? And his Lordship quotes a declaration of Jesus to prove it does
neither, which in the very terms imply that it does
both. For what is a Kingdom, but a Society? And
what is the not being of this World, but a declaration
of independency? Indeed the Author of the Alliance
employed the subject of the proposition, Christ's Kingdom, to prove it was a Society; and the attribute,
its not being of this World, to prove, that Church
and State are independent of one another. For

[18] Book i, c, 5.

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was Christ's Religion a Kingdom of this Worla, the consequence would be, that either the State is dependent on the Church, or the Church on the State; because, in that case, both having coercive power, (as all kingdoms of this World have) a mutual independency would make that solecism in Politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: Whereas, Christ's Kingdom not being of this World, and his Apostles, as his Lordship rightly observes, having no power, (besides Miracles) but that of teaching, exhorting, and protesting against insidelity, i. e. having no coercive power, there remained no pretence for its dependency on the State.

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His Lordship's second Argument against the independency of the Church is, that Jesus sent out his Apostles to teach, and to baptize, and the utmost power he gave them, besides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust of their seet, and to protest against the insidelity of those who resused to receive them, and the Gospel they published. The Apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in the same Office of teaching and baptizing. The Apostles could give no more power than they had received.

1. He is to prove that the Christian Religion did not compose a Society by institution. And how does he set to work? With an argument which shews it to be a Society by institution, and without coercive power; the very Society which the Author of the Alliance contends for. Jesus sent out his Apostles,—they ordained others to accompany and to succeed them. Here a Society is plainly instituted; for you find officers appointed; and they provide for a Succession.—The utmost power they had was to teach and baptize those who wil-

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lingly received the Gospel. Here all coercive power is excluded; and that exclusion makes the Society independent. What more may be inferred from this account (and which his Lordship should have inferred) is, that the a Society was instituted, yet the particular form of Church-Government was lest to human discretion: But he could find no Society of Christ's appointment, where he saw no particular form of Church-Government minutely marked out, as in the Mosaic Dispensation. The, had he found any such it would, when he least suspected it, have been most to his purpose; for of such, and only of such, he might have said truly, that being given by God, it is in its nature invariable.

2. His observation, that the Apostles could give no more power than they had received, infinuates that the Author of the Alliance contended for inberent coercive power in the Church; which is a groß misrepresentation of his Adversary, who expressly affirms that the Church has no fuch power, while unallied; and when allied, receives it, in a very limited manner, from the State; and enjoys it no longer than the Alliance continues. But these misrepresentations are things essential to his Lordship's polemics. So again, To pretend (fays he) that the Church has a right to the former [i.e. wealth and grandeur] by com-" pact or by virtue of an Alliance with the State, "would be to fay whatever comes uppermost in a " WHIMSICAL HEAD [19]." This is to infinuate that the Author of the Alliance pretends that the wealth and grandeur of the Church necessarily arises from it's makistownia wind stay at

alliance with the State, But let him speak for himself, and you shall hear him faying the direct contrary the acquifition of bonours, riches, and power could not be a motive for Alliance. His reason is, that it would be impertinent in a Church to aim at them, because they are things a Church could neither use nor profit by [20]."

His Lordship concludes this long paragraph in these words-No argument of right can be drawn from any thing that paffed, nor from any thing that these men [the Apofiles did for the maintenance of their Sect, while Christianity was a Sea. His Lordship here forgets, as usual, the personage he assumes, which is that of a Believer, who supposes, the Apostles acted, in all things, by the direction of their Master: consequently, an argument of RIGHT MAY be drawn from every thing that passed, and from all they did, in support or maintenance of their feet, while Christianity was a Sect. It is true, if we suppose the Apostles to be Politicians like his Lordship, a fort of men who put in practice all kind of means to support and maintain their Cause or Party, no argument of right can be drawn from any thing they did or faid. But when God directs the actions and organs of his Ministers in the propagation of Religion, we know from the knowledge of his Attributes, that no rights of Humanity or Society will be violated; and confequently, that from every fuch action, an argument of right may be drawn.

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.If, indeed, his Lordship meant no more by his profound observation than this, That, from what the Apostles did, to affert and maintain the independency of Christ's Religion while it remained a Sect, no argument of

[20] Alliance, p. 112.

dent when it becomes established, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the understanding him in so reasonable a sense, which is, that it supports the Theory of the Alliance; which, I presume, was not in his Lordship's intention. Besides, it contradicts what he so much labours to prove, That, if the independency of the Church was of divine institution, the Church could not give it up, when it entered into Alliance.

In a word, the whole of his Lordship's reasoning against an Alliance between Church and State from the nature of a Church, may be reduced to these sour propositions:

1. If Christianity be not a Society by divine insti-

tution it is no Society at all.

2. If Christianity be an independent Society by divine institution it could not give up its independency to the State.

3. If Christianity be a Society by divine institution a certain form of Church government must be expli-

citly prescribed.

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4. If such a form be explicitly prescribed then that Form, and the Discipline which belongs to it, must be as unalterable as the Doctrine; which is contrary to the genius of this supposed Alliance.

Now I have shewn, that every one of these four propositions is utterly void of all truth and reason.

After these exploits, nothing was wanting to make his Lordship's victory compleat against Albances and Establishments, but to discredit that first and most famous one of all, made by Constantine. "This great Revolution (says he) was effected in part by circumstances

PHILOSOPHY-WAIV A 317 " cumstances I have mentioned, and by others that favoured the growth of Christianity. The impe-Hal Authority did the reft, but did it ill ; fo ill, that the chief of those political views which Con-STANTINE had in making this ESTABLISHMENT were defeated by it, and the admission of a reli-" gious Society into the State, in the manner in which he admitted it, was the cause of all the " ecclefiaftical and theological evils that have fol-" lowed from his time to ours, and that are fo falfly " imputed to Religion itself. We may be assured, " that the Society co-operated with the Court, to bring about a Revolution fo much to their ad-" vantage; and thought themselves happy enough " to be dependent, not independent on the Emperor; " his instruments not his allies, whatever appearances " he might give, or fuffer them to assume, in those " folemn ecclefiaftical Farces, wherein he conde-" scended to act, in some respects, a second part. " But while he recalled to his mind, as he did most " probably, the great service Religion was of to ancient Rome, he seemed to forget, that when that " Religion flourished, and was of so much service to " the State, it was under the immediate inspection " of the State. There was no Council but the Se-" nate to define Doctrines, nor to regulate Disci-" pline. And men were at the head of the religious, " because they were at the head of the civil, admini-" firation; instead of being at the head of the latter, " because they were at the head of the former. -"He [Conftantine] meaned that this [spiritual power] " should be distinct from the civil; THAT THEY P 3.1 " SHOULD

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should be independent of one another, and both dependent on him [1].

That noblest part of Legislation, the adjusting the rights and privileges, and fettling the bounds and limits of the two Societies, his Lordship, as we faid before, feems much a stranger to. Indeed, every new paragraph makes his ignorance but the more conspicuous by his endeavouring to disguise it; as his attempts are generally made at the expence of a Contradiction.

In the Establishment of Religion under Constan-TIME, the Church, he fays, became dependent on the supreme civil Magistrate. They thought themselves bapty enough to be dependent, not independent on the Emperor; bis instruments, not bis allies. Yet, in the same breath, he tells us, that this very Emperor was contented to act a second part to these his instruments, or, in other words, to become theirs: Nay, he expressly affirms, that Christianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganism had been in the old: Now Faganism, he tells us, was the instrument of the fupreme Magistrate. Christianity then, must be an Ally, not an infirument to the supreme Magistrate. His Lordship fays, this Establishment was ill, very ill, made: However that be, every body fees it is very ill represented .- It defeated all Constantine's political views, all the good be intended. It is not unlikely. We have an example before us, in his Lordship's Essays throughout, that his contradictions can defeat all the evil intended; this is doing fomething more, for malice is not fo eafily defeated as benevolence.

[1] Vol iv. p. 432-445.

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But if you ask, Why, in this account of Constan-TINE's Establishment, the Church is one while made the Infirument, and another, the Ally of the civil Magistrate? I will tell you. His Lordship had decried was, he fays, in FACT, fuch an Alliance. To countenance this affertion, Constantine's Establishment is represented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the Church became the tool and instrument of the civil Magistrate. But then again, he was to flew that such an Alliance was not of RIGHT, as being very mischievous to the State: This turns the Tables; and then CONSTANTINE meaned, that the Spiritual power should be distinct from the civil, and that they fould be INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER (for he all along mifrepresents the Theory of the Alliance. as making the Church keep its independency after the Union) indeed he fays, and both dependent on bimfelf [2]; but this was only added to forcen the absurdity. To such wretched shifts do his Principles ever and anon reduce him : - The Religious and the Civil Society are independent of one another; yet the Religious is dependent on the supreme Magistrate; i. i. on him who represents the civil Society, and is at it's head. The Theorem is to the promote the

But now let us examine the ground-work of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He fays, the Church was happy enough to be dependent, NOT INDEPENDENT, on the Emperor; his Instruments, NOT HIS ALLIES. This sentence is made up of a

[2] Vol. iv. p. 445.

false

A VIEW of LORD BOLINGBROKE'S false infinuation, and a mistaken consequence. The infinuation is that the Author of the Alliance holds. the independency of the Church, on the Magistrate, during an Establishment. The mistaken consequence is, that if the Church be dependent, it is the Instrument, not the Ally, of the State. But GROTIUS, as he is quoted in the book of the Alliance, might have fet his Lordship right in this matter. "This (fays the Author) is what Grorius calls fadus inaquale. Inæquale FOEDUS, hic intelligo quod ex " ipfa vi pactionis MANENTEM PRÆLATIONEM quandam alteri donat : Hoc est ubi quis tenetur alterius " imperium ac majestatem conservare, ut POTENTIONI PLUS HONORIS, inferiori plus auxilii deferatur. De " jur. B. & P. L i. c. iii. Sect. 21 [3]." Hence, in the opinion of this great Lawyer, alliance and dependence are very confistent things.

In ancient Rome, fays his Lordship, there was no Council, but the Senate, to DEFINE DOCTRINES, nor to REGULATE DISCIPLINE. Now in antient Rome it so happened, there were no Doctrines to define [4]. And as to Discipline, this was regulated not by the Senate, but by the Colleges of the Priests. When the Senate imagined the necessities of State required the observance of religious Rites, they sent to the Priests for their directions concerning the choice and regulation of them. The Senate were the Mafters whether they would have any celebrated; but if of that they had determined, they were tied down to the rules and [3] Alliance, p. 88.

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^[4] See Div. Leg. B. ii. Sect. 5.

directions of the facred Books, as the fenfe of them was reprefented and interpreted by the Priests [5].

On the whole, his Lordship affures us, that Con-STANTINE established the Church very ill; and fo fays the Author of the Alliance. Nay, which is more, he proves he did fo, and explains the causes of his mistakes.

His Lordship's account of Constantine's Establishment, and the Author's account of that by an Alliance, fland thue, apily so pactional a strong to play

[5] When the Romans entered on a war with Philip of Macedon, Senatus decrevit (they are the words of Livy) uti Confules majoribus hostiis rem divinam facerent quibus Diis ipsis videretur, oum precatione ea: Quam rem, &c. He then tells us that the Confuls made their report to the Senate; and there we find the part their Priests had in this matter. - Quum pronunciassent Consules; rem divinam RITE perfectam esse, et precationem admilife Deos Aruspices Respondere, lataque exta effe et prolationem finium, victoriamque et triumphum portendi - L. xxxi co q. But the State further ordered that the Conful, to make the Gods propitious, should according to old custom make 4 Vow and on this occasion we have a more explicite account of the Share the old Pagan Church had in this matter, by which we find it was not the Senate, but the College of Priests which regulated Discipline, or, if his Lordship will have it so, defined Doctrine. Civitas religiofa (fays the Historian) ne quid prætermitteretur, quod aliquando factum effet; ludos Jovi, donumque vovere Consulem justit moram voto publico Licinius pontifex maximus attulit, qui negavit ex incerta pecunia vovere debere. Si ea pecunia non posset in bellum usui esse; reponi statim debere, nec cum alia pecunia misceri. Quod nisi factum effet, Votum RITE Solvi non posse. Quanquam et res, et auctor movebat; tamen ad Collegium pontificum referre Conful juffus, fi poffet recle votum incertæ pecuniæ suscipi. Posse rectiusque etiam effe. Pontifices desreverunt. Vovit in eadem verba Consul, præeunte maximo Pontifice. - L. xxxi. c. 9.

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not bis Allies. The ALLIANCE makes the Church the Ally, and not the Instrument, of the Civil Magistrate.

2. Constantine placed men at the head of the civil Administration, because they were at the head of the religious. The Alliance places men at the head of the religious, because they were at the head of the civil administration.

3. CONSTANTINE did not take to bimself the title of supreme head of the Church under God and Christ. The Alliance makes the supreme Magistrate head of the Church under God and Christ.

4. Constantine gave riches and coercive power to the Church without assuming this supremacy or headship. The Alliance, when it gave riches and coercive power to the Church, conferred the Supremacy on the civil Magistrate.

His Lordship's conclusion from this long story of Constantine is this, that "He and his Successors "raised that spiritual tyranny, which was established and grown into sull strength before Charles the "Great [6]." And what could we expect less when every term in the Alliance was violated or neglected? This was just as natural as that civil Tyranny should grow to a head, when the terms of the original contrast between prince and people, had not been adverted to or observed? In a word, the mischiefs, which, his Lordship tells us, followed from Constantine's establishment are the best recommendation of the theory of the Alliance; a theory formed, as it were, and

fitted to avoid and guard against them: It has in fact done so, and rendered our present Constitution of Church and State the most happy and prosperous of any upon the face of the Earth.

At last, as if on fet purpose to recommend the Theory of the Alliance, his Lordship concludes his Section concerning Constanting in these words: "Thus it feems to me that the great and fundamen-" tal error, from whence fo many others proceeded, "and which Constantine committed in THE " ESTABLISHMENT OF CHRISTIANITY, Was this, " be admitted a Clergy into an establishment, on the samefoot, on which this order had flood, white Christianity " was the Religion, and these men were the beads, the " directors, the governors, and magistrates of a Sect, by no " authority, but that of the Sea itfelf. He admitted "them vested with this authority, which might be " necessary as long as Christians made a Sect apart,.. " out of the protection of the laws; and which be-" came unnecessary and dangerous, when Christia-"mity had a legal establishment. - The conduct of "Conffantine on this occasion must needs appear ex-" tremely abfurd to every one who confiders the con-" fequences it had [7]." Can there be greater encomium on the principles of the Alliance? The fundamental error of CONSTANTINE's establishment was, the fuffering the Church to RETAIN IT'S IN-DEPENDENCY. The fundamental condition of effabliffment on the theory of Alliance is, that the Church GIVES UP IT'S INDEPENDENCY.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 438-9.

After this, would you expect to hear him return again to his abuse of the Addiance? The sole intention and sole effect of it [the theologic system of the schools] "was to establish an ecclesiastical "Empire, under that spiritual Monarch the Pope, "and his spiritual Ministers the Clergy. This was "The effect of that supposed Alliance "Between the Church and State [8]."

Before, It was Constantine and his Successors, who raised that spiritual Tyranny [9]: And it was done, he says, by means of his Establishment; which suffered the Church to retain its independency, and admitted it on the same foot on which it had stood while it was a Sect [10]. But now, it is the supposed Alliance between Church and State which raised this spiritual Tyranny; an Alliance which will not suffer the Church to retain in it's dependency; or admit it on the same foot on which it stood while it was a Sect.

We have feen such amazing instances of his Lord-ship's contradictions, as not to be surprized at the boldest of them. Sometimes, when tapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his contradictions, what the man in the Play did by his ingratitude, he strives to cover the monstease bulk of them, by a proportionable size of words; sometimes again, to shew his utter contempt of the Public, he chuses to follow the advice there given; to let them go naked, that men may see them the better. But, when he masks his double sace, the falsification of the Theory of the Alliance always affords him the best play. He constantly takes it for grant-

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^[8] Vol. iv. p. 621--2. [9] Vol. iv. p. 446. [10] Vol. iv. p. 438.

od or avouches it for a fact, throughout his whole argument against the Book, that the Author contends for and maintains the independency of the Church on the State, under an establishment. This brings Constants Ting's Establishment, and the Establishment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the same thing; so that the mischiefs ascribed to one, may be safely transferred to the other.

And here, Sir, in conclusion, the odd fortune of this book of the Alliance is worth Your notice. It had been writ against by many nameless scribblers, bestore his Lordship: And two very capital crimes had been objected to it: The one was, That it makes the Church a Creature of the civil Magistrate; the other, That it makes the civil Magistrate a Creature of the Church. Some insisted on the first of these charges, some on the second. But to prevent it's escaping, one surious fellow, in a thing called a Comment on the Alliance, roundly insisted upon both. So that his Lordship, whose care is for the State, and the Dissenting Answerers who are as anxious for the Church, will come in but for halves in the full merit of this illustrious Commentator.

I have now, Sir, given you, as I promised, a view of his Lordship's political talents. The Author whom I have defended against him, is no further my concern than as he afforded me the occasion. Nor is there any reason he should grow vain of the superior distinction of being picked out to be immolated, as it were, to the first Philosophy. For let me tell him, that as I desended him-for want of

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a better, so his Lordship abused him because he could not find a worse. He had personally injured and asserted his Lordship. And to these insolencies, the sollowing words allude where his Lordship takes leave of his Friend, in the last volume of his never-dying Works, "You have, I know, at your elbow a very foul-mouthed and very trissing Critic, who will endeavour to impose upon you on this occasion, as he did on a former. He will tell you, again, that I contradict myself, &c. But if the dogmatic pedant should make this objection, be pleased to give him this answer, &c. [11]."

This, the Curious will readily perceive smells of the Anecdote. As the secret has been communicated to me by a good hand, I shall not scruple to lay it before You. It may serve at least to entertain you, in the quality of Farce to this serious Piece.

Mr. Pope had permitted Lord Boefference to be considered by the public, as his Philosopher and Guide: and in their conversations concerning the impious complaints against Providence on account of the unequal distribution of things natural and moral in the present System, they agreed that such objections might be well evaded on the Platonic principle of The Best. This encouraged the Poet to philosophise: and the fruits of his speculations we have in the celebrated Essay on Man. In which, if you will take his Lordship's word, or indeed, attend to his argument, you will find that Pope was so far from putting his prose into verse, (as has been invidiously suggested) that he has put

[11] Vol. v. page the last.

Rope's verse into profe. They agreed, as we obferved, in the principle of the Best. And Mr. Pope. thought they had agreed in the question, to which this principle was to be applied. But time has fince shewn that they differed very widely. The Esfay on Man is a real vindication of Providence, against Libertines and Atheifts .- The Esfays on the first Philosophy are a pretended vindication of Providence against an imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheifts. The Poet directs his argument against Atheifts and Libertines in Support of RELIGION; -The Philosopher, against Divines, in support of NATURALISM But the' his Lordship thought fit to keep this a fecret from his Friend, as well as from the Public; yet he took so friendly a share in the prodigious success of the Essay on Man, that he could not forbear making the Poet, then alive and at his devotion, the frequent topic of his ridicule amongst their common Acquaintance, as a man who understood nothing of his own principles, nor faw towhat they naturally tended. For the truth of this instance of his Lordship's virtuous emulation, I appeal to a right honourable Gentleman now living.

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While things were in this State, Mr. de Croufaz wrote some malignant and absurd remarks on the Essay on Man; accusing it of Spinozism, Naturalism, and all the heretical -isms in the Bigot's Dictionary. These Remarks by great chance fell into the hands of the author of the Divine Legation. And mere indignanation at an ill-natured caviller put him upon writing a defence of the sirst episte. Which, being well received by the Public, he was induced to defend the

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rest on the same principles of natural and revealed Religion, against this blundering Swiss Philosopher; frequently indeed missed by a very faithless transla-

tion of the Esay into french verse.

Mr. Pope, who was naturally on the fide of Religion, embraced the fense given to the Essay by his new Commentator, with the utmost pleasure and fatisfaction; as appears by the Letters he wrote on that occasion. You will hardly suppose, his Lordship took the same delight in them. He saw his Pupilreasoned out of his hands; He saw (what was worse) the Effay republished with a Defence, which put the Poem on the fide of Religion, and the Poet out of the necessity of supporting himself on his Lordship's System, when he should condescend to impart it to him : And, (what was worst of all) he saw a great number of lines appear, which out of complaifance had been struck out of theMS. and which, at the Commentator's request, being now restored to their places, no longer left the religious fentiments of the Poet, equivocal.

It was his chagrine at these changes which occafioned his Lordship, (when he NEW MODELED the introductory Letter to his Essays, addressed to Mr., Pope) to
end it in this manner, "I cannot conclude my dis"course on this occasion better than by putting you in
"mind of a passage you quoted to me once with great
"applause from a sermon of Forster, and to this
"effect," Where MYSTERY begins; RELIGION ends."
"The Apophthegm pleased me much, and I was glad
"to hear such a truth from any pulpit, since it shews
"an inclination at least, to purify Christianity from
"the leaven of artificial Theology; which consists prin"cipally

" cipally in making things that are very plain, myf-"terious; and in pretending to make things that are "impenetrably mysterious, very plain. If you con-" linue fill of the same mind, I shall have no excuse to " make to you, for what I have written, and shall write. " Our opinions coincide. If you have changed your mind, "think again and examine further. You will find it is "the modest, not the PRESUMPTUOUS, Enquirer " who makes a real and fafe progress in the discovery " of divine truths. One follows Nature and Nature's "God; that is, he follows God in his Works, and "in his Word; nor prefumes to go further, by me-" taphyfical and theological commentaries of his own in-" vention, than the two texts, if I may use this ex-" pression, carry him very evidently. - They who " have done otherwise, have been either ENTHUSI-"ASTS OR ENAVES [12]." But alas; this kind admonition came too late. Mr. Pope had now got a better Guide than either FORSTER or his LORDSHIP. I mean, Mr. Locks; who, in the conclusion of his first Letter to Bishop Stillingsleet, had taught the Poet to answer thus, " I know not any thing more difin-"genuous, than not publicly to own a conviction " one has received, concerning any thing erroneous " in what one has printed; nor can there, I think, " be a greater offence against Mankind than to pro-"pagate a fallhood, whereof one is convinced; " especially in a matter wherein Men are highly con-"cerned not to be misled. The HOLY SCRIPTURE " is to me, and always will be, the constant Guide y pulpic taxed it mews

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of my affent: and I shall always hearken to it, as containing infallible truth, relating to things of the highest concernment. And I wish I can't fay there were no mysteries in it. I acknowledge there are, to me, and I sear always will be: But where I want the evidence of things, there yet is ground enough for me to believe, because God has said it: and I shall presently condemn and quit any opinion of mine, as soon as I am shown that it is contrary to any Revelation in the holy Scripture [13].

But the Author of the Divine Legation foon after committed a much greater offence against his Lordship's philosophic Dignity. And to this, the following words, quoted above, more particularly allude: You have, I know, at your elbow, a very faul mouthed and a very trissing Critic, who will endeavour to impose upon you on this occasion, as he did on a FORMER.

About the year 1742, a little before Lord Boling-broke's return to England, this Critic was with Mr. Pope at T. who shewed him a printed book of Letters on the Study and use of History, and desired his opinion of it. It was the first volume of the work since published under that name. Mr. W. on turning over the book, told him his thoughts of it with great ingenuity. What he said to Mr. Pope of the main subject is not material: but of the Digression concerning the Authenticity of the Old Testament, he told his Friend very frankly, that the Author's arguments, poor as they were, were all borrowed from other

[13] Locke's Works, Vol. i. p. 405, 2010 10 10

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Writers; and had been often confuted to the full fatisfaction of the learned world: that, the Author of these Letters, whoever he was, had mistaken some of those reasonings; had misrepresented others; and had added such mistakes of his own, as must discredit him with the learned, and dishonour him with all honest men: that therefore, as he understood the Author was his Friend, he could not do him better fervice then advise him to strike out this Digression, a digression that had nothing to do with his subject, and would fet half his Readers against the work, which, without this occasion of scandal, would have much ado to make head against the other half, whenever it should appear. Mr. Pope said, his friend (whose name he kept secret,) was the most candid of all Writers; and that he the Author of the D. L. could not do him a greater pleasure than to tell him his thoughts with all freedom on this occasion. He urged this fo warmly, that his friend complied, and, as they were then alone, scribled over half a dozen sheets of paper before he rose from the table, where they were then fitting. Mr. Pope read what was written: and, as he had a wonderful partiality for those he loved, approved of them; and to convince his friend (the Scribler as my Lord rightly calls him). that he did so, he took up the printed Volume and croffed out the whole Digression. The remarks were written, as you may well suppose, with all the civility, Mr. W. was likely to use to a friend Mr. Pope appeared fo much to reverence: but the word prevarication, or fomething like it, chanced, it foems, to escape his pen, The papers were sent to Paris; and received

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received with unparalleled indignation. Little broke out; but fomething did; and Mr. Pope found he had not paid his court by this officious piece of fervice. However, with regard to the Writer of the papers, all was carried, when his Lordship came over, with fingular complaifance; fuch as men use when their delign is to draw on those whose homage they propose to gain. In the mean time, his Lordship was meditating and compiling an angry, and elaborate Answer to this private, hasty, and impertinent, tho' well meant, Scribble: and it was as much as They could do, who had most influence over him, to prevail with him at length to burn it. For the truth of all this, I might appeal to a noble Person, one of the greatest Characters of this, or indeed of any age; who being much courted by his Lordship, (for superior virtue will force homage from the most unlike) was for some time able, and at all times most desirous, of restraining the extravagance of that first Philosophy, which he detested and defpised.

The event has fince shewn, that it had been happy for his Lordship's reputation, had the advice to strike out the Digression, been approved. For it is this which first sunk him in the popular opinion; and made men overlook the merit of the very best of all his Compositions.

Mr. Pope, however, was still stattered and carefled. And the vengeance treasured up against him for the impiety of erasing those sacred pages, did not break out till the Poet's death, then indeed it came forth with redoubled vehemence, and on the most

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ridiculous pretence. Pope had, as his Lordfhip pretended, unknown to him, printed an Edition of the Patriot Prince, or Patriot King, (for it had two titles, as his Lordship's various occasions required) a very innocent thing, which might have been proclaimed by the common Cryer, without giving the least umbrage or offence. To fay the truth, it was a mere School. declamation, which, in great pomp of words, informs us of this Secret, That if a Prince could but once be brought to love his Country, he would always all for the good of it. As extraordinary as this discovery appears, there was much odd practice employed to give a colour of necessity for the publishing it. However, published it was, and the memory of Pope traduced in fo cruel, fo feandalous a manner, that the Reader is suffered to conclude, even Curt himself could not have acted a more infamous or rafcally part: For it must be owned, his Lordship has dealt one equal measure to his Country, his Relicion, and his FRIEND. And for what was all this outrage? To speak the worst of the offence, For one of those private offices of indiscreet good will, which generous men are always ready to forgive, even when they fee themselves most incommoded by it.

The Public stood amazed. And those who had any regard for the Poet's Memory, waited with impatience to see, Which of his old Friends would rescue it from his Lordship's talons. Contempt I suppose, of so cruel a treatment, kept them all silent. However, the same contempt at length provoked an Anonymous Writer to publish a Letter to the Editor of the Patriot King; for his Lordship had divided him-

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felf into the two personages of Editor and Author. This Letter, written with all the respect due to his Rank and Character, he thought fit to ascribe to the Author of the Divine Legation; so that you need not wonder if it exposed the suspected writer to all his Lordship's rage, and to all the ribaldry of his Sycophants; of which, some, that was said to pass through this great Man's hands, was in language bad enough to disgrace even Gaols and Garrets.

This, SIR, is the Anecdote I promised you. And now I shall release you from so tedious a Subject. I have compleated my View of his Lordship's Philosophy; which I chose to address to You in compliance with his Challenge; who appeals, for the truth of all he advances, from Artificial Theology and School-Learning, to the breast of the PLAIN HONEST MAN,

- " Slave to no Sect, who takes no private road,
- " But looks through nature up to nature's God;

Him whose heart is filled with the love of God and Man. To this Tribunal he appeals: and to this I have now brought him. What he will gain by it, You, whom he has made his judge, must now tell us. I greatly suspect, that of all his Principles one only is likely to escape your censure; and with this, as I would part with him upon good terms, I shall conclude: it breaks out unexpectedly from amidst the corruption of party politics; and in all likelihood was ingendered by them. — Some men there are, the pests of society I think them, who pretend a great regard to religion in general, but who take every opportunity of declaiming

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PUBLICELY AGAINST THAT SYSTEM OF RELI-GION, OR AT LEAST AGAINST THAT CHURCH-ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RECEIVED IN BRI-TAIN [14].

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[19] Differentien on Parties, p. 148. 8vc. Edit.

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